The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

l bilanciamento tra le libertà economiche e i diritti sociali collettivi operato dalla Corte di Giustizia è un contemperamento tra diritti equiordinati?* = The balance between economic freedoms and collective social rights and actions; Court of Justice is a choice between rights equiordinati? Actions by the Court of Justice. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 98/2012

In the Viking and Laval judgments and more recently in the Comm. v. Germany ruling, the Court of Justice applied the proportionality test to collective rights, setting a series of restrictions to the exercise of the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining. The way the ECJ balances the economic freedoms and the social rights is indeed very different from that of the Italian Constitutional Court. Unlike the European Union Treaties, the Italian Constitution recognizes an important role to the right to take collective action which has to be connected with article 3, paragraph 2, consequently the right of strike is more protected than the exercise of economic freedoms.

Land Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 1, September 2011

The paper provides an overview and a comparison of land markets covering the three candidate countries for European Union membership: Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia and Turkey. It analyses and compares agricultural land structures and factors driving land markets, based on the available cross-section and time-series evidence on agricultural land structures and land productivity (yields). The land productivity measured by production per hectare of agricultural land varies between the three countries. Agricultural land structures are the result of historical evolution in land markets and land-leasing developments with additional different institutional environments and agrarian and land reforms.

Agricultural Land Markets and Land Leasing in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 11, February 2012

The aim of this Factor Markets Working Paper is to identify the driving forces that shape agricultural land structures, land market and land leasing in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Institutional developments and land reforms have so far been modest in the FYROM, and have not contributed to significant changes in agricultural ownership, operational structures, or land market and land leasing arrangements. Land ownership and land use are bimodal, consisting of several small-scale family farms and a few large-scale agricultural enterprises. The small family farms own and operate land on several small parcels, which is one of the major obstacles to the modernisation of family farm production. A considerable portion of the land is uncultivated, which affects land market and land leasing values. Due to underdeveloped institutional frameworks and market institutions in support of small-scale farms, a large proportion of state-owned land is rented by agricultural enterprises.

Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 15, February 2012

In this paper, we describe the regulations governing the rental markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on various kinds of regulations and institutions connected with the land rental market, including price, tenancy duration, quantity and other regulations, as well as transaction costs. The diverse government regulations on price restrictions and tenancy duration are analysed, along with the social norms observed for rental payments and contracts. The paper also examines the type and registration of contracts, the contract enforcement rules, the regulations on the inheritability of contracts and the pre-emptive right of tenants to buy the land.

Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French Farmland: A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the role of environmental and land regulations. Factor Markets Working Document No. 51, June 2013

This paper investigates the determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. It found a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies capitalised, at least to some extent, but the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends on the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on the location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-aside premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm payments have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a nitrate-surplus zone.