Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/04, 27 March 2014

Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. We quantitatively assess for the European Union a number of relevant mechanisms suggested by Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, and compare them to the United States. For this purpose, we update a number of empirical analyses in the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries and (2) the magnitude of insurance mechanisms relative to similar mechanisms and compare results for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with those obtained for the US. To study the level of synchronization between EMU countries we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). To measure the effect of an employment shock on employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates we perform an analysis based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). We measure consumption smoothing through capital markets, fiscal transfers and savings, using the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2007). To analyze risk sharing through a common safety net for banks we perform a rudimentary simulation analysis. |

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.

Is Vietnam the Right Choice for Foreign Investment?: The Case of the European Union’s Slipping Opportunity. ACES Working Papers, 2012

This analysis is broken into three interdependent sections: First, an analysis of the restrictions placed on foreign direct investment in Vietnam captures the current freedoms and inhibitors of investment in Vietnam. Foreign direct investment is defined by the UN as an investment made to acquire a lasting interest in or effective control over an enterprise operating outside of the economy of the investor. Second, a cursory look at the macroeconomic risks, to which investment dollars are susceptible, will paint a realistic portrait of return of foreign investment. Finally, this paper will examine the current, and historical, trade relationship between Vietnam and the European Union, in order to convey that the opportunity for investment in Vietnam remains to be an opportunity for Europe’s developed economies.

The European Union’s Democratic Deficit and Options for EU Democracy in the 21st Century. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 22, August 2014

The European Union (EU) is widely acknowledged as a successful example of economic and political integration of nation states today – a slate of democratic institutions such as the European Parliament have also been developed and European citizens now possess extensive political and civil rights by virtue of the introduction of European citizenship. Nevertheless, the EU is said to suffer from a so called “democratic deficit” even as it seeks deeper and closer integration. Decades of institutional design and elite closed-door decisions has taken its toll on the inclusion and integration of European citizens in social and political life, with widening socio-economic inequalities and the resurgence of extreme-right parties during in the wake of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. This paper attempts to evaluate the democratic development of the EU through the use of a process-oriented approach, and concludes at the end with discussions on the various options that the EU and its citizens can take to reform democratic processes and institutions in Europe.

The European Union’s Regionalism Diplomacy in Africa: An English School Approach. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers [BRIGG] #2.2015

This paper proposes an innovative analytical approach to regionalism promotion by the European Union (EU) in Africa. The approach pursues the dual aim of accommodating African approaches to regionalism in EU foreign policy analysis and of expounding the centrality of diplomacy in negotiating a renewed EU-African Union relationship. The concept of ‘regionalism diplomacy’ brings the negotiated and contentious nature of EU regionalism promotion to the fore. The paper espouses contemporary English School thinking about ‘international society’ and argues that EU regionalism promotion cannot just remain the expansion of European regional international society onto Africa. Instead, EU regionalism diplomacy should acknowledge and incorporate the anticolonial pan-African roots of African regionalism. Overall, the EU should seek a more diplomacy-focused, negotiated Africa-Europe interregional relationship. The paper concludes with an outline of a pan-African approach to regionalism diplomacy and avenues for future research.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

Rethinking the security of the European Union’s gas supply. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2016/01 January 2016

Highlights: • The security of the European Union’s gas supplies is crucial to ensuring that supplies to households are not disrupted in freezing winters, that industry can flourish and that the EU cannot be blackmailed in vital foreign policy questions. • Gas supply security should be addressed at EU level because a joint solution would be cheaper, national approaches could undermine the internal energy market and have adverse effects on other countries, and the EU Treaty explicitly calls for energy solidarity. • The current focus on supply diversification and reduction of dependence on imported gas is expensive and does not constitute a systemic response. • Instead of doing everything to reduce gas supplies from key suppliers, gas supply security could more effectively be safeguarded by ensuring that unused alternatives are maintained so that they can be tapped into for an indefinite period in case of supply disruption from a key supplier.This Policy Contribution outlines a market approach that could safeguard gas supply security at very low cost.

The European Union’s growing innovation divide. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/08 April 2016

There is a significant divide between the European Union countries with the greatest capacity to innovate, and those with the least capacity to innovate. The difficult convergence process has been proceeding only very slowly and unevenly, and more recently seems to have come to a halt. A particular weak spot for the EU is corporate investment in research; in this area, the intra-EU divide is growing. As the business sector is responsible for the persistent R&D intensity gap between the EU and the United States and Asia, the persistent failure of lagging EU countries to catch up in this area provides much of the explanation for the EU’s weak performance compared to other economies. The evidence shows that the deployment of public budgets and the mix of policies employed by EU member states have tended to aggravate the intra-EU divide. The EU needs to better understand its growing internal innovation divide if it is to achieve its ambition of becoming a world innovation leader.

Countercyclical regulation in Solvency II: merits and flaws. CEPS Commentary, 25 June 2012

October 2011 saw the latest draft of Solvency II, the European Union’s code for regulation of the insurance industry. This commentary, a collective effort by a group of academics specializing in financial, banking and insurance institutions, argues that the latest proposals need to be drafted again, urgently.

Fiscal rules: timing is everything. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02, September 2012

The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances.

Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service. EPIN Working Paper No. 34, 20 November 2012

Based on interviews with diplomats from a representative cross-section of nine member states and members of the EEAS itself, the research findings of this EPIN Working Paper confirm long-standing traditions and member state perceptions of cooperation with European institutions. The paper also reveals new aspects of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union; in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, the Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action.

The European Union in the Arctic: A Pole Position? Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 4/2012, December 2012

With temperatures in the Arctic rising at twice the pace of anywhere else in the world, the European Union (EU) decided in 2008 to begin formulating an overall Arctic policy tackling maritime, environmental, energy and transport challenges. This attempt to draft a comprehensive policy on a topic that the EU had rarely touched upon unavoidably ran up against other existing strategies from Arctic and non-Arctic states. Against this background, this paper examines whether the EU’s current Arctic policy is conducive to framing a strategy that is both correctly targeted and flexible enough to represent Europe’s interests. It shows that the EU’s approach can serve as an effective foreign policy tool to establish the Union’s legitimacy as an Arctic player. However, the EU’s Arctic policy is still underestimating its potential to find common grounds with the strategic partners Russia and China. A properly targeted Arctic policy could help influence Russia over the EU’s interests in the Northern Sea Route and strengthen cooperation with China in an endeavour to gain recognition as relevant Arctic players.