21 resultados para Penalty-kick


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There is general consensus that to achieve employment growth, especially for vulnerable groups, it is not sufficient to simply kick-start economic growth: skills among both the high- and low-skilled population need to be improved. In particular, we argue that if the lack of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) is a true problem, it needs to be tackled via incentives and not simply via public campaigns: students are not enrolling in ‘hard-science’ subjects because the opportunity cost is very high. As far as the low-skilled population is concerned, we encourage EU and national policy-makers to invest in a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon. The ‘low-skilled’ label can hide a number of different scenarios: labour market detachment, migration, and obsolete skills that are the result of macroeconomic structural changes. For this reason lifelong learning is necessary to keep up with new technology and to shield workers from the risk of skills obsolescence and detachment from the labour market.

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From the Introduction. Little attention is paid, until now, to the duration of environmental procedures under Articles 226 and 228 EC Treaty, though these procedures are the only instrument at the disposal of the European Commission to enforce the application of EC environmental law1. Indeed, the Commission itself has no possibility to impose a fine or a penalty payment against a Member State, or to withhold sums under the Structural Funds, where a Member State persistently infringes Community environmental law. Rather, the Commission is obliged to first issue a Letter of Formal Notice against a Member State which infringes Community law. Where the infringement is not repaired, the Commission may issue a Reasoned Opinion against the Member State, and if also this does not lead to the compliance with EC law, it may appeal to the Court of Justice2.

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From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

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The EU Arctic policy, initiated in the European Commission’s Communication “The European Union and the Arctic region” in 2008, was created to respond to the rising expectations that the European Union would have a bigger stake in this region which was gaining in importance due to its ecologic vulnerability, economic potential and clashing political interests of the global powers. Whether the European Union managed to establish itself as a significant actor in the Arctic through this new policy is open for discussion. Arguably, while the genuine interest and influence of the EU institutions was there to give a kick-start to this initiative, the pressure of the traditional and still dominant members of the regional Arctic system has been sufficient so far to effectively prevent it from realizing its full potential.

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In this CEPS Commentary, Ilaria Maselli and Miroslav Beblavý argue that the European economic governance system needs to be equipped with a supranational automatic stabiliser that would kick-in automatically in the event of an economic downturn, to avoid unduly burdening national public finances. In their view, the option of creating an unemployment benefit system for the euro area should be given serious consideration. The possible variations of such a system and their implications will be the subject of in-depth study at CEPS over the coming year.