What drives the European Parliament? The Case of the General Data Protection Regulation. Bruges Political Research Papers 47/2015.

This paper evaluates which factors influence the European Parliament’s decision-making, based on a case study: the 2012 proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. Following a ‘competitive testing’ approach, six different hypotheses are successively challenged in order to explain why the EP adopted a fundamental rights- oriented position. The first three factors relate to the internal organization of the EP’s work, i.e. the role played by the lead committee, by the rapporteur and by secretariat officials. The last three factors are external-related, i.e. lobbying activities, outside events and institutional considerations. Based on the empirical findings, it is argued that even though the EP’s position is due to a range of various factors, some of them prove to be more relevant than others, in particular the rapporteur and lead committee’s roles. New institutionalism theories also provide a comprehensive explanation for the EP’s willingness to achieve a fundamental rights oriented outcome.

The Israeli lobby for Research and Innovation in the European Union. An example of efficient cooperation in the European Neighbourhood? Bruges Political Research Papers 49/2015.

Israel figures among the world-leaders in R&D expenditure and has a high-performing scientific community. Since the 1990s it has been associated with the Scientific Policy of the European Union via the European Research Framework Programmes (FP). The cooperation between Israel and the EU in this domain has gradually increased and benefits the scientific communities on both sides. In 2014 the association of Israel to the latest and biggest European FP ever adopted (Horizon 2020) was renewed for the fourth time. Based on all the scientific evidence provided, the elaboration of a European Research Policy can be identified as a highly regulated domain, offering relevant ‘channels of influence’. These channels offer Israel the opportunity to act within the Research Policy system. Being a member of several formal EU bodies in charge of implementing EU Research Policy, Israel is able to introduce its positions effectively. This is accompanied by an outstanding level of activity by Israel in linking concrete EU Research Policy measures to the Israeli Scientific Community at the national level. To carry out this task, Israel relies on an effective organization, which remodels the provided EU structures: European ‘National Contact Points’ (NCPs) are concentrated within the ‘Europe Israel R&D Directorate’ (ISERD). ISERD connects efficiently all the relevant actors, forums and phases of EU-Israeli Research Policy. ISERD can be recognized as being at the heart of Israel's research cooperation with the EU, and its structure may be a source of in

European regions in Brussels: towards functional interest representation? Bruges Political Research Papers 53/2016

Opportunities structures for participation in EU policy-making are characterised by the inefficiency of institutional channels of territorial representation and the progressive inclusion of broad civil society in new systems of consultation and cooperation with EU institutions. Recent Multilevel Governance literature has recognised an increasing convergence in strategies of territorial and functional actors to respond to these challenges. Nevertheless, it has neglected the partial shift of European regions from territorial institutional representation to lobbying strategies based on acting as intermediaries for functional interests. Through strong cooperation with the private sector, regions go beyond their purely institutional roles, partly presenting themselves as actors of functional representation and thus playing by the same rules of most lobbying actors in Brussels: providing specialised and genuine information to EU institutions in exchange for inclusion in the policy-making process.