50 years of the ‘twin engine’. Franco-German reconciliation, European integration and reflections for Asia. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 8, March 2013

On 22 January 2013, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel gathered in Berlin to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the document that ended centuries of rivalry and warfare between their two countries. It is all too easy to forget the importance of Franco-German reconciliation. The 1950 Schuman Declaration, which led to the creation of the European Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), sought to render the prospect of war between France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible’. Over 60 years later, when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that indeed, ‘war between Germany and France is unthinkable’. Halfway around the world in Asia, the other theatre of World War II, tensions between China and Japan have arisen, with Taiwan and South Korea also in the fray. Nationalist movements in these countries have grown. This background brief lays out the issues for a timely reappraisal of the applicability, or otherwise, of the European integration and reconciliation processes to East Asia. The brief seeks to outline the contours of the historic act of Franco-German reconciliation, and its consequences ever since. Starting from a brief look at the history of rivalry and war between the two countries, the brief examines the events leading to the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and the development of Franco-German exchanges that have cemented the relationship. Difficulties between the countries are also raised. A timescale analysis of the opinion of the two publics is considered, as a measure of the success of Franco-German reconciliation.

The Berlin Republic and the real end of the post-war era. OSW Commentary No. 67, 2011-12-07

In the post-war era, Germany has undergone a deep change almost like clockwork every two decades. In 1949, the foundations were laid for the establishment of the two German states: the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; 1968–1969 was the time of the student revolt as a harbinger of the democratisation and liberalisation of society; and in 1989–1990, the process of unification took place, with all its consequences. Two decades later, another deep revision of the values is happening, as a consequence of which Germany is bidding a final farewell to the post-war epoch and its inherent certainties: its advancing society, the homogeneous national state and the faith in Europe as a solution to the ‘German question.’ This revision will not be revolutionary. However, as with the previous turning points, Germany is becoming a different state and a different society, which Europe will have to build its relations with anew.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.