Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."

The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

The Weakness of Post-Communist Civil Society Reassessed. CES Papers - Open Forum #11, 2012

During the last two decades, scholars from a variety of disciplines have argued that civil society is structurally deficient in post-communist countries. Yet why have the seemingly strong, active and mobilized civic movements of the transition period become so weak after democracy was established? And why have there been diverging political trajectories across the post-communist space if civil society structures were universally weak? This paper uses a wide range of data from various available sources to show that civil societies in Central and Eastern European countries are not as feeble as is commonly assumed. Some post-communist countries possess vigorous public spheres, and active civil society organizations strongly connected to transnational civic networks able to shape domestic policies. Following the calls by Anheier (2004) and Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) we adopt a multidimensional approach to the measurement of civil society. In a series of cross-section timeseries models, we show that our broader measures of civic and social institutions are able to predict the diverging transition paths among post-communist regimes, and in particular the growing gap between democratic East Central Europe and the increasingly authoritarian post-Soviet space.

International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. COMECON, No. 549, September 1964

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance is the least known of all the regional organizations. This is attributable partly to the fact that it was largely dormant from its inception in 1949 until the late 1950s and partly to the scattered and fragmentary nature of information on its activities. The present article is an attempt to bring available knowledge into focus for a coherent pioture of the organization that "will probably play an increasing role in the economic development of East Central Europe." COMECON is of interest not only because of its importance as one of the regional bodies shaping a network of relations among European countries. Its interest lies also in the light it throws on the particular problems faced by centrally planned economies when they try to integrate and in its demonstration that international organizations have a life of their own.

Niemiecki sieci na wschodzie. Niemiecki soft power w Europie Wschodniej, Azji Centralnej i na Kaukazie Południowym: polityka – administracja – kultura – nauka – społeczenstwo. OSW Raport, wrzesien 2010. = German networks in the east. German soft power in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South Caucasus policy - administration - culture - science - the society of. CES Report, September 2010

Do realizacji niemieckich interesów w polityce zagranicznej, bezpieczeństwa i gospodarczej RFN wykorzystuje instrumenty soft power z obszaru dyplomacji publicznej, polityki rozwojowej, kulturalnej i naukowej. Budowanie sieci kontaktów i lobbing polityczny, programy współpracy rozwojowej oraz zagranicznej polityki kulturalnej i naukowej, mają służyć wspieraniu niemieckiej gospodarki uzależnionej od eksportu, uzyskaniu statusu europejskiego ośrodka technologii i innowacji oraz zwiększeniu wpływu RFN na działania zewnętrzne UE. Jednym z priorytetowych obszarów stosowania tych instrumentów są dla Niemiec państwa Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południowego i Azji Centralnej. Decydują o tym bliskość geograficzna i otwierające się rynki zbytu, konieczność modernizacji gospodarek tych krajów, zagrożenia dla „miękkiego” bezpieczeństwa RFN oraz rozwój relacji UE z tymi państwami. Niemiecka aktywność jest w tych krajach niezależna od sytuacji politycznej i stanowi długofalową strategię ugruntowującą pozycję RFN jako ich najważniejszego europejskiego partnera gospodarczego i politycznego.