Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Putin: The morally depraved degradation of a strong state leader. CEPS Commentary, 31 March 2015

In a new CEPS Commentary, Michael Emerson calls for an end to diplomatic euphemisms in describing Putin’s tragic degradation of Russia, its political regime and society. The assassination of Boris Nemtsov on February 27th signals one more step down this dreadful path.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

EU-Russia energy diplomacy: The need for an active strategic partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012, July 2012

This paper explains the conflictive and cooperative elements of energy diplomacy between the European Union (EU) and Russia. It argues that interdependence forms the underlying principle of this relationship and creates both sensitivity and vulnerability for the interdependent parties, thus carrying the sperms of both conflict and cooperation. Both sides would be negatively affected by the other side’s noncooperation within the current policy framework and the prevailing mistrust and recurring tensions can be explained by this sensitivity. However, even if both sides’ policies were adjusted, vulnerability interdependence would still prevent them from seriously reducing their energy cooperation. It is necessary then to see how EU and Russian energy diplomacy can converge and how their strategic energy partnership can be cemented.

Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54, 25 February 2013

EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched almost a decade ago in 2003, has borne fruit more in the security aspects than the justice and liberty-related policy areas. This study assesses the uneven cooperation on justice and home affairs between the EU and Russia, while delving into the intersection between cooperation on justice, liberty and security and the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law in EU-Russia relations. The study concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament for playing a more active role in this important field of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

spotlight europe #2013/03 — März 2013: Europäische Union und Russland am Scheideweg = The EU and Russia at a crossroads

No abstract.

spotlight europe #2013/03 – March 2013: The European Union and Russia at a Crossroads

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.

The Boston Marathon and the Visa Negotiations between the EU and Russia: Time to get real and positive. CEPS Commentary, 8 May 2013

Against the background of the Boston Marathon bombing as a violent reminder of the lawlessness throughout much of the Northern Caucasus, Michael Emerson calls in this commentary for a fresh direction in the EU’s negotiations with Russia over visa-free travel. While finding that a ‘visa liberalisation’ regime has a very slim prospect of materialising any time soon, on the other hand, he sees realistic possibilities for fast delivery of a ‘virtual visa free regime’ of the multi-year, multi-entry visa, which would be a real and important achievement for EU-Russian relations.

Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership and replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own. CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2013

This new Commentary by Michael Emerson and Hrant Kostanyan shows how the pressure exerted by President Putin on Armenia to withdraw from the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement it had negotiated with the EU and to join the Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia customs union is but the most recent in a long series of ongoing moves by Russia to destroy the Eastern Partnership. In their view, the message to be hammered home to those unsure of the economic arguments is that you do not have to have an exclusive customs union to enjoy deep integration for goods, services, people and capital, and of course even less for hard security relationships. High-quality free trade agreements are the logical instrument for those who want excellent relations with more than one big neighbour.

The EU and Syria – Time to Play behind Closed Doors. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue, September 13, 2013

From the Introduction. Since the – presumed – utilization of chemical weapons against civilians by the Assad regime late August, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community have been building the case for a military intervention, a punishing mission against Bashar al-Assad. Despite evidences that sarin gas was used, the UK and Germany seem to be out of the race – for a similar reason: domestic politics –, leaving the US and France in the starting blocks. French President Hollande has expressed his commitment to go to war. The world is now on hold waiting for the US as President Obama, after asking US Congress to postpone a vote on a military intervention, is working on a possible diplomatic solution with Russian President Putin. Since Kerry’s comments in London earlier this week, Russian President Putin has been seeking for a diplomatic solution that would put all Syrian chemical arsenals under international supervision.