Regulation of European Banks and Business Models: Towards a new paradigm? CEPS Paperbacks. June 2012

Amidst talks of establishing an EU-wide banking union, the recent changes in the regulatory framework and the rethinking of the future of European banking structure, the future of EU bank regulation is inextricably linked to banks’ business models. Using a sample of over 70 banks, which overlaps with those subjected to the EBA’s 2011 stress tests, this report emphasizes the key regulatory gaps that emerge from a comprehensive analysis of the soundness and performance of bank business models and provides policy-makers with guidance to reinforce the evolving regulatory framework in European banking.

Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014

From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2

New Pact for Europe: Towards a New Pact for Europe. Second report, October 2014

As the new EU leadership takes office, Europe faces a complex web of economic, political, social and global challenges which require new responses – above all, the need to restore the public’s faith and trust after the years of crisis which have prompted growing dissatisfaction with the Union, with many people now seeing it as part of the problem rather than part of the solution to those challenges. In 2012, a consortium of 11 European foundations initiated by the King Baudouin Foundation and Bertelsmann Stiftung, and supported by the European Policy Centre, decided to launch a project to promote a Europe-wide debate on the future of EU integration: an ambitious participatory initiative whose ultimate goal is to develop realistic reform proposals to shore up a Union hit by multiple storms in recent years, which have left many people questioning its capacity to respond effectively to those challenges. Two years later, we are proud to be able to present the outcome of this endeavour: the result of a joint reflection process involving the public, politicians, policy-makers, business leaders, trade unionists, EU experts, opinion-formers and other civil society representatives in many EU Member States. Obviously, not all the ideas and proposals generated by this process could be included in this report, but we hope that it faithfully reflects the feedback we received in all the debates. The discussions we have had led to the report that you now hold in your hands, which calls for a New Pact for Europe – between EU Member States and between the EU and its citizens – to enhance the Union’s capacity to deliver effective solutions to the many challenges facing Europe, and to do so in a way that benefits all EU countries and groups within society. This report is designed to feed into the on-going discussions about the EU’s future as the new leadership team takes charge, providing what we hope will be seen as a valuable contribution to the debate on how to introduce ambitious while at the same time workable and realistic reforms to make the EU more effective in responding to the challenges we face. We hope that it will be taken up for discussion by the new European Parliament, the new leadership of the European Commission, European Council and European External Action Service, and also by policy-makers in the Member States. And it does not by any means mark the end of the process. The report will be discussed again with policy-makers and stakeholders in a majority of Member States. Their feedback is important to us and will impact the future progress of the initiative.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

Mutual Recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 24/June 2012

Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep' market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods, mutual recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for EU Member States. This BEER paper attempts to explain the rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU internal goods market, its working in actual practice for about three decades now, culminating in a qualitative cost/benefit analysis and its recent improvement in terms of 'governance' in the so-called New Legislative Framework (first denoted as the 2008 Goods package) thereby ameliorating the benefits/costs ratio. For new (in contrast to existing) national regulation, the intrusive EU procedure to impose mutual recognition is presented as well, with basic data so as to show its critical importance to keep the internal goods market free. All this is complemented by a short summary of the scant economic literature on mutual recognition. Subsequently, the analysis is extended to the internal market for services. This is done in two steps, first by reminding the debate on the origin principle (which goes further than mutual recognition EU-style) and how mutual recognition works under the horizontal services directive. This is followed by a short section on how mutual recognition works in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services markets.

Is Regulatory Convergence Efficient? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.3, May 1992

One of the important themes in the new institutionalism is the convergence of market regulations in a world with three powerful clusters of countries (Western Europe, North America, and East Asia) on a small number of regimes, like disorganized capitalism, free market capitalism, and coordinated market capitalism. This paper examines the political-economic theory of regulatory convergence. It reconstructs and compares three welfarist approaches: the optimal regulatory regime (Tinbergen), the rule of constitutional law (Buchanan), and regulatory rivalry (Hayek). The paper concludes that most plausible results of convergence theory are completely opposite to the expressed political intentions of the theorists. Tinbergen's theory predicts neoliberalism, not social democracy. The theories of Buchanan and Hayek predict respectively a consensual or spontaneous formation of corporatist regulations, not the return of classical constitutionalism or liberalism. The paper summons new institutionalists to repair the weak scientific elements of convergence theory and to make a distinction between the ideological origins of this theory and its unintended ideological consequences.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Too good to be true? A quick assessment of the EC’s new Better Regulation Package. CEPS Special Report No. 108/May 2015

On 19 May 2015, the European Commission published a very comprehensive, ambitious and innovative Better Regulation package, which contains new guidelines on various phases of the policy cycle and various documents setting out the rules and functioning of entirely new consultation platforms and a new body in charge of regulatory scrutiny. This Special Report presents some initial impressions on the content of this remarkable set of new documents, which will shape the way in which EU policies will be prepared, shaped, monitored and evaluated in the years to come.

2016 already puts its mark on the economic map of Europe. CEPS Essay No. 22/8 January 2016

The start of 2016 brought highly symbolic changes to the trade policy map of Europe between the EU- and Russian-led blocs, as the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine entered into force provisionally, while Russia moved in precisely the opposite direction by scrapping its free trade agreement with Ukraine. However the ongoing changes go far wider and deeper. The energy sector and major industries see disengagement between Ukraine and Russia, and Russia’s share in Ukrainian trade is falling substantially. New transport corridors with China may offer synergies with trade opportunities for all three DCFTA states, with Georgia first in line. Visa liberalisation for the entire DCFTA space is now firmly in prospect. Divergent macroeconomic trends between a recovering eurozone and recession in Russia will accentuate the changes in trade structures. A better organisation of the pan-European economic space is surely desirable, but prospects for links between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union remain problematic.