Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/11, 12 July 2012

As a background document for Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11 ‘Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment’, this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: • The sectoral changes in the economy; • The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components; • Export performance. • The ULC-REERs are calculated: • For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors; • Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter are free from the impacts of compositional changes; • Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.

The EMS Crisis of the 1990s: Parallels with the present crisis? CEPS Working Document No. 393, 28 March 2014

The EMS crisis of the 1990s illustrated the importance of a lack of confidence in price or exchange rate stability, whereas the present crisis illustrates the importance of a lack of confidence in fiscal sustainability. Theoretically the difference between the two should be minor since, in terms of the real return to an investor, the loss of purchasing power can be the same when inflation is unexpectedly high, or when the nominal value of government debt is cut in a formal default. Experience has shown, however, that expropriation via a formal default is much more disruptive than via inflation. The paper starts by providing a brief review of the EMS crisis, emphasising that the most interesting period might be the ‘post-EMS’ crisis of 1993-95. It then reviews in section 2 the crisis factors, comparing the EMS crisis to today’s euro crisis. Section 3 outlines the main analytical issue, namely the potential instability of high public debt within and outside a monetary union. Section 4 then compares the pressure on public finance coming from the crises for the case of Italy. Section 5 uses data on ‘foreign currency’ debt to disentangle expectations of devaluation/inflation from expectations of default. Section 6 concludes.

Le role des politiques monétaires et la convergence macroeconomique sur le développement des systèmes financiers dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. = The role of monetary policies and macroeconomic convergence in the development of financial systems in south Mediterranean countries. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 12/April 2012

This MEDPRO Technical Report shows that the monetary and exchange rate policies conducted by central banks in the South Mediterranean region display apparent homogeneity in their operational frameworks, albeit with some specificities and differing degrees of advancement. While central banks state that price stability is their ultimate objective, failures to control interest rates as operational objectives of monetary policy result in monetary authorities resorting to quantitative approaches to monetary policy, meaning that monetary aggregates and credit targets are being used as intermediate targets of monetary policy. An econometric exercise limited to Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) has been conducted to analyse the potential scenarios of convergence and monetary policy coordination. Given the high structural heterogeneity and the slow pace of real convergence due to weak commercial integration in the Maghreb, results nevertheless show alternative dynamics in the integration of effective nominal exchange rates, as well as a complete convergence dynamic in exchange rate policies. Partial convergence of monetary policies regarding the stabilisation of inflation rates remains an open option for a transitional phase where financial integration is low.

Les enjeux de la libéralisation des comptes de capital dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. = Challenges arising from Capital Account Liberalisation in the Countries of the South Mediterranean Region. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 11/March 2012

This MEDPRO Technical Report confirms the importance of commercial openness and macroeconomic performance (i.e. the control of inflation and stability of current account balance and exchange rate) on growth dynamics in the south Mediterranean countries. In particular, the positive impact of capital account liberalisation is conditioned by the imperative reinforcement of institutional quality, country risk reduction, and government stability. An examination of the Tunisian case shows that only sectors subject to tariff dismantlement within the framework of the Association Agreement with the EU appear to benefit from capital account liberalisation. Furthermore, the report shows that a scenario of capital account liberalisation requires the anticipation of monetary policy reaction functions. It follows that the mechanisms for interest rate adjustment, or inter alia, the interest rates’ reaction to price fluctuations, are weakly volatile. In turn, the analysis shows that an active control of inflation mismatches occurs essentially through exchange rate corrections, thus highlighting the greater interest central banks have in exchange rate stability over real stability. A capital account liberalisation scenario would hence impose a tightening of monetary policy.

Institutions and Growth in Europe. CEPS Working Document No. 421, April 2016

This paper provides empirical evidence in support of the view that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth of European countries. When also taking into account the initial level of GDP per capita and government debt, cross-country institutional differences can explain to a great extent the relative long-term GDP performance of European countries. It also shows that an initial government debt level above a threshold (e.g. 60-70%) coupled with institutional quality below the EU average tends to be associated with particularly poor long-term real growth performance. Interestingly, the detrimental effect of high debt levels on long-term growth seems cushioned by the presence of very sound institutions. This might be because good institutions help to alleviate the debt problem in various ways, e.g. by ensuring sufficient fiscal consolidation in the longer-run, allowing for better use of government expenditures and promoting sustainable growth, social fairness and more efficient tax administration. The quality of national institutions seems to enhance the long-term GDP performance across a large sample of countries, also including OECD countries outside Europe. The paper offers some evidence that, in the presence of good institutions, conditions for catching-up seem generally good also for euro-area and fixed exchange rate countries. Looking at sub-groupings, it seems that sound institutions may be particularly important for long-term growth in the countries where the exchange rate tool is no longer available (and where also sovereign debt is high), and less so in the countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. However, this result is preliminary and requires further research. The empirical findings on the importance of institutions are robust to various measures of output growth, different measures of institutional indicators, different sample sizes, different country groupings and to the inclusion of additional control variables. Overall, the results tend to support the call for structural reforms in general and reforms enhancing the efficiency of public administration and regulation, the rule of law and the fight against rent-seeking and corruption in particular.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess savings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280, 28 August 2012

As an alternative to the present system of intermediation of the German savings surplus, this paper suggests that the risk-adjusted rate of return could be improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for Germany (designated DESWF), which could invest excess German savings globally. Such a DESWF would offer German savers a secure vehicle paying a guaranteed positive minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when real investment returns allowed. The vehicle would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly diversified by geography and asset classes. Positive real returns can be expected in the long run based on positive real global growth. Since, in this case, a significant amount of funds would flow outside the euro area, the euro would depreciate, which would help crisis countries presently struggling to revive growth through exports and to close their external deficits so as to recoup their international credit-worthiness. Target imbalances would gradually disappear and German claims abroad would move from nominal claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal claims on various private and public foreign entities in a variety of asset classes.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

The response speed of the International Monetary Fund. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/03, 16 July 2013

The more severe a financial crisis, the greater has been the likelihood of its management under an IMF-supported programme and the shorter the time from crisis onset to programme initiation. Political links to the United States have increased programme likelihood but have prompted faster response mainly for ‘major’crises. Over time, the IMF’s response has not been robustly faster, but the time sensitivity to the more severe crises and those related to fixed exchange rate regimes did increase from the mid-1980s. Similarly, democracies had tended to stall programme initiation but have become more supportive of financial markets’ demands for quicker action.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

The Ghost of Deflation Past. CEPS Hi-level Brief, 13 December 2013

This note takes a look at the development of monetary aggregates and debt in the G7 (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan), plus non-G7 euro-area countries, which have an important bearing on the future development of price levels. It also discusses the problem of restoring external competitiveness in the weaker euro-area countries without aggravating their debt burden. The key conclusions are i) monetary and debt developments in the G7 countries point to relatively sluggish growth but do not signal deflation risks and ii) the realignment of ‘internal real exchange rates’ in the euro area will most likely come through a rise in prices in Germany (and a few other stronger countries). The lessons learned in the early 1930s have made a come-back of deflation quite unlikely.

British business and the Euro. ACES Cases No. 2008.2

During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the United Kingdom obtained an opt-out option on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). When Tony Blair came to power, he promised there would be a referendum on the euro if the government decided it was in the national interest to join. Many believed Tony Blair intended to call and try to win a referendum on the euro. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the debate over the euro raged in Britain, filling the pages of the tabloids and the minds of many Britons. In this paper based on empirical research conducted in London in 2005-06, I investigate whether the business sector had a clear preference on the issue of British membership in the EMU and tried to influence the government‟s decision. I use Jeffry Frieden's model of interest group preferences regarding exchange-rate policies to develop hypotheses regarding the position of the business sector on the euro. Research findings reveal that the business sector was divided on the issue of euro membership exactly as Frieden's model predicts. However, the intensity of business preferences decreased overtime. By the end of Tony Blair's second term, the business sector had become neutral on the issue of the euro.

Manufactured Exports and FDI in Southern Mediterranean Countries: Evolution, determinants and prospects. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 14/April 2012

This paper investigates the evolution and determinants of manufactured exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 11 southern Mediterranean countries over the period 1985–2009, as well as their prospects under different scenarios pertaining to the development of the determinants. The econometric analysis confirms the role of exchange rate depreciation, the openness of the economy and the quality of institutions and infrastructure in fostering manufactured exports and FDI inflows in the region. The assessment of the prospects suggests that a scenario of deeper integration with the EU entails superior performance for manufactured exports and FDI compared with either the status quo or less integration with the EU but greater integration within the region.

The end of an overlooked European currency war. CEPS Commentary, 21 January 2015

On January 15th the Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned the efforts it had taken since September 2011 to ensure that the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate would not fall below 1.2 Swiss francs per euro. The Swiss franc appreciated immediately by almost 20% (after a temporary overshot of an even larger amount).The justification was that speculative capital flows induced by the euro crisis were driving the Swiss franc above its equilibrium value. Daniel Gros draws some important general lessons in this Commentary from the Swiss case and finds that the move by the SNB to stop its interventions will have an important impact on the euro-area economy.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.