Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.

Britain’s Political Earthquake: What aftershocks for Europe and the UK? CEPS Commentary, 11 May 2015

In the wake of last week’s elections in Britain, Michael Emerson examines in this CEPS Commentary the implications of the astonishing results for the EU and the UK and outlines a possible reform package that David Cameron might present to the EU institutions and other member states to fulfil his pledge to achieve a “reformed EU”. He also urges the Prime Minister to consider adding a constructive component to his reform package, namely positioning the UK to act once again as a leading proponent of a more effective European foreign, security and defence policy.