What’s the use of a transatlantic free trade area? Jean Monnet Policy Brief 05/2014

For many of those who remember the hostile EU-US trade relations of the 1980’s and the various trade disputes that have emerged between these two trade partners since then, the opening of negotiations on a joint free trade area would be good news. Strengthened trade cooperation between the partners holds the promise of expanding their mutual exchange of goods and services, not the least by solving obstacles to integration on less transparent issues such as the extent to which product characteristics should be defined by their regional characteristics (e.g. can Budweiser be produced outside the Budweis region in the Czech Republic?).

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

EU Democratic Legitimacy and National Parliaments. CEPS Essay No. 7, 25 November 2013

The role of national parliaments in the EU has been at the centre of a long debate. Since the Maastricht treaty, new powers to the EU level have been accompanied not only by an increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process, but also by a number of declarations and protocols to ensure that national parliaments received the information and documents required to effectively monitor their governments in EU affairs. The Lisbon Treaty extended the guarantees and also included new modes of direct participation. The proper use of the mechanisms in place, namely, the subsidiarity checks, the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament, has become of vital importance in view of recent developments in EU economic policy and beyond. The choice for increasing inter-governmentalism in decision-making and the centralisation of the implementing and supervisory powers in the Commission and the Central Bank have raised questions about political accountability and the appropriate involvement of parliaments. However, the extent to which national parliaments should be more involved is also rather controversial. This essay examines the difficulty of defining and addressing the question of the democratic legitimacy in the EU. It examines the role of the national parliaments in the treaties and explores ways in which they can contribute to improving that legitimacy.

Does All Fit One Size? An evaluation of the ECB policy response to changing economic conditions in the Euro area member states. ACES Cases No. 2008.1

This paper empirically investigates the extent to which the European Central Bank has responded to evolving economic conditions in its member states as opposed to the euro area as a whole. Based on a forward-looking Taylor rule-type policy reaction function, we conduct counterfactual exercises that compare the monetary policy behavior of the ECB with two alternative hypothetical scenarios: (1) were the euro member states to make individual policy decisions, and (2) were the ECB to respond to the economic conditions of individual members. The results reflect the extent of heterogeneity among the national economies in the monetary union and indicate that the ECB's monetary policy rates have been particularly close to the "counterfactual" interest rates of its largest euro members, as well as of countries with similar economic conditions, which includes Germany, Austria, Belgium and France.

Citizenship Deprivation: A Normative Analysis. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 82, 19 March 2015

Most critical analyses assess citizenship-deprivation policies against international human rights and domestic rule of law standards, such as prevention of statelessness, non-arbitrariness with regard to justifications and judicial remedies, or non-discrimination between different categories of citizens. This report considers instead from a political theory perspective how deprivation policies reflect specific conceptions of political community. We distinguish four normative conceptions of the grounds of membership in a political community that apply to decisions on acquisition and loss of citizenship status: i) a ‘State discretion’ view, according to which governments should be as free as possible in pursuing State interests when determining citizenship status; ii) an ‘individual choice’ view, according to which individuals should be as free as possible in choosing their citizenship status; iii) an ‘ascriptive community’ view, according to which both State and individual choices should be minimised through automatic determination of membership based on objective criteria such as the circumstances of birth; and iv) a ‘genuine link’ view, according to which the ties of individuals to particular States determine their claims to inclusion and against deprivation while providing at the same time objections against including individuals without genuine links. We argue that most citizenship laws combine these four normative views in different ways, but that from a democratic perspective the ‘genuine link’ view is normatively preferable to the others. The report subsequently examines five general grounds for citizenship withdrawal – threats to public security, non-compliance with citizenship duties, flawed acquisition, derivative loss and loss of genuine links – and considers how the four normative views apply to withdrawal provision motivated by these concerns. The final section of the report examines whether EU citizenship provides additional reasons for protection against Member States’ powers of citizenship deprivation. We suggest that, in addition to fundamental rights protection through EU law and protection of free movement rights, three further arguments could be invoked: toleration of dual citizenship in a political union, prevention of unequal conditions for loss among EU citizens, and the salience of genuine links to the EU itself rather than merely to one of its Member States.

Europe on the Road to the Third Stage of EMU: Recent Evidence. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.2, 1996

The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.

How European Integration Impacts on National Legislatures: The Europeanization of The German Bundestag. CES Germany and Europe Working Papers, No. 06.2, 2006

In looking at the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper brings together two different debates: the well-established debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union sees national Parliaments as guarantor of one branch of a "dual" legitimacy. The more recent debate on "Europeanization" addresses the impacts that European integration has had on its Member States. Analyzing the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper identifies and analyzes three dimensions: legislative Europeanization – the extent to which legislative decision making by the German Bundestag has been influenced by European stipulations over the last twenty years; institutional Europeanization – how the Bundestag as an institution reacted to this loss of function by establishing institutional and procedural provisions for influencing the government's Euro-politics; and strategic Europeanization – the ways in which individual MPs started more recently to develop euro-political strategies that go beyond controlling the national government. The paper shows that the Bundestag only hesitantly reacted to the increasing loss of functions through legislative Europeanization by establishing effective institutional and procedural provisions for controlling the government's Euro-political activities. What is more, the establishment of institutions does not guarantee their effective use. All in all, Euro- politics continues to remain the activity of few MPs. These few, however, have more recently started to europeanize their strategies. The empirical findings support the claim that the traditional concept of chains of legitimacy is inadequate, both in conceptual and in empirical terms. With regard to the democ- ratic legitimacy of EU governance, this indicates that, apart from major reform projects, especially with regard to everyday legislation, not too great a burden should be placed on national Parliaments.

The Dangers and Inanity of (Euro-) Nationalism: From Communitarianism to Cosmopolitanism. Egmont Paper No. 77, April 2015

INTRODUCTION In the current times of multifaceted crisis, nationalism looks, more than ever, like a positive and necessary feeling. It seems both natural and indispensable if we are to have viable political and social institutions that meet the needs and preferences of all citizens. The following paper contests this vision. Its criticism of nationalism is directed not only at its national forms, but also at any defence of collective identity based on the same model, such as the various forms of European nationalism. Furthermore, the same overriding criticism can be made of different kinds of nationalism, regardless of their more or less open and progressive political content. In order to ground our argument theoretically and practically, we will try to show that nationalism is always potentially harmful to individual rights, and unnecessary for the maintenance of a just social and political system. We will thus oppose any acritical defence of the intrinsic value of a specific community and the belief in its artificial homogeneity. The historical construction of a supposedly homogeneous community, and the insistence on its values, which are perceived as superior and binding, facilitate the absorption of the individual into the collective. As we will explain further in more details, this holistic approach is typical of communitarian approaches. In that respect, it does not really matter whether they appeal to passion or to reason, to some irrational binding features of the community or to more rational political aspects of a common identity. The main problem in nationalism is not the emotion it can trigger, it is not even its reliance on particular values. What makes nationalism problematic is, firstly, that it tends to overlook the intrinsically divisive and contradictory nature of individual and collective interests in unjust societies; secondly, that it attributes an intrinsic superiority to a particular community over others; and thirdly, that it sees politics as a means to promote the interests, values or identity of that community. As an alternative, we will very briefly advocate a cosmopolitan approach that grounds political legitimacy in a demanding approach to individual freedom, rather than in a shared collective identity. However, even if only briefly, we will also carefully distinguish our own vision of cosmopolitanism from those commonly put forward. Frequently, cosmopolitan perspectives entangle their identity frameworks with concrete political projects, without clearly explaining how the latter derive from the former. Our approach to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is, first and foremost, a critical vision of all communitarian postulates according to which politics should be based on some form of collective identity. Thus, we insist on the conceptual distinction between a general stance on identity issues and the more practical political ideology one stands for. In a subsequent step, we link this cosmopolitan framework with a progressive approach to individual rights. Because of our demanding approach to individual freedom, our cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand with a revival of identity-free sovereignty. It is therefore distinct from the severe condemnation of sovereignty often found in most mainstream cosmopolitan positions. Finally, instead of the frequent confusion found in public discourses and in the literature between ideals and reality, our position acknowledges the deep gulf separating these two dimensions. It therefore sketches out very general strategic principles to bring normative ideals closer to political reality.

Banking Union as a Shock Absorber: Lessons for the eurozone from the US. CEPS Paperback, December 2015

This book illustrates how the structure of the US banking market and the existence of federal institutions allowed regional financial shocks to be absorbed at the federal level in the US, thus avoiding local financial crisis. The authors argue that the experience of the US shows the importance of a ‘banking union’ to avoid severe regional (national) financial dislocation in the wake of regional boom and bust cycles. They also discuss the extent to which the institutions of the partial banking union, now in the process of being created for the euro area, should be able to increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles, thereby stabilising the single currency.