22 resultados para Most Probable Number
Resumo:
The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.
Resumo:
Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, Odessa Oblast, one of Ukraine’s key regions in economic and political terms, is still strongly polarised as regards its residents’ views on the future of their country. The political circles rooted in the Party of Regions have maintained their influence to a great extent due to increasing dissatisfaction with the central government’s activity and with the economic crisis which has strongly affected the public. Politicians linked to the ancien régime remain the most important political players. Some pro-Ukrainian circles had pinned their hopes for change in the region on the nomination of the former Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for governor of Odessa Oblast on 30 May 2015. At the beginning of his rule this politician made widely publicised promises to combat corruption, to improve the quality of the administration services, to develop infrastructure and to attract foreign capital. However, more than half a year has passed since he assumed office, and it is difficult to speak about any spectacular successes in reforming the region. Saakashvili has above all become a player on the national forum, supporting the presidential camp in their struggle with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, among others. However, his nomination has made Odessa Oblast more important for Ukraine, above all in political and symbolic terms. This is because Odessa Oblast is the best manifestation of the condition of the Ukrainian state two years since the Revolution of Dignity – rudimentary reforms or no reforms at all, strong resistance to any changes from the administration, strong local political-business connections, the lack of consolidation among post-Maidan groups and corruption inherent in the system.
Resumo:
Since gaining its independence Tajikistan has faced severe political, economic and social problems. The last several months has seen a clear increase in their intensity. This is in part caused by the deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the significant fall of remittances from the Tajik labour migrants in Russia, as well as by President Emomali Rahmon’s rising authoritarianism. Despite this intensification, qualitatively speaking Tajikistan’s problems have been unchanged for years. Besides the state’s structural weakness, the main cause is the ongoing neo-colonial dependence on Russia, which effectively limits Dushanbe’s room for political manoeuvre and keep Tajikistan in Russia’s sphere of control. This dependence on the one hand protects the country from collapsing, but on the other it precludes the development of the state, resulting in Tajikistan’s enduring stagnation. Similar processes also take place in other countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in the case of Tajikistan the dependence and stagnation it causes are the strongest and their mechanisms most easily observed.
Resumo:
Thirty years after the Chornobyl nuclear power plant disaster, its aftermath and consequences are still a permanent element of the economic, environmental and social situation of Ukraine, Belarus and some regions of Russia. Ukraine, to which the scope of this text is limited, experienced the most severe shock because, among other factors, the plant where the accident took place was located just 100 km away from Kyiv. Its consequences have affected the course of political developments in the country, and have become part of the newly-shaped national identity of independent Ukraine. The country bore the huge cost of the clean-up effort but did not give up on nuclear energy, and today nuclear power plants generate more than half of its electricity. The system of social benefits for people recognised as disaster survivors, which was put in place by the Soviet government, has become a huge burden on the country’s budget; if implemented fully, it would account for more than 10% of total public spending, and is therefore being implemented to only a partial extent. This system has reinforced the Ukrainian people’s sense of helplessness and dependence on the state. The disaster has also become part of the ‘victim nation’ blueprint of the Ukrainian national myth, which it has further solidified. The technological and environmental consequences of the disaster, and hence also its economic costs, will persist for centuries, while the social consequences will dissipate as the affected generation passes away. In any case, Chornobyl will remain an important part of the life of the Ukrainian state and society.
Resumo:
A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime in the years 1917–1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, 1939–1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter two are being observed – the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a thousand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far (parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreover, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in Ukraine’s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ‘by-product’.
Resumo:
The relations between Russia’s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key interest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia’s economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect for the rights of ownership.
Resumo:
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.