Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

The Central European Predicament. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 9, May 2014

From Introduction. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has experienced a very deep economic and political transformation since the beginning of the nineties. The early years of transition were characterized by big hopes for a quick and successful development. The international community, including the EU and the USA showed interest in the transformation of the region for a number of reasons. From a geopolitical perspective, the transformation was of tremendous importance as it confirmed the end of the cold war and the bipolar global system was replaced first by a unipolar superpower system and later gave way to a multipolar or a new bipolar system. This also signaled the weakness of the Soviet Union (and later Russia), as it was not able to prevent this transformation and was soon mired in a serious and long lasting economic and political crisis that undermined its international position. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the nineties Russia remained very weak, both economically and politically. The power vacuum and the transformation in Central Europe made the establishment of a new international economic and security structure possible. The new economic and political pattern that started to develop within the region was based on the liberal market economy model, with the objective of opening up markets and integrating the region into the world economy and the North Atlantic security structure.

Germany's European Policy: A Constructivist Perspective. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.1, 1998

This paper sets out a constructivist analytical framework and applies it to post-reunification German policy towards the European Union. Although the structural constraints facing Germany shifted dramatically with the end of the Cold War and reunification, the direction of its European policy did not. The more powerful Federal Republic continued to press for deeper economic and political integration, eschewing a more independent or assertive foreign policy course. Neorealism, neoliberalism, and liberalism cannot adequately explain this continuity in the face of structural change; a constructivist account centered around state identity can. During and after reunification, German leaders across the political spectrum identified the Federal Republic as part of an emergent supranational community. This European identity, with roots in the postwar decades, drove Germany's unflagging support for deeper integration across the 1989-90 divide.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

The Ukraine crisis and the demise of the European Security order. EPC Policy Brief, 1 December 2015

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent war in the Donbas have delivered a severe blow to the European security order, and have increased tensions between the West and Russia to a level unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. In this context, it would be difficult to start negotiating a new commitment to the principles of the European security order. In this Policy Brief, Paul Ivan analyses the Ukraine crisis and its effect on European security and calls for the EU and NATO to stand firm on their own principles, but also to engage carefully with Russia to develop mechanisms to contain risks and avoid escalation and military confrontation, whether in Syria, the Baltic, the Mediterranean or the Black seas. The recent shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkish forces makes clear the need to prevent such incidents with potential rapid escalatory dynamics.

Turkey makes a mockery of Europe’s claim to uphold democratic values. EPC Commentary, 16 March 2016

The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.

Turkey makes a mockery of Europe's claim to uphold democratic values. EPC Commentary, 16 March 2016

The 7 March EU-Turkey migration crisis summit took place three days after the Turkish authorities seized Feza media group, which includes Turkey’s largest circulation daily Zaman and its English language sister paper Today’s Zaman. The seizure was the latest development in the worst crackdown on fundamental rights and freedoms Turkey has witnessed in decades. Yet because Turkey is vital in dealing with the migration/refugee crisis, the EU’s response was meek to say the least. For the first time since the Cold War – when Turkey was key in shoring up Europe’s security – Ankara has found itself in a particular position of strength. Turkey has skillfully exploited the EU’s and particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s urgent need to find a way out of the crisis.

EU democratization policies in the Neighbourhood countries and Russia’s reaction as a destabilizing factor. A comparative case study of Georgia and Moldova. Bruges Political Research Papers 45/2015.

The EU democratization policies have not achieved the expected results in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. On the contrary, they have led to the outbreak of the most important crisis in Europe after the end of the cold war. A new vision of cooperation in the field of democracy is necessary in the East, as long as even Georgia and Moldova, countries considered to be the most advanced among the EaP states, have not registered essential progress in the democratization of their societies. Assuming that democratization, as part of EU’s neighbourhood policies, can be considered a threat to Russia and hence a ‘destabilizing factor’ for the EU partners, this thesis tried to understand what changes can be made to EU policies and to what extent cooperation between EU and Russia is possible in the process developing democratization policies in Georgia and Moldova. While arguing for the revitalization of the instruments used for the implementation of the democratization policies, this thesis finds that cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of democracy is excluded as long as the two geo-political actors have different values and different views on the notion of democracy. The most likely cooperation that might occur between EU and Russia is the establishment of a Common Economic Space ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. Even though such a scenario would have the potential to reduce confrontation between the two actors in the common neighbourhood, this cooperation would, however, have a negative impact on the on-going democratic reforms in Georgia and Moldova.

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. OSW Commentary NUMBER 216 | 05.07.2016

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.