The debates on citizenship in Morocco. Social movements and constitutional reform. EUSpring Working Paper No. 4, 11 August 2015

Introduction. The current debates on citizenship in Morocco are taking place in a political context marked by the events of the Arab Spring. How are political, social, legal, and identity-related dimensions of citizenship formulated in the context of a monarchy that has a long continuity in Moroccan history?

The Fundamental Rights Agency and Civil Society: Reminding the Gardeners of their Plants' Roots. EDAP 02/2012, 2012

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the EU body responsible for advising EU institutions on fundamental rights, is equipped with a Fundamental Rights Platform (FRP) to ensure an on-going and structured exchange of information and feedback between the FRA and Civil Society. When the FRA was founded in 2007, there was little pre-existing knowledge on how to design such a Platform; hence, the development of the relationship between the FRA and Civil Society over the first five years proved an interesting experiment. Although the Platform was never intended as a mechanism of democratic co-decision making, it is far more than a loose marketplace where Civil Society actors across the spectrum of fundamental rights themes gather. The Platform offers channels of consultation and exchange not only among the participants but also with the FRA. It allows for cross-pollination, ensuring informed grassroots input into FRA work and FRA expertise flow to Civil Society actors. This synergetic relationship builds upon both the self-organising forces of Civil Society and the terms of references of the FRP as defined by the FRA. The Platform allows to find a certain unity in the remarkable diversity of fundamental rights voices. To what degree, however, the Platform’s dynamics allow the transformation of sometimes ‘compartmentalised’ single human rights discussions into wider trans-sectoral and transnational debates within the Human Rights Community depends on the motivation and the interest(s) of the different Civil Society players.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

Subsidiarity between Law and Economics. Research Papers in Law, 1/2005

From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.

Between Apathy and Anger: Challenges to the Union from the 2014 Elections to the European Parliament. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 39, 20 May 2014

This EPIN study brings together contributions from a ​broad selection of member states ​and ​provid​es ​insightful analysis ​into the 2014 elections to the European Parliament on the ground. The report reveals the different factors that impede the development of genuine European elections and the consequences of the ballot in the member states covered by the study​, namely Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the UK​,​ and at EU level. The report finds that: • The EP Resolution to encourage European parties to nominate candidates for the next Commission President has not really increased public interest in the EU and voter turnout will probably remain low. • Visibility of the European top candidates in most member states has been quite limited. • National manifestos do not coincide – and sometimes event conflict with – the European parties’ manifestos. • Election debates focus on national issues; EU issues are only brought to public debate when they are relevant for domestic politics. • Again, we will see a protest vote against governments and large parties. The EP elections are still perceived as a test ahead of local and national elections, or as a vote of confidence in national governments. • This year the protest vote also concerns the EU. The report predicts a more eurosceptic ballot that might complicate decision-making in the EU, exacerbate the conflict between the national and European levels and increase tensions among member states.

Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/08, July 2014

From the Introduction. In the long shadow of the euro-area crisis, the relationship between governments and their banks has been brought to the the centre of the policy debate in Europe by the implementation of regulatory reforms, the risks associated with financial fragmentation, and the fight to sustain the flow of credit to governments and corporates. The attempt to interpret the patterns of pressure and influence running between governments and their financial system has led commentators to rediscover and give new life to concepts originating from academic debates of the 1970s such as “regulatory capture” and “financial repression”. Government agencies have been frequently described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, often allowing financial interests to hijack political, regulatory and supervisory processes in order to favouring their own private interests over the public good1. An opposite view has instead pointed the finger at governments, which have often been portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system to their benefit, either in order to secure better financing conditions to overcome their own financial difficulties, or with the objective of directing credit to certain sectors of the economy, “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets and potentially the private interests of some of its participants2

The European Council's strategic guidelines and immigration: can the EU be bold and innovative? EPC Commentary, 25 June 2014

The agenda of the June 2014 EU Summit will be particularly heavy. Alongside issues related to the conclusion of the European Semester, the climate and energy framework, possible debates about Ukraine, Iraq and Syria, EU leaders will have to decide on two key dossiers: the nomination of the next Commission President and the future of the area of freedom, security and justice.