Bosnia i Hercegowina wobec pytania o tozsamosc. Kosowo - kewstia ostatecznego statusu. Prace OSW 10/2003 = Bosnia and Herzegovina: facing the question of identity. Kosovo - the question of final status. OSW Study 10/2003

In June 2003, during a meeting held in Saloniki, the leaders of European Union member states turned to the presidents and heads of the governments of five Western Balkans nations – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania – assuring them that Brussels sees a future for the entire region in Europe and that, without their membership in the EU, the integration of the continent would not be complete. Of these five – actually six, as Kosovo’s protectorate was represented by a separate delegation: the Prime Minister, President, the Head of the international administration, and a representative of the Serbian party – only Croatia can count on quick integration. The membership of the remaining countries is being spoken of (unofficially) in the perspective of ten to fifteen years. However, no EU diplomat is able to answer the question of how the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, with the EU, will look in practice – these two organisms exist solely owing to the will and efforts of the international community.

Enlargement Agenda - Special focus on Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo. CEPS Commentary, 27 March 2013

This CEPS Commentary notes that this is a critical time for the EU’s enlargement agenda with competing interests at play – between those who suggest that further enlargement is a heavy burden that the EU can ill afford in the current economic climate, and others who continue to believe that extending the frontiers of peace and security to include the Balkan countries will make the EU a safer place. To counter the naysayers, Erwan Fouéré underlines the importance for the EU to show that its current strategy continues to deliver dividends, as it certainly does in the case of Kosovo and Serbia. He further advises the EU to be ready to adapt its strategy where necessary, as in the case of Macedonia, by using whatever leverage it has in a more direct and consistent way and ensuring that its policy objectives and strategy in this area are based on the progress assessment narrative and not the other way around. In his view, opening accession negotiations with Macedonia will be the only way to prevent the country from sinking into further political instability.

Bosnia, Kosovo and the EU: Is Accession Possible without Full Sovereignty?

Bosnia and Kosovo are the only two members of the EU enlargement zone that have never tried to apply for EU membership, given that both are too far from complying with the required minimum standards. But besides lacking basic capacities, these two potential candidates share another common feature: both are limited, to different degrees, in their national sovereignty. This lack of sovereignty not only limits the capacity of the potential candidates to negotiate or to enter into agreements with the EU; it also undermines their readiness to undertake serious reforms. The EU tries to dodge the political blockades that are the root cause of the problem by focusing on the technical issues; this might provide a temporary relief but cannot substitute a realistic accession perspective, which is currently absent. However, without this perspective, the EU’s ‘normative power’ in these countries will continue to erode – which bears the risk that both Kosovo and Bosnia will, in the end, try to solve existing problems through unilateral measures, such as partition. Given its lack of ability to provide alternatives, the EU has to realistically consider such outcomes and think about the possible consequences.