Free movement of workers in the EU. Legal aspects of the transitional arrangements. ZEI Discussion Paper No. 217, 2013

From the Introduction. There are four fundamental freedoms which lay the foundation of the European Union. Those are the free movement of goods, free movement of capital, free movement of services and free movement of persons. They guarantee the existence and effective functioning of an area without internal borders within which goods, capital, services and people move freely. Despite the pivotal importance of these freedoms, there are cases where some freedoms can be partially or fully restricted within the territory of some member states or the Union as a whole. This thesis is going to analyze the restrictions of one of these freedoms: the free movement of persons, resulting from the arrangements applying to new member states. The focus will be the free movement of workers from new to old member states for a transitional period following the date of accession.

Falling short of expectations? Stress-testing the European banking system. CEPS Policy Brief No. 315, 15 January 2014

Before the ECB takes over responsibility for overseeing Europe’s largest banks, as foreseen in the establishment of a eurozone banking union, it plans to conduct an Asset Quality Review (AQR) throughout the coming year, which will identify the capital shortfalls of these banks. This study finds that a comprehensive and decisive AQR will most likely reveal a substantial lack of capital in many peripheral and core European banks. The authors provide estimates of the capital shortfalls of banks that will be stress-tested under the AQR using publicly available data and a series of shortfall measures. Their analysis identifies which banks will most likely need capital, where a public back stop is likely to be needed and, since many countries are already highly leveraged, where an EU-wide backstop might be necessary.

Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farms in selected EU countries and the impact of policy reforms. Factor Markets Working Document No. 42, May 2013

This deliverable provides a comparative analysis, among selected EU member states, of the investment demand of a sample of specialised field crop farms for farm buildings, machinery and equipment as determined by different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support. It allows for the existence of uncertainty in the price of output farmers receive and for both long- and short-run determinants of investment levels, as well as for the presence of irregularities in the cost adjustment function due to the existence of threshold-type behaviours. The empirical estimation reveals that three investment regimes are consistently identified in Germany and Hungary, across asset and support types, and in France for machinery and equipment. More traditional disinvestment-investment type behaviours characterise investment in farm building in France and the UK, across support types, and Italy for both asset classes under coupled payments. The long-run dynamic adjustment of capital stocks is consistently and significantly estimated to be towards a – mostly non-stationary – lower level of capitalisation of the farm analysed. By contrast, the expected largely positive short-run effects of an increase in output prices are often not significant. The effect of CAP support on both types of investment is positive, although seldom significant, while the proxy for uncertainty employed fails to be significant yet, in most cases, has the expected effect of reducing the investment levels.

Falling Labor Share and Rising Unemployment: Long-Run Consequences of Institutional Shocks? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.2, 1999

The literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues while the impact of capital foonation is largely neglected Job-creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock. In contrast, this paper explicitly deals with the long-run consequences of institutional shocks on capital foonation and employment. It is shown that the usual trade off between employment and wages disappears in the long run. In line with an appropriation model, the estimated values for the long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are substantially greater than one.

Addressing the immediate needs of the Greek banks. CEPS Commentary, 31 July 2015

Based on a detailed calculation of the recapitalisation requirements of the Greek banks, we find that the sector needs an infusion of capital, but that the level largely depends on the stringency of the capital requirements applied. An expedient quick fix to comply with the minimum capital requirements could be achieved by a bail-in of existing creditors under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of around €5 billion, leaving only €6 billion needed for re-capitalisation. If the ‘Cypriot’ standard is applied, however, the required re-capitalisation would be €15 billion. A ‘generous’ approach, which takes into account the phasing in of the new more-stringent capital requirements until 2018, would imply a re-capitalisation of €29 billion (or more bailing-in of creditors). The re-capitalisation should be undertaken preferably by the EIB, the EBRD or the new Greek investment fund, rather than via loans from the ESM to the Greek government.

Squaring the cycle: capital flows, financial cycles, and macro-prudential policy in the euro area. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/14, November 2015

• Before the financial and economic crisis, monetary policy unification and interest rate convergence resulted in the divergence of euroarea countries’ financial cycles. This divergence is deeply rooted in the financial integration spurred by currency union and strongly correlated with intra-euro area capital flows. Macro-prudential policy will need to deal with potentially divergent financial cycles, while catering for potential cross-border spillovers from domestic policies, which domestic authorities have little incentive to internalise. • The current framework is unfit to deal effectively with these challenges. The European Central Bank should be responsible for consistent and coherent application of macro-prudential policy, with appropriate divergences catering for national differences in financial conditions. The close link between domestic financial cycles and intra-euro area capital flows raises the question of whether macro-prudential policy in the euro area can be compatible with free flows of capital. Financial cycle divergence had its counterpart in the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, so effective implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure would support and strengthen macro-prudential policy.

Capital Markets Union: A Work in Progress: Quick and high impact measures for the Capital Markets Union. European Policy Brief No. 37, September 2015

Capital Markets Union has three objectives. The first objective is to improve access to finance for all businesses but especially SMEs; the second is to increase the share of capital markets in the funding mix of the real economy; and the third is to make capital markets more effective and integrate them more closely across borders. This paper examines the best impact measures for the Capital Markets Union to proceed successfully.

Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU financial system. CEPS Special Report No. 136/April 2016

This paper discusses the application of the new European rules for burden-sharing and bail-in in the banking sector, in view of their ability to accommodate broader policy goals of aggregate financial stability. It finds that the Treaty principles and the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework for combating moral hazard and removing incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking by bankers. However, the application of the new rules may have become excessively attentive to the case-by-case evaluation of individual institutions, while perhaps losing sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system. Indeed, in this first phase of the banking union, while large segments of the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring and recapitalisation, the market may not be able to provide all the needed resources in the current environment of depressed profitability and low growth. Thus, a systemic market failure may be making the problem impossible to fix without resorting to temporary public support. But the risk of large write-offs of capital instruments due to burden-sharing and bail-in may represent an insurmountable obstacle to such public support as it may set in motion an investors’ flight. The paper concludes by showing that existing rules do contain the flexibility required to accommodate aggregate policy requirements in the general interest, and outlines a public support scheme for the precautionary recapitalisation of solvent banks that would be compliant with EU law.