The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

EU democracy promotion in Eastern ENP Countries

The paper finds out that the increased incentive structures under the ENP and the more intense socialization dynamics in which Eastern ENP countries have been brought in since the launch of the ENP are not reflected into their regime patterns. However, on the long run (1991-2010) the EU democracy promotion in the region under consideration appears to be largely consistent. In addition, a content analysis of Progress Reports released by the European Commission on the implementation process of ENP Action Plans (ENPAPs) reveals that most Eastern partners have considered in their reform agendas the democracy-related objectives of these documents and that some have also sought to adopt international democratic instruments as provided for in the ENPAPs. Though the record is far from satisfactory on norm internalization, content analysis of Commission's Reports suggests that one should be cautious while totally sweeping away the EU's democratization role.

EU Conditionality on Nationality-Sensitive Matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Promoting Democracy or Maintaining the Status Quo? EDAP 05/2013

This paper will analyse the impact of the EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its efficacy in promoting democratic changes in this country. It will be argued that as BiH is a unique case, its constitutional constraints must be taken into account because every reform that affects the difficult balance between the three main ethno-religious groups of BiH is perceived as a nationality-sensitive issue and is therefore vulnerable to political pressure. With reference to two specific situations where EU has demanded the BiH political elites to adopt EU-compatible reforms, namely the police reform process and the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci ruling, it will be argued that the use of the conditionality tool has increased inter-ethnic polarization among the political parties, thus preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina from moving forward in the EU integration process.