The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy. OSW Commentary No. 142, 29.07.2014

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.

The relief of Vienna in vain. Assessing the Implications of Turkish EU-membership for Council of Ministers’ Decision-making. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2011

This research forecasts the implications of Turkish membership for decision-making effectiveness and dynamics within the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). Effectiveness is determined in this research by 'passage probability': the chance that a random proposal as put forth by the European Commission (EC) is accepted by the Council of Ministers. Dynamics are determined by means of the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI), which plots power values of individual member states by forecasting a number of possible EU enlargement scenarios. This study falsifies earlier research by Baldwin and Widgrén.1 It finds that the implications of Turkish EU-membership for EU decision-making efficiency are ambiguous and depend on the number of other candidate states entering the EU alongside Turkey, as well as the timeslot - 2014 or 2020 - at which the accession would take place. Moreover, this study asserts that Turkish EU-accession would result in unequal- but generally negative - power changes among other EU member states, although member states with similar demographic weight will experience comparable changes. Finally, it appears that the larger a EU member state is, the more power it loses if Turkey would join the EU.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

Turkish Stream and its implications for the EU. European Policy Brief No. 34, March 2015

“A first assessment is that this would not work”, EC Vice-President in charge of Energy Union Mr. Maros Sefcovic said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal at the World Economic Forum in Davos on the 22nd of January. He was commenting on the recent announcement by President Vladimir Putin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller. Indeed, the Russian gas giant’s CEO announced that South Stream would be replaced by a new project, Turkish Stream, linking Russia to the European part of Turkey and this in addition to the existing 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) Blue stream. This policy brief looks at the various implications this new reality could have for Europe’s energy security.

The Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU. OSW POINT OF VIEW 53, 2015-08-20

The Southern Gas Corridor is a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects controlled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, each at a different stage of implementation. The crisis in EU-Russia relations over Ukraine has made the two players interested in the Southern Gas Corridor once again. Brussels views it as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of gas supplies and a way to reinforce its position against Russia. In turn, Moscow’s proposal for Turkey and Greece to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project changes the energy map of the regional projects, which indirectly affects the Southern Gas Corridor. This has raised concern in Azerbaijan, which has been making efforts to manoeuvre between the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

Information Guide: European Union information from Turkish sources

No abstract.

Enlisting business to help loosen the Gordian knot around Cyprus. CEPS Commentary, 5 October 2012

Citing evidence from around the world, including the recent Turkish-Greek reconciliation, Adam Balcer suggests in this CEPS Commentary that establishment of economic cooperation between the business communities of Cyprus and Turkey can facilitate a political rapprochement or at least can prevent a rise in tensions.

Who remembers Turkey's pre-accession? CEPS Special Report No. 74/December 2012

In 2005 the EU and Turkey officially started accession negotiations that were intended to lead to Turkey’s full membership of the EU. Yet today, the Turkish accession process has virtually ground to a halt and lost all credibility. Talk of alternatives to full membership can be heard from various sides; we highlight four instances of what we call ‘parallelism’, namely the elusive concept of a ‘privileged partnership’, the EU-Turkey customs union, the recently launched ‘Positive Agenda’ and Turkish participation in the Energy Community Treaty. While a privileged partnership represents a more comprehensive but still remote framework for EU-Turkish relations, the latter three are merely an escape route from preaccession. We conclude our analysis with a discussion on Turkey’s possible membership of the European Economic Area, which in effect would serve none of the parties involved. We conclude that both partners, the EU and Turkey, would be well advised to remember their pre-accession commitments of 13 years ago – for their mutual benefit.