Commission v. Gazprom: The antitrust clash of the decade? CEPS Policy Brief No. 285, 31 October 2012

This new CEPS Policy Brief boldly asserts that the antitrust case launched by DG Competition against Gazprom on September 4th will turn out to be the landmark antitrust case of this decade, in much the same way that Microsoft v. Commission was the defining antitrust lawsuit of the last decade. The paper argues that, for a host of political and economic reasons, this case is likely to be hard fought by both sides to a final prohibition decision and then onwards into the EU courts. In the process, the European gas market and the powers of DG Competition in the energy field are likely to be transformed.

The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

The Future of the Clean Development Mechanism. Note on the report “A Call to Action” of the High-Level Panel on CDM Policy Dialogue. CEPS Special Report No. 71, 20 November 2012

The clean development mechanism (CDM) has been through a long and complex growing process since it was approved as part of the Kyoto Protocol. It was designed within the framework of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and reflected the political and economic realities of that time. To ensure its continued effectiveness in contributing to future global climate action and to reflect on how best to position the CDM to respond to future challenges, a high-level panel (HLP) was formed at the Durban climate change conference in 2011. Following extensive consultations, the panel published its report in September 2012. Through this Special Report, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum offers its reflections on findings and recommendations of the HLP, as well as, by extension, its own views on the future of the CDM. In the context of the latter, it explores the following questions: Is there a need for an instrument such as the CDM in the future? What ‘demand’ can it fill? In the roles identified under the first question, what can be done to adapt it and also continue to increase its efficacy?

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Member State BITS after the Treaty of Lisbon: solid foundation or first victims of EU investment policy? Research Paper in Law, 02/2012

[Introduction.] This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on the basis of the proposed Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries presented by the Commission on 7 July 20101 and the European Parliament’s Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.2 The proposed Regulation and the Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the development of an EU international investment policy”.3 The first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief introduction of the notion of investment law and the scope of the EU’s new investment competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation.

Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe. Security Policy Brief No. 40, November 2012

Have Europeans lost the art of making grand strategy? In a reflection process initiated by Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain, they are invited to rediscover it and draft a “European Global Strategy”. This policy brief argues that what the EU needs most is a short set of priorities for collective action, to be reassessed for each term of the High Representative.

Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans. CEPS Commentary, 16 May 2013.

Ten years have passed since the EU-Western Balkans summit was held in Thessaloniki in June 2003. In this new CEPS Commentary, CEPS Associate Senior Fellow Erwan Fouéré exhorts the EU to mark the occasion by reaffirming with greater determination the European perspective for the countries of the region in the hope of keeping the Balkan ghosts at bay.

Central bank cooperation during the great recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/08, 20 June 2013

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.

A Copernican turn in Banking Union urgently needed. CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, July 2013 [is another Brief with no. 297]

Despite broad agreement among central bankers, policy-makers and economists that creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress in building this union has been painfully slow. This is largely due to the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. Taking a cue from Copernicus, Thomas Mayer suggests in this new CEPS Policy Brief that the impasse may be broken by turning the whole process on its head. So, instead of trying to move from common bank supervision, over to bank resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he proposes reversing the process by starting with deposit insurance, moving from there to resolution and ending with supervision.

Deploying the energy incentive: reinforcing EU integration in South-East Europe. CEPS Policy Brief No. 296, July 2013

This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community by further Europeanising the Energy Community Treaty. It argues that the level of dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular.

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

Comparative regional perspectives: the Bologna process and higher education attainment. Jean Monnet/Robert Schumann Paper Series Vol 13 No. 11, August 2013

Since 1999, countries have voluntarily chosen to reform their higher education systems to join the European Higher Education Area. This paper compares Bologna Process implementation across four regions within the European Union. While there are 47 countries participating in the Bologna Process, this paper uses statistical analysis to consider 25 of the 28 EU Member States. The time period of analysis is 2000-2011, prior to Croatia’s accession to the EU on 1 July 2013. Across Europe there are inter-regional differences in how the Bologna Process has been implemented and in the political economy contexts that influence higher education reform for policy convergence. There are three explanatory variables in the political economy context: 1. competitive economic pressures and globalization 2. domestic politics at the national level 3. leadership from the supranational European Union that socially constructs regional norms Tertiary education attainment is the dependent variable of interest in this research. The objective of 40%, for 30-34 year olds, is Europe 2020 benchmark target. There are additional higher education reform criteria encompassed in the Bologna Process. These criteria concern Credit and Degree Structure, Quality Assurance, and Recognition of academic degrees among countries in the EHEA. This tertiary education attainment variable, which is of interest in this paper, does not capture the entire implementation process. Nevertheless, it is a measure of one important indicator of success in providing higher education access to populations within the context of democratic governance. This research finds that statistically GDP Per Capita is the most significant variable in relationship to tertiary education attainment across four regional areas in the European Union.

Bologna Process Bucharest Ministerial Conference Takes Place amid Political Crisis in Romania. EUMA Papers Series Vol. 12, No. 5, May 2012

During the last week in April the Ministers responsible for higher education from 47 countries convened in Bucharest, Romania for the Ministerial Conference of the Bologna Process. On April 26 and 27, 2012 the venue for the meeting was the Palace of the Parliament, which was constructed by the dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu in 1984 and completed the year before his death by execution on Christmas Day 1989. One of the largest civilian buildings in the world was location for the first ministerial conference to take place since the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) became effective in 2010. Originally the creation of the EHEA was envisaged by the Bologna Process Declaration in 1999 which had representatives from 29 countries as signatories. This essay will describe the proceedings of the Ministerial Conference, report on the negotiations among delegates in parallel sessions and plenary sessions, discuss the thematic sessions with emphasis on “Global academic mobility: Incentives and barriers, balances and imbalances” and review the adoption of the Bucharest Communiqué and the Bologna Policy Forum Statement.

Industries and Citizens’ Groups Networks in EU Food Policy: The Emergence of ‘Unholy Alliances’ in Multilevel Governance? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 30, September 2013

Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are collaborative patterns that temporarily bring together antagonistic stakeholders behind a common cause. This paper deals with such ‘transversal’ co-operations between citizens’ groups (NGOs, consumers associations…) and economic stakeholders (food industries, retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case studies that enable a more nuanced view on the perspectives for the development of transversal networks at the EU level. The main findings are that (i) the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of improved access to institutions; (ii) membership of a collaborative network leads to a learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors independent of the stakeholders themselves.