Kyiv-in memoriam; Brussels-think big; Moscow-big rethink. CEPS Commentaries, 24 February 2014

In surveying the traumatic events of the last week in Kyiv, Michael Emerson reports on the profoundly moving scenes at the Maidan this last weekend, but goes on to offer constructive advice to the EU on its next move there; and the clear message to Russia that its coercive policies towards its most important neighbour do not work and need a big rethink.

Ukraine-A week of testing red lines ahead. CEPS Commentaries, 3 March 2014

Despite the rapidly escalating situation in Ukraine, Michael Emerson discerns in this CEPS Commentary a very slim margin of possibility that cooler heads may still prevail in the Crimean peninsula and allow a return to a mundane and peaceful normality.

Can Ukraine be saved at this 11th hour? CEPS Commentary, 2 May 2014

With Ukraine disintegrating before our eyes, Michael Emerson calls for the EU to convene again the Geneva Quad with the utmost urgency, and proposes a peacekeeping operation by a jointly flagged tripartite brigade of Ukrainian, EU and Russian troops and police to clean up the Maidan in Kyiv, moving on into Donetsk and Lugansk. This short-term action should also have long-term consequences for the European order, if it initiated a switch by the EU and Russia into a cooperative mode over their common neighbourhood.

Cameron’s reality check on Europe. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 38, 15 April 2014

Ever since Prime Minister David Cameron made his major speech on Europe on 23 January 2013, in which he argued for some kind of new deal between the UK and the EU, the rest of the EU as well as the British public have been wondering what he would actually propose in operational terms. On 15 March 2014, the Prime Minister offered at least an interim reply to these questions in an article in the Daily Telegraph newspaper. This paper extracts from the Daily Telegraph article the main ideas that the Prime Minister advances. In all, 10 propositions are identified, presented in the precise language used, followed by an appraisal. The article has not attracted so much attention, mainly because its content is not particularly sensational, but that is its real importance and quality. It points the way towards resolving what otherwise would mean a huge political crisis for the UK and the EU. The Prime Minister gave the overall impression that he is not now heading towards making an impossibly difficult list of demands. On the contrary, an informed and moderate realism seems to be in the making. The package outlined in this paper could be sold in Brussels. There would then have to be a robust communications campaign to sell it to the British public. This paper is part of a series for a CEPS-EPIN project on “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative”, which is pegged to an ambitious ongoing exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union. The intention is that this should provide a basis for informed debate before the referendum on the UK remaining in the EU or not, which is scheduled for 2017.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism. EPIN Paper No. 40, June 2014

This paper is the second in a series for a CEPS project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative”. It is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. In all, 32 sectoral policy reviews are being produced over the period 2013-2015, as input into public information and debate leading up to a referendum on whether the UK should remain in, or secede from, the EU, planned for 2017. This second set of reviews covers a broad range of EU policies (for the single market for goods, external trade, transport policy, environment, climate change, research, asylum, non-EU immigration, civil judicial cooperation, tourism, culture and sport). The findings confirm what emerged from the first set of reviews, namely that there is little or no case for repatriation of EU competences at the level they are defined in the treaties. This does not exclude that at a more detailed level there can be individual actions or laws that might be done better or not at all. However, that is the task of all the institutions to work at on a regular basis, and hardly a rationale for secession. For the UK in particular the EU has shown considerable flexibility in agreeing to special arrangements, such as in the case of the policies here reviewed of asylum, non-EU immigration and civil judicial cooperation. In other areas reviewed here, such as the single market for goods, external trade, transport, environment, climate change and research, there is a good fit between the EU’s policies and UK priorities, with the EU perceived by stakeholders as an ‘amplifier’ of British interests.

Towards a fresh deal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies: 15 steps. CEPS Commentary, 29 May 2014

Following the convincing election of Petro Poroshenko as Ukraine’s new President, Michael Emerson puts forward 15 steps with a view to creating a fresh start for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies.

Trade policy issues in the Wider Europe – that led to war and not yet to peace. CEPS Working Document No. 398, July 2014

This paper looks at the trade policy landscape of the EU and the wider Europe, with a focus on issues arising from the signature on 27 June 2014 of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between the EU and three East European countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), and actual or prospective issues relating to the customs union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (BRK), and the Eurasian Economic Union whose founding treaty was signed on 29 May 2014. The huge expansion of intercontinental free trade area negotiations currently underway, in which the EU is an active participant alongside much of the Americas and Asia, stands in contrast with Russia’s choice to restrict itself to the Eurasian Economic Union, which is only a marginal extension of its own economy. Alone among the major economies in the world, Russia does not seek to integrate economically with any major economic bloc, which should be a matter of serious concern for Moscow. Within the wider Europe, the EU’s DCFTAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are a major new development, but Russia now threatens trade sanctions against Ukraine in particular, the economic case for which seems unfounded and whose unilateral application would also impair the customs union. The Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan customs union itself poses several issues of compatibility with the rules of the WTO, which in turn are viewed by the EU as an impediment to discussing possible free trade scenarios with the customs union, although currently there are far more fundamental political impediments to any consideration of such ideas. Nonetheless, this paper looks at various long-term scenarios, if only as a reminder that there could be much better alternatives to the present context of conflict around Ukraine.

With the Scottish vote, Brussels can heave a great big sigh of relief. CEPS Commentary, 19 September 2014

On the morning after the momentous vote in Scotland, Michael Emerson also breathes a deep sigh of relief that the nightmare scenario of secession will not unfold and expresses his hope that Brussels can now return to its own business, with its renewed leadership feeling a bit encouraged to go about their burdensome agenda with more confidence.

Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

The Dano case – Or time for the UK to digest realities about the balance of competences between the EU and national levels. CEPS Commentary, 14 November 2014

The European Court of Justice's new judgment on the Dano case should be reverberating around the UK. In Michael Emerson's view, it shows how national competences can be deftly used to control for 'benefit tourism' without challenging EU law, and that the Court is not acting as the agent of 'EU competence creep', as alleged in the Eurosceptic's stereotype.

First Anniversary of the Vilnius Summit: Or, how Tolstoy might have portrayed the legacies of Yanukovich and Putin. CEPS Essay No. 18/25 November 2014

Taking inspiration from both Tolstoy’s epic novel War and Peace and the Bible, Michael Emerson reflects in this CEPS Essay on the tumultuous year that has passed since President Yanukovich reneged on signing Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU, and on President Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine, tearing up all norms of international relations and public morality and inducing the sanctions that now inflict grave economic damage on Russia itself.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

Proportionality needed in the subsidiarity debate in the EU – Appraisal of the British and Dutch initiatives. CEPS Essay No. 11, 8 April 2014

In a new CEPS Essay, Michael Emerson assesses the initiatives taken by the UK and Dutch governments to cut out excessive EU regulatory intrusion, namely in the form of the ongoing British Balance of Competences Review and the Dutch list of 54 items of EU regulation that they would like to see repealed or reformed. He concludes that while one can approve of a campaign for better EU regulation and for cutting out unnecessary micro-regulation, it would require impressive commitment by all member states and the EU institutions to follow the best features of the British and Dutch leads for this to have a real effect in the fight against populist euroscepticism. In his view, that battle will have to be won primarily with bigger weapons – some combination of better macroeconomic results, bigger foreign policy achievements and the emergence of a European-level political leadership to which the people can relate. In short, there has to be due proportionality in the diagnosis of the responsibility of inadequate subsidiarity for the EU’s ills.

After the Vilnius fiasco: Who is to blame? What is to be done? CEPS Essay No. 8, 21 January 2014

All three parties principally responsible for the Vilnius fiasco are to blame, each in their very different way: the EU for having drafted agreements with an inadequate balance between incentives and obligations, and vulnerable as a result to Putin’s aim to torpedo the whole process in favour of his misconceived Eurasian Union, while Yanukovich tried playing geo-political games that left him personally and the Ukrainian state as Putin’s hostage. It will require a major recalibration of policies to get this unstable new status quo back onto sound strategic lines, and proposals are advanced along three tracks in parallel: for rebuilding the remnants of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, for attempting to get Russia to take Lisbon to Vladivostok seriously, and for promoting a Greater Eurasia concept fit for the 21st century that would embrace the whole of the European and Asian landmass.