The emblematic statement of the Nobel Peace Prize. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 1, January 2013

From the Introduction. On October 12th the Nobel Committee announced that the annual Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to the European Union for, “promoting peace, democracy and human rights over six decades”.1 This was a bit of good news for the EU who had produced nothing but bad press with the Euro Crisis, the bailouts of struggling countries like Greece, and protests in the southern member states of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. At such a momentous occasion the EU’s next challenge was to figure out who would be the rightful head of the EU to accept the award. The EU has made their decision by opting to send its top three officials Jose Manuel Barroso the President of the European Commission, Herman Van Rompuy the President of the European Council, and Martin Schulz the President of the European Parliament2 as a sign that the EU is not headed by one person but instead is an supranational economic and political bloc that seeks to unify the European continent. Their symbolic acceptance of the award is in response to what Geir Lundestad, the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, called, “an accumulated record.”3 This record has ushered the EU into the international spotlight as a beacon for countries in the EU’s periphery to want to join the bloc.

The Impact of the SFP System on Italian Farmland Prices and Tenure Contracts. Factor Markets Working Document No. 65, August 2013

EDITED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED SOON. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the estimation of the potential effects of the CAP reform on propensity to transaction, particularly comparing the effect of different new instruments/policy settings with the current policy (CAP health check) used as a baseline. The work is focused on three of new policy instruments within the post 2013 CAP reform proposal: regionalization, greening and capping. The first and second are analysed in more detail. The analysis will be based on a survey of farmers in the Province of Bologna, Emilia Romagna, Italy. The questionnaire focuses on mechanism of access to land and related incentives towards different land use/economic behaviour. The survey includes information about respondent characteristics (farm, farmer, household and payments received) and stated intention about potential changes in land operated under alternative agricultural policy scenarios (particularly the post-2013 reform proposals).

Breaking down the barriers to firm growth in Europe: The fourth EFIGE policy report. Bruegel Blueprint 18, 28 August 2012

Large firms contribute disproportionately to the economic performance of countries: they are more productive, pay higher wages, enjoy higher profits and are more successful in international markets. The differences between European countries in terms of the size of their firms are stark. Firms in Italy and Spain, for example, are on average 40 percent smaller than firms in Germany. The low average firm size translates into a chronic lack of large firms. In Italy and Spain, a mere 5 percent of manufacturing firms have more than 250 employees, compared to a much higher 11 percent in Germany. Understanding the roots of these differences is key to improving the economic performance of Europe’s lagging economies. So why is there so much variation in firm size in different European countries? What are the barriers that keep firms in some countries from growing? And which policies are likely to be most effective in breaking down those barriers? This policy report aims to answer these questions by developing a quantitative model of the seven European countries covered by the EFIGE survey (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK). The EFIGE survey asked 14,444 firms in those countries about their performance, their modes of internationalisation, their staffing decisions, their financing structure, and their competitive environment, among other topics.

The Italian Merck Case. Research Papers in Law, 1/2007

From the Introduction. Regulation 1768/921 created supplementary protection certificates (hereinafter, ‘SPCs’) for medicinal products (hereinafter, “pharmaceuticals”) protected by patents. SPCs afford the same exclusive rights as those conferred by patents once these expire and may be granted for a maximum of five years.2 Italy enacted similar legislation in 1991, the most salient difference between both texts being that, pursuant to Law No. 349/91,3 holders of Italian patents for pharmaceuticals could be granted supplementary protection for a maximum period of 18 years after the expiration of the patent. Following the enactment of Regulation 1768/92, SPCs granted by the Italian authorities were brought in line with the period provided for in that text. However, pharmaceuticals for which supplementary protection was sought in the lapse between the adoption of Law No. 349/91 and Regulation 1768/92 (around 400 products) continued to enjoy the protection provided for in the former text.4 Several steps were taken by the Italian authorities to progressively reduce the length of protection granted to these products.

Migration in the Central Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 02/2013

In the last decade irregular immigration has emerged as a “security” challenge (in the language of International Relations military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region particularly in the central, sub-region1. The designation of this issue as a “security challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial and will be discussed further down. This paper focuses on the situation in the central Mediterranean involving mainly four countries namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of which have long standing historic links and bilateral relations and participate in the so called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean. Two of these Central Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are EU member states and Tunisia has a long standing relationship with the EU [Association Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya so far has no formal relations at all with the EU. This paper analyses some of the aspects of migration in the central Mediterranean focusing on the link between the domestic and international politics of the issue in Italy and Malta and contrasting the different approaches taken. For example, although Italy and Malta both resort to self-help and both try to involve the EU in helping them tackle the problem, they do this in a markedly different way: Italy uses the EU as a supplement to its independent and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the EU as the major solution to the problem. Lacking the power and influence to deal with the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as primarily a multilateral issue or one that can only be tackled in concert with stronger powers in the region preferably within an EU context. On the other hand, Italy has been keen in involving the EU but decided to go it alone when this option turned out to be a dead end. In this paper I also try to show the extent (or limitations) to which multilateral initiatives such as the “5+5” and Euro operation really play a decisive role in incentivizing or facilitating inter-state cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity (norms) and the extent to which it is implemented as well as a number of connected issues. The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean Boat People, have been referred to by various names in the literature, all of which may be more or less deficient in actually defining them all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or “irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of international protection, “migrants at sea” and “boat people”. The use of “boat people” dispenses with the need of having to define the various categories of migrants involved and is thus preferred in this paper.

Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012

The sentiment that the euro is now in real danger is based in large part on the widespread conviction that interest rates of 6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and Spain., After taking a closer look at the fundamentals, however, Daniel Gros concludes in this new Policy Brief that both countries should be able to live with this level of interest rates for quite some time, but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which remain strong in both countries. For Spain, some debt/equity swaps are also needed.