On the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU economic policies. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/04, 9 November 2012

For markets, European economic governance faces a crisis of policy effectiveness, while for citizens the European Union faces a democratic legitimacy crisis. The introduction of the European Semester economic policy surveillance system has not resolved these problems. Policy guidance deriving from the Semester is not focused enough on areas of significant spillovers and on problem countries, and national compliance is often procedural rather than actual. This brings into question both the Semester’s effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s new intervention rights, which allow intrusion into national policy-making.

The ‘Personalisation’ of the European Elections: A half-hearted attempt to increase turnout and democratic legitimacy? EPIN [Working] Paper No. 37, 11 April 2014

On May 22nd to the 25th, elections to the European Parliament are taking place throughout the European Union. Following a recent EP initiative, most of the European political parties have selected top candidates for the position of Commission President, who are to lead an EU-wide campaign, with the objective of increasing citizens’ interest in the elections and reinforcing their European dimension. This paper analyses the main weaknesses in the process of selecting the lead candidates and how they are approaching the campaign. In addition to the challenges posed by a cross-national campaign, the lack of a clear political programme and the possibility that none of the candidates will become the President of the next Commission might all limit the impact of this new initiative on voter turnout and undermine EU democratic legitimacy. The mainstream parties might also fail to counter the rise of radical eurosceptic parties, which so far are proving more successful in mobilising the protest vote in the wake of the euro crisis.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms.

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy? It’s about Legitimation, Stupid! European Policy Brief No. 21, March 2014

Are we witnessing a crisis of democratic legitimacy? While citizens may lose trust in political authorities, democratic principles and ideals continue to exercise considerable appeal. This Policy Brief argues that this paradox must be understood as a crisis of legitimation. Research suggests that legitimacy is inherently subjective and must be constantly re-earned. Low levels of political trust can be explained as the result of the complexity of globalised yet fragmented societies. The present feeling of malaise calls for a redefinition of the relationship between citizens and the authorities by which they are ruled. If popular sovereignty is to mean anything in today’s age, it requires a new legitimising narrative.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Does the Stockholm Programme matter? The struggles over ownership of AFSJ multiannual programming. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 51/December 2012

Does the 2009 Stockholm Programme matter? This paper addresses the controversies experienced at EU institutional levels as to ‘who’ should have ownership of the contours of the EU’s policy and legislative multiannual programming in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. It examines the struggles around the third multiannual programme on the AFSJ, i.e. the Stockholm Programme, and the dilemmas affecting its implementation. The latest affair to emerge relates to the lack of fulfilment by the European Commission of the commitment to provide a mid-term evaluation of the Stockholm Programme’s implementation by mid-2012, as requested by both the Council and the European Parliament. This paper shifts the focus to a broader perspective and raises the following questions: Is the Stockholm Programme actually relevant? What do the discussions behind its implementation tell us about the new institutional dynamics affecting European integration on the AFSJ? Does the EU actually need a new (post- Stockholm) multiannual programme for the period 2015–20? And last, what role should the EP play in legislative and policy programming in order to further strengthen the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ?

Participatory approaches in the management of Natura 2000: when EU biodiversity policy gets closer to its citizens. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 26/May 2012

The Habitats Directive has created a European network of protected areas combining environmental protection with social and economic activities. Although not clearly advocated in the Directive, participatory approaches have incrementally emerged in order to ensure an adequate management of the Natura 2000 network. This paper looks at the reasons why the European Commission on one side and the national/local authorities on the other side chose to engage in participatory approaches and assesses the structure, degree and scope of these approaches in the light of input and output legitimacy. Main findings are that participation was mostly implemented as a reaction to conflicts and out of a concern over policy implementation, two elements that continue to drive the philosophy of the Natura 2000 network‘s management. The limits of participation in Brussels are contrasted with the potential for more genuine and effective participation mechanisms on the field.

National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU’s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity. Bruges Political Research Paper 28/2013

The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome the Euro Crisis. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote the creation of a new kind of supervisory body.

The Discursive double game of EMU reform: the clash of titans between French White Knight and German Iron Lady. Paper presented at the 9th Biennial Conference European Community Studies Association–Canada (ECSA-C), Ottawa, Ontario, April 27-28, 2012

From the Introduction. In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and observers of European integration were proclaiming that the French-German “engine” of Europe had come to an end. The political legitimacy of French-German initiatives was contested by coalitions of smaller member states and the ‘new Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynamics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alternative to the Franco-German partnership has yet to emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration. However, unlike in the past, agreements on steps forward have proven to be particularly difficult. This is largely due to these countries’ contrasting political economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices....the paper analyses the ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while tracing their discursive interactions against changing background conditions since the European debt crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 until the last measures taken in 2012 before the French Presidential elections. The empirical analysis is based on a systematic corpus of press conferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is complemented by a number of press interviews including some given by their respective Finance Ministers) and important speeches in that same period of time.

European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

The Economic Basis of Attitudes towards the European Community: Familiarity Breeds Content. Institute for Advanced Studies Political Science Series, 12 April 1994

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic basis of mass support for, and opposition to the European Community. In other words the main question is: to what extent, and in what ways, is popular support or opposition to the EC dependent upon economic circumstances and considerations? Behind this research question lies the matter of the legitimacy of the EC in the eyes of citizens across Europe. In some respects the results of this study are frustrating and inconclusive. In other respects, however, the results suggest some clear generalizations and conclusions. First, we have found rather little evidence that the EC or European unification are evaluated in primarily economic terms. Secondly, support seems to be associated more strongly with social and attitudinal variables of a non-economic kind. Thirdly, the figures suggest that diffuse and somewhat idealistic reasons for supporting unification and EC membership tend to outweigh more specific reasons. Fourthly, a solid foundation of inertia, custom, and national tradition seem to maintain support and make it grow.

Multilateral Interchange Fees: Competition and regulation in light of recent legislative developments. ECRI Research Report No. 14, 31 January 2014

Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments area.