Europe's continental regionalism. CEPS Working Document No. 375, February 2013

This paper reviews the multiple forms of European continental regionalism, which takes the overall shape of a complex set of concentric circles, with a substructure of a core group within the EU based on the euro and Schengen areas, and several rings of neighbours outside, including the European Economic Area, the regions of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and finally some pan-European organisations. While all world regions have their own unique features, the European case offers some important lessons that should be of interest to other world regions. The first is what appears to be a relatively robust model for single market integration. The second consists of the lessons currently being learned on the hazards on monetary integration without adequate fiscal and political integration. The third lesson is another warning, over the difficulties of anticipating the political dynamics of integration processes once set in motion, often described in Europe as a ‘journey to an unknown destination’. The fourth consists of the EU’s current efforts to develop a comprehensive neighbourhood policy, which is encountering difficult issues of matching ambitious objectives with incentives of adequate weight. Nevertheless, the policy sees a landscape of positive and constructive relations between the EU and its neighbours, in marked contrast to some ugly conflictual or coercive features seen in the cases of other continental hegemons – the three BRIC states of China, India and Russia, but not the fourth one, Brazil.

Emergent Brazil and the Curse of the ‘Hen’s Flight’. CEPS Working Document No. 379, 27 February 2013

The ‘Emergent Brazil’ growth model is reaching its limits. Its main engines have been slowing significantly since the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis. Even its much-praised predictable macroeconomic policy has been eroded by political interference. Inflationary pressures are growing and GDP performance is anaemic. As ominous, Brazil cannot compensate for its domestic deficiencies with an export drive. Commodity exports are suffering with the world economic slow-down and the manufacturing industries’ competitiveness is in sharp decline. Brazil has put all its trade negotiation eggs into the South American and WTO baskets, and now its export market share is threatened by the Doha Round paralysis, the Latin American Alianza del Pacífico, and the US-led initiatives for a Trans-Pacific Partnership and a trade and investment agreement with the EU. Paradoxically, this alarming situation opens a window of opportunity. There is a mounting national consensus on the need to tackle head-on the country’s and its industries’ lack of competitiveness. That means finding a solution to the much-decried ‘Brazil Cost’ and stimulating private-sector investment. It also entails an aggressive trade-negotiating stance in order to secure better access to foreign markets and to foster more competition in the domestic one. The most promising near-term goal would be the conclusion of the EU–Mercosur trade talks. A scenario to overcome the paralysis of these negotiations could trail two parallel paths: bilateral EU–Brazil agreements on ‘anything but trade’ combined with a sequencing of the EU–Mercosur talks where each member of the South American bloc could adopt faster or slower liberalisation commitments and schedules.

When do adults learn? A cohort analysis of adult education in Europe. CEPS Working Document No. 383, 21 May 2013

Adult learning is seen as a key factor for enhancing employment, innovation and growth, and it should concern all age cohorts. The aim of this paper is to understand the points in the life cycle at which adult learning takes place and whether it leads to reaching a medium or high level of educational attainment. To this end we perform a synthetic panel analysis of adult learning for cohorts aged 25 to 64 in 27 European countries using the European Labour Force Survey. We find, as previous results suggest, that a rise in educational attainment as well as participation in education and training happens mostly at the age range of 25-29. However, investment across the life cycle by cohorts older than 25 still occurs: in most countries in our sample, participation in education and training as well as educational attainment increases observably across all cohorts. We also find that the decline with age slows down or is even reversed for older cohorts, for both participation in education and educational attainment. Finally, we can identify a Nordic model in which adult learning is achieved through participation in education and training, a Central European model in which adult learning occurs in the form of increasing educational attainment and a liberal model in which both approaches to adult learning are observable.

Modelo Europeu como referencia par a integracao na American Latina do seculo XXI = Europe as a model in the integration of Latin American in the 21st century. Jon Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 5, February 2013

No abstract.

La costruzione giuridica del modello sociale europeo (con una postilla sul MSE al tempo della crisi globale) [The legal construction of the European social model (with a note on the MSE at the time of the global crisis)]. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 88/2011

No abstract.

Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 234, October 2012

This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.