The EU, China and Southeast Asia: Divergent Views of Dealing with Human Security. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 8, May 2014

Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

From Lockerbie to Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab (Assessing the Destruction of Civilian Aircrafts by Terrorism). Transatlantic Security Paper N.1–April 2010

Data published by the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) in its "Annual report on the criminal acts against civil aviation" indicates that in the year 1960, there have been fifteen attacks on board planes leaving 286 dead; 44 in the year 1970 with 650 dead (mostly hijackings); and 26 in the 1980s leaving 1207 dead. In the 1970s, the record is established by the year 1976 (168 dead).The three years - 1985 (390), 1988 (287), and 1989 (278) - were more deadly than the 1960s all together. These casualties were largely provoked by IEDs. Since the end of 1980 - the deadliest decade, with the exception of September 11, 2001 -, it is however a rare practice. The reasons for the decline in big and politically motivated hijackings were varied. One could have been the improvement of the effectiveness of the safety response by States, airports and companies. The improvised explosive device (I.E.D.) posed a serious threat to the civil aviation industry in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the jihadi networks have regularly tried to target aircrafts using various types of IEDs.

The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.