One year after the Youth Guarantee: Policy fatigue or signs of action? EPC Policy Brief, 27 May 2015

In April 2013, the EU Council called on EU member states to establish Youth Guarantee (YG) schemes, ensuring that “all young people under the age of 25 years receive a good-quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education”. Implementation was meant to start more than a year ago, but political interest seems to have waned a bit. Is a ‘policy fatigue’ contaminating youth employment policies across the EU? Have some timid signs of economic recovery led to youth unemployment being less urgent or are we witnessing the usual policy developments whereby grand EU statements are worn down by political realities and resistance on the ground? In this Policy Brief, Claire Dhéret and Martina Morosi assess the implementation of the Youth Guarantee and provide suggestions on how to renew a sense of enthusiasm for such an ambitious tool across Europe.

Combating Youth Unemployment: The latest European fad? CEPS Commentary, 14 June 2013

When examining youth unemployment in the broader context of its contribution to total unemployment in Europe, Daniel Gros finds in this new Commentary that the problem reveals a completely different picture from the one usually presented. Extreme figures on youth unemployment in the periphery hide the fact that the number of actually unemployed is rather small given that most youth in countries like Spain or Greece are not even looking for a job.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.

La disoccupazione giovanile in tempo di crisi: un monito all’Europa (continentale) per rifondare il diritto del lavoro? = Youth Unemployment in Recessionary Times: a Caveat to (Continental) Europe to Reconstruct its Labour Law. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 91/2012

The current debate taking place in continental Europe on the need to reform labour law to reduce the duality between labour market insiders and outsiders, thus giving new employment opportunities to young people seems to be, at its best, a consequence of the crisis, or at its worst, an excuse. The considerable emphasis placed on the power of legislation to reduce youth unemployment prevents real labour market problems from being clearly identified, thus reducing the scope to adopt more effective measures. Action is certainly required to help young people during the current crisis, yet interventions should not be exclusively directed towards increased flexibility and deregulation. This paper questions the “thaumaturgic power” wrongly attributed to legislative interventions and put forward a more holistic approach to solve the problem of youth employment, by focusing on the education systems, school-to-work transition and industrial relations. As a comparative analysis demonstrates, in order to effectively tackle the issue of youth employment, it is not enough to reform labour law. High quality education systems, apprenticeship schemes, efficient placement and employment services, cooperative industrial relations and flexible wage determination mechanisms are the key to success when it comes to youth employment, not only in times of recession.

Ideas and Policy: The European Union considers social policy futures. ACES Cases No. 2010.2

The European Union’s social policy perspectives have changed quite dramatically over the last several decades. Now EU’s social policy discourse often promises to “invest in people,” sometimes “to invest in children,” and always to pay particular attention to youth. This paper argues that the tools of historical institutionalism can lead to understanding the ideational roots of this social investment perspective so distant from the “European social model.” Coming out of social movements, and with collective identities shaped both by those movement roots and national experiences, activists have effectively focused their practices on altering the social representations of European social solidarity through their interest group interventions, their participation in policy forums, and their mobilization within civil society at the European and sub-European levels. They have been able to make common cause with several epistemic communities that themselves revamped their ideas in the face of new institutional constraints, in order to advance their interests in promoting particular directions for social policy. The paper documents that “ideas” are not a variable and discourse “sometimes important” but that the ideas carried by movements and in epistemic communities are integral to the very definition of their interests that they promote within and with institutions.

The growing intergenerational divide in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/17, November 2015

During the economic and financial crisis, the divide between young and old in the European Union increased in terms of economic well-being and allocation of resources by governments. As youth unemployment and youth poverty rates increased, government spending shifted away from education, families and children towards pensioners. To address the sustainability of pension systems, some countries implemented pension reforms. We analysed changes to benefit ratios, meaning the ratio of the income of pensioners to the income of the active working population, and found that reforms often favoured current over future pensioners, increasing the intergenerational divide. We recommend reforms in three areas to address the intergenerational divide: improving European macroeconomic management, restoring fairness in government spending so the young are not disadvantaged, and pension reforms that share the burden fairly between generations.

Energy across the Mediterranean: a call for realism. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/03 APRIL 2016

Political instability in the southern Mediterranean countries have highlighted the unsustainability of their economic models. Widespread economic discontent, and in particular very high youth unemployment, underpinned the Arab Spring uprisings. As the refugee crisis shows, this is also Europe’s problem and Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation needs to be reviewed. Energy is a key part of the cooperation framework.

The need to re-engage Europe's youth. EPC Commentary, 18 July 2016

In the immediate aftermath of the UK EU referendum, the breakdown of results sparked talks of a generational conflict, with young people – who voted overwhelmingly to remain - being blamed for having brought Brexit on themselves with their dismally low 36% turnout. New data compiled by the London School of Economics reduces the grounds for these accusations, suggesting a 64% turnout for 18-24 year olds. While this is certainly positive, the problem of youth disengagement lingers as the 64% turnout of those aged 18-24 has to be weighed against a 90% turnout of those aged 65+. This should not come as a surprise as Britain generally has the lowest youth turnout in Europe and the last referendum confirmed a trend that is not at all new, neither in Britain nor in other European countries.