Determinants of Financial Development across the Mediterranean. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 29/February 2013

Casual observation shows that that the financial systems in the southern and eastern Mediterranean are unable (or unwilling) to divert the financial resources that are available to them as funding opportunities to private enterprises. Using a sample of both northern and southern Mediterranean countries for the years 1985 to 2009, this study empirically assesses the reasons underlying such conditions. The results show that strong legal institutions, good democratic governance and adequate implementation of financial reforms can have a substantial positive impact on financial development only when they are present collectively. Moreover, inflation appears to undermine banking development, but less so when the capital account is open. Government debt growth appears to weaken credit growth, which confirms that public debt ‘crowds out’ private debt. Lastly, capital inflows appear to primarily have an income effect, increasing income and thereby national savings, and thus increasing the availability of credit.

Corporate Taxation in Europe: Let's get it together! CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

More comprehensive cooperation in corporate taxation at European level could significantly advance the region’s socio-economic prosperity, but its potential contribution is unfortunately overlooked in the current search for growth and job creation. Lucrative tax niches established in some member states and the fear of losing fiscal autonomy prevent several countries from accepting the move towards an EU single market for taxation. If ‘Lux leaks’ and other revelations of tax avoidance and evasion can succeed in changing the dominant attitudes in the European tax debate, this commentary outlines the steps that need to be taken to allow tax policy to play a positive role in promoting economic prosperity.

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.

Addressing the immediate needs of the Greek banks. CEPS Commentary, 31 July 2015

Based on a detailed calculation of the recapitalisation requirements of the Greek banks, we find that the sector needs an infusion of capital, but that the level largely depends on the stringency of the capital requirements applied. An expedient quick fix to comply with the minimum capital requirements could be achieved by a bail-in of existing creditors under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of around €5 billion, leaving only €6 billion needed for re-capitalisation. If the ‘Cypriot’ standard is applied, however, the required re-capitalisation would be €15 billion. A ‘generous’ approach, which takes into account the phasing in of the new more-stringent capital requirements until 2018, would imply a re-capitalisation of €29 billion (or more bailing-in of creditors). The re-capitalisation should be undertaken preferably by the EIB, the EBRD or the new Greek investment fund, rather than via loans from the ESM to the Greek government.

Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.

Will the Single Resolution Fund be a ‘baby tiger’ during the transition? CEPS Commentary, 17 December 2015

The short answer to this question is no! According to the authors’ calculations, even during its early years, the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) should be sufficient to deal with almost any crisis scenario imaginable. They caution, however, that its funding will be built up only gradually over the coming decade and there is thus a legitimate concern that the SRF will not be sufficient to deal with a major crisis.

The Digital Market for Local Services: A one-night stand for workers? An example from the on-demand economy. CEPS Special Report, No. 133/April 2016

This case study provides a snapshot of the dynamics in the digital market for locally provided personal services. Based on a case study for a Belgium platform with 14,113 identified workers and 9,459 posted tasks, the findings suggest that the current intermediation is inefficient. Only a limited share of the tasks posted on the platform are being completed, whereas the characteristics of the not-completed tasks are fairly limited. Moreover, just a small share of the workers participating in the platform is actually performing the completed tasks. Their average earnings per hour are in most cases above the minimum wage and even above the median wage in the offline market. At the present time, however, the limited earnings for individual workers prevent this mode of working from becoming an alternative to a conventional job. In addition to the standard determinants of workers’ earnings (e.g. gender, age, occupation, etc.), the characteristics and evaluation mechanism of the platform have a large influence on the distribution of tasks and earnings.

The ECB’s Latest Gimmick. Cash for loans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 341, March 2016

Among several important monetary policy initiatives decided by the European Central Bank on 10 March 2016 was the launch of a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II), expanding on the previous TLTRO. In assessing this scheme, which might cost up to €24 billion, this Policy Brief finds that while it could become important, it is questionable whether it will achieve its goal of encouraging the extension of credit for new investment, as banks can easily window dress their loan book.

The fall-out from the Brussels terrorist attacks. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 22 March, Belgium got a brutal wake-up call. In a coordinated attack, two nail bombs exploded in the departure hall of the Brussels National Airport. A little over an hour later, a third bomb exploded inside a metro train passing through Maelbeek station. 32 civilians lost their lives, while more than 300 people were injured. The Islamic State (IS) network, which was responsible for the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, claimed responsibility. The arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the sole survivor of the Paris attacks, on 18 March, seems to have made IS expedite the Brussels attacks following a claim from the Paris prosecutor that Abdeslam would cooperate with the French Justice Department over the Paris attacks.

The Impact of the Collaborative Economy on the Labour Market. CEPS Special Report No. 138, June 2016

The digitalisation of work is creating new ways of intermediating work, with for example platforms intermediating work between individuals online. These so-called online collaborative platforms have the potential to fundamentally change the labour market, but for the moment, with an estimated 100,000 active workers or 0.05% of total employees in the EU, they do not seem to have a large impact on the offline/traditional labour market or the create/destroy impetus. This paper analyses the direct and indirect impact of the collaborative economy on the labour market. The findings, based on a collection of empirical studies, suggest that most workers do not earn their main income through online platforms and they obtain earnings from different types of platforms. Earnings from physical/local services are, in general, substantially higher than virtual services that can potentially be delivered globally. The paper also assesses the conditions, number of hours worked and employment status, compared to the offline labour market, and finds shows large differences across types of workers, platforms, and countries. The emergence of online collaborative platforms poses some challenges and opportunities for policy-makers. On the one hand, they may be challenged to ensure minimum remuneration, fair evaluation, tax declaration and social protection, and reduction of the administrative burden. On the other hand, the new technologies may provide opportunities to (partially) liberate some professional services and activate specific groups at a distance away from the labour market. This paper was commissioned by the European Commission as input into its European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy. This Ag