REACH: A killer whale for SMEs? CEPS Policy Brief No. 307, 9 December 2013

REACH is a very demanding system for any business either large or small, yet right from the start one of the more serious concerns was whether and how SMEs could cope with the Regulation. After all, some 27,600 companies in EU chemistry are SMEs (95% of all firms). Seven years down the line, many of these fears are materialising. Assuming no significant changes are introduced to REACH, this paper suggests the following recommendations: Above all, we strongly encourage SMEs to start early and develop a strategy for REACH compliance well before 2018. Address the potential competition law implications of current SIEF arrangements, e.g. through a Guidance document from DG Competition by 2014 (in time for 2018) Facilitate the exchange of information along the value chain by adopting pragmatic approach to the content and format of Safety Data Sheets. More can be done on the IT front as well, for instance by developing tools that generate compliant Safety Data Sheets. Improve the communication of REACH and its intended goals, that is, the health and environmental benefits, to the wider public. SMEs regret the unawareness of the public in the light of the enormous efforts they have to undertake. In the event of a later review of REACH, the logic should be risk-based rather than hazard-based.

Still together, but apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas. OSW Commentary No. 160, February 6 2015

From the Introduction. The peace deal agreed on 5 September 2014 concerning the ceasefire in the region covered by the conflict in the Donbas brought about a significant reduction in the scale of military clashes. However, in mid-January the separatist forces, supported by the Russian military, started an offensive along the entire front line. For example, they seized the airport in Donetsk and the village of Krasnyi Partyzan. About a third of the Donetsk and the Lugansk oblasts currently remain outside Kyiv’s control (see Map). Before the war, these areas were inhabited by 6.6 million residents, 15% of Ukraine’s total population. The process launched in September 2014 in Minsk, which was intended to regulate the conflict within the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and representatives of the separatists), resulted in an exchange of some prisoners of war, although it failed to have any political effects. Attempts at regulating the political situation were additionally complicated by the illegal ‘elections’ of leaders of the two separatist regions, the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the DPR and LPR).

Abkhazia’s ‘creeping’ incorporation. The end of the experiment of a separatist democracy. OSW Commentary 164, 2015-03-12

On 5 March 2015 a Russian-Abkhazian treaty on alliance and strategic partnership came into effect; it had been signed on 24 November 2014. In fact, the treaty provides a “roadmap” for the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian area of defence and economic and social affairs: as soon as the transition periods defined in the treaty expire, Russian standards and legal regulations will be rolled out in these areas. Despite maintaining the formal status of the Abkhazian government institutions and attributes of statehood (which, however, is a fact of minor importance, as Abkhazia is not internationally recognised as a state), the treaty’s entry into force will de facto bring the current model of functioning of this para-state to an end.