The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

Gibt es eine politische Philosophie der Europäischen Union? = Is there a political philosophy of the European Union?. ZEI Discussion Paper C223, 2014

In a theoretical context, the European Union is generally interpreted through the prism of integration theories, which in turn reflect the ever changing empirical reality of the integration process. ZEI Director Ludger Kühnhardt asks if and to what extent the process of European integration has begun to generate a specific political philosophy which uses the EU - and not the classical notion of the state – as the starting and reference point for its reasoning. Kühnhardt examines examples – such as the European notion of civil rights and the notion of the Union itself, but also critical categories such as euroskepticism – which indicate that the EU itself is beginning to be the starting point and frame of reference for a reflection on the common good. For now, a political philosophy in the context of the European Union exists only in an embryonic stage, but the topic may generate intellectual insights through further and deeper research.

The Political Response of Firms to the 1992 Single Market Program: The Case of the German Automobile Industry Pamela Camer. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 1994

This paper examines the political responses of German automobile firms to the 1992 Single Market initiative. I argue that the decision by firms to try to influence EC policies depends on the perceived economic impact of the single market and ,the market alternative open to firms, while the decision on how to lobby depends on the size of the finn and the institutional and strategic environment in which a firm operates. I use this framework to explain why German automobile firms were slow in responding the single market initiative and why, when they did choose to lobby, the firms pursued different political strategies. The research suggests that we should not limit our studies to the political activity of trade associations and sectors, but should also examine the political strategies and activities of individual firms. It also suggests that, as integration efforts in Europe proceed, there is likely to be increased activity by individual firms and national associations because European trade associations may not be able to agree on specific EC policy proposals.