European Union-Latin American relations in a turbulant era. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, Special December 2012

From the Introduction. The mere mentioning of “the Trans-Atlantic Relationship” generates a standard interpretation. Customary understanding claims that it is supposed to deal with the links between Europe and the United States (moderately expanded to include Canada, a country taken for granted). This is a view shared both in Brussels and Washington. This geographical concept very rarely refers to include the role of Mexico, for example. This “relationship” is never understood as triangular, formed by three partners (United States/Canada, Europe and Latin America/Caribbean). A quadrangular format, including Africa, is contemplated only in a bilateral sense (usually when one of the important partners (the United States or Europe) is considered as a protagonist. In sum, “Atlantis” (as an entity shared by all) is as mysterious and difficult to grasp as the myth of antiquity, as a problem that this volume surely tries to grasp and analysis.

The Border Management Programme in Central Asia: Explaining the European Union's Choice of Implementing Partners. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2014

Between 2003 and 2014 the European Union’s (EU) Border Management Programme in Central Asia was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, the latter’s implementing responsibilities have just come to an end, with the next phase of the programme to be implemented by an EU member state consortium. This paper seeks to explain why the EU chose the UNDP to implement the programme in the first place; why the programme was redelegated to the UNDP over successive phases; and why, in the end, the EU has opted for a member state consortium to implement the next phase of the programme. The paper will draw on two alternative accounts of delegation: the principal-agent approach and normative institutionalism. Ultimately, it will be argued that both the EU’s decision(s) to delegate (and redelegate) implementing responsibilities to the UNDP, and its subsequent decision to drop the organisation in favour of an EU member state consortium, were driven for the most part by a rationalist ‘logic of consequentiality’. At the same time, a potential secondary role of a normative institutionalist ‘logic of appropriateness’ – as a supplementary approach – will not be discounted.