Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.

From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/04, February 2012

The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.

The new European framework for managing bank crises. CEPS Policy Brief No. 304, 21 November 2013

This Policy Brief describes and discusses the proposals for a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks and for a Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR). The authors find that the proposals are generally well designed and present a consistent approach, yet there is room for improvement, including the streamlining of procedures for the start of resolution, which now entail much overlap in the powers attributed to the various institutions involved (the Commission, the Single Resolution Board and the European Central Bank). The paper makes a number of key recommendations to facilitate discussions for stakeholders and regulators.

Bail-in Provisions in State Aid and Resolution Procedures: Are they consistent with systemic stability? CEPS Policy Brief No. 318, 21 May 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief examines the provisions for bail-in in the European Union – that is, the principle whereby any public measure to recapitalise a bank with insufficient prudential capital must be preceded by a write-down or conversion into equity of creditors’ claims – in state aid policies and in the new resolution framework for failing banks, with two aims: i) to assess whether and how they are coordinated and ii) more importantly, whether they address satisfactorily the question of systemic stability that may arise when investors fear that creditors’ claims are likely to be bailed-in in a bank crisis. The issue is especially relevant in the present context, as the comprehensive assessment exercise underway for EU banks falling under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank may lead supervisors to require substantial capital injections simultaneously for many of the banks involved, possibly shaking investors’ confidence across EU banking markets. The authors conclude that the two sets of rules are, broadly speaking, mutually consistent and that they already contain sufficient safeguards to address systemic stability concerns. However, the balance of the elements underpinning the European Commission’s decisions in individual cases may not be clear to bank creditors and potential investors in financial markets. The impression of unneeded rigidity on this very sensitive issue has been heightened by official statements over-emphasising that each case will be assessed individually under competition rules, thus feeding the concern that the systemic dimension of the issue may have been underestimated. Therefore, further clarification by the Commission may be needed on how the various criteria will be applied during the ongoing transition to banking union – perhaps through a new communication completing the state aid framework for banks in view of the adoption of the new resolution rules.