Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.

Changes in the political elite, economy and society of Belarus: Appearances and reality. OSW Study 30/2008

In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.

Is the EU-Central Asia Strategy running out of steam? EUCAM Policy Brief No. 17, May 2011

The EU’s Central Asia Strategy approaches its fourth anniversary. In that time the EU has placed its relationship with Central Asia on a more structured footing. Although progress has been made in building dialogue and in furthering engagement, the strategy’s limitations are increasingly obvious. This brief argues that the driving force of the EU engagement should be based on a closer link between security and development. Engagement in this broad field should be underpinned by a values based approach that seeks to promote more explicitly reform on human rights, rule of law, governance and democracy. The momentous changes sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated that even the most apparently durable authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to sudden political shocks.

The Political Response of Firms to the 1992 Single Market Program: The Case of the German Automobile Industry Pamela Camer. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 1994

This paper examines the political responses of German automobile firms to the 1992 Single Market initiative. I argue that the decision by firms to try to influence EC policies depends on the perceived economic impact of the single market and ,the market alternative open to firms, while the decision on how to lobby depends on the size of the finn and the institutional and strategic environment in which a firm operates. I use this framework to explain why German automobile firms were slow in responding the single market initiative and why, when they did choose to lobby, the firms pursued different political strategies. The research suggests that we should not limit our studies to the political activity of trade associations and sectors, but should also examine the political strategies and activities of individual firms. It also suggests that, as integration efforts in Europe proceed, there is likely to be increased activity by individual firms and national associations because European trade associations may not be able to agree on specific EC policy proposals.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Citizenship in the discourse of Egyptian political parties. EUSpring Working Paper No. 6, June 2015 [also Citizenship Report no. 3]

The concept of citizenship is one of the most complicated in political and social sciences. Its long process of historical development makes dealing with it particularly complicated. Citizenship is by nature a multi-dimensional concept: there is a legal citizenship, referring first to the equal legal status of individuals, for instance the equality between men and women. Legal citizenship also refers to a political dimension, the right to start and/or join political parties, or political participation more broadly. Thirdly, it has a religious dimension relating to the right of all religious groups to equally and freely practice their religious customs and rituals. Finally, legal citizenship possesses a socio-economic dimension related to the non-marginalisation of different social categories, for instance women. All of these dimensions, far from being purely objects of legal texts and codifications, are emerging as an arena of political struggle within the Egyptian society. Citizenship as a concept has its roots in European history and, more specifically, the emergence of the nation state in Europe and the ensuing economic and social developments in these societies. These social developments and the rise of the nation state have worked in parallel, fostering the notion of an individual citizen bestowed with rights and obligations. This gradual interaction was very different from what happened in the context of the Arab world. The emerging of the nation state in Egypt was an outcome of modernisation efforts from the top-down; it coercively redesigned the social structure, by eliminating or weakening some social classes in favour of others. These efforts have had an impact on the state-society relation at least in two respects. First, on the overlapping relation between some social classes and the state, and second, on the ability of some social groups to self-organise, define and raise their demands. This study identifies how different political parties in Egypt envision the multi-dimensional concept of citizenship. We focus on the following elements: Nature of the state (identity, nature of the regime) Liberties and rights (election laws, political party laws, etc.) Right to gather and organise (syndicates, associations, etc.) Freedom of expression and speech (right to protest, sit in, strike, etc.) Public and individual liberties (freedom of belief, personal issues, etc.) Rights of marginalised groups (women, minorities, etc.)

The Potential Evolution of the European Energy System to 2020 and 2050. CEPS Working Document No. 392, 26 March 2014

This paper assesses the impact of decarbonisation of the energy sector on employment in Europe. Setting the stage for such an assessment, the paper provides an analysis of possible pathways to decarbonise Europe’s energy system, taking into account EU greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets for 2020 and 2050. It pays particular attention to various low-carbon technologies that could be deployed in different regions of the EU. It concludes that efficiency and renewables play a major role in any decarbonisation scenario and that the power sector is the main enabler for the transition to a low-carbon economy in Europe, despite rising electricity demand. The extent of the decline in the share of fossil fuels will largely depend on the existence of carbon capture and storage (CCS), which remains a major source of uncertainty.

The beginning of a new political cycle: the results and consequences of a nomination summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 30 June 2014

Despite a broader agenda, the June 2014 European Council was dominated by the decision of EU leaders – taken by qualified majority – to propose to the European Parliament Jean-Claude Juncker as the next Commission President. In this post-summit analysis Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that recent developments could have four consequences: increasing politicisation at European level; opposition from the side of national governments to what they consider to be an unjustifiable shift of power; further complication, maybe even deterioration of the relationship between London and ‘Brussels; and ‘consolidation’ as the predominant political attitude in the beginning of a new political cycle. Aside from all this, the Summit adopted a Strategic Agenda for the years to come, agreed to new strategic guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, postponed the decision on a new energy and climate framework to October, concluded the fourth European Semester with the adoption of country-specific recommendations, and, last but not least, EU leaders finally signed the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrating that the Union and these countries are ready to deepen political and economic ties.

Adapting to climate change from a regional perspective: in search of a requisite policy and legal framework. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 8/2014

This paper aims to identify the Mediterranean States’ potential in adopting a regional strategy on climate change adaptation. The author proposes a Mediterranean Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change as the first step to a political/legal regional approach to climate change issues that would supplement the multilateral process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. According to the author such a strategy would enhance cooperation between the EU and other Mediterranean states in various ways. The experience of the EU in regulating climate change and its ever growing knowledge-base on its impacts could serve to guide the other Mediterranean states’ and help bridge their knowledge-base gap on the topic. On the other hand, the support and cooperation of the EU’s Mediterranean partners would provide an opportunity for the EU to address better the challenges the climate change threatens to bring in its southernmost regions. The strategy could eventually even pave the way for the very first regional treaty on climate change that could be negotiated under the auspices of the Regional Seas Programme and the Union for the Mediterranean.

Belarus 2006. OSW Report, January 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006. Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

EU development ministers discuss approach to Central Asia. EUCAM Commentary No. 16, July 2011

On 14 July European development ministers met in Sopot, Poland. Among a host of development related matters Central Asia was on the agenda and European Union Special Representative Pierre Morel and Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs were invited to give political and development assistance oriented background to the European ministers. The Polish Presidency wants to devote special attention to EU development assistance to this often over-looked region, which the EU has traditionally viewed predominantly through a foreign policy lens. Development strategies to Central Asia need to be discussed in the context of the five year old political strategy, set to be reviewed this coming autumn.

Kyrgyzstan: Balancing on the Verge of Stability. EUCAM Policy Brief No. 19, July 2011

Following the ‘revolution’ in April 2010, the subsequent interethnic violence in June and the recent international inquiry into these events, Kyrgyzstan is not in safe waters yet. The coming period leading up to the Presidential elections will be important for the country’s stability. What is the current situation in the South of the country, which saw clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and what are the expectations for the presidential elections? Is Kyrgyzstan on the road to democracy, and what role can external actors play?

Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin. OSW Point of View 48, February 2015

Since the beginning of his third presidential term, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked conservative ideology. Thus he legitimises the Kremlin’s new political strategy, the aim of which is to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation in Russia around a liberal agenda. This strategy is also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current model of government, by portraying it as ‘traditional’ for Russia; and to justify the government’s repressive and anti-Western policies. It also includes the policy of reintegrating the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Moscow, as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and the Novorossiya project. This strategy was devised as a response to the galvanisation of adherents of liberalisation in Russia, namely the new middle class and a part of the business and administrative elites who publicly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime in 2011 and 2012. However, the dissonance between the conservative slogans mouthed by the ruling elite and its actual conduct suggest that the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ is purely instrumental in nature, which in the longer term will undercut its effectiveness by undermining its credibility in the eyes of Russian society.