The Orange Revolution in Ukraine: An attempt to understand the reasons. OSW Study 18/2005

The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.

Why Is Sovereign Debt Restructuring a Challenge? The Case of Greece. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 24/2012

The reduction of Greek sovereign debt by €106 billion, agreed in the second bailout package of February 2012, is the largest in history. Nevertheless, immediately after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose whether it would achieve its goals: to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% in 2020 and to ensure the return of Greece to market financing by 2015. This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical framework through which the expected failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. It surveys the economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring: (1) sovereign’s fundamentals, (2) inefficiencies inherent in the restructuring process and (3) costs of restructuring; and applies them to the case of Greece. Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece to enact current structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the introduction of uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty, discipline the runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not recommended as a universal solution for over- indebtedness in the EU, given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring and the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises.

European Integration and Europeanisation: Benefits and Disadvantages for Business. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 29/2013

European integration is a project of great economic importance for the 500 million consumers and 21 million companies in Europe. With the economic borders between Member States removed, Europeanisation becomes inevitable for companies. The paper proposes a framework to analyse the benefits and disadvantages for business that come with the process of European integration, structured according to the logic of the four fundamental freedoms of movement within the Internal Market (freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people) complemented by the section on technology and innovation, and the general EU regulatory environment. Whereas the business decisions need to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration firm’s own capabilities and resources as well as industry specificities, several recommendations for companies willing to Europeanise are made, based on an analysis of the regulatory macro-environment of the EU. Above all, any company willing to be successful in the EU has to become a learning organisation, responsive to the advancements of the macro-environment. The ability to anticipate the regulatory developments and to adjust one’s own business and corporate strategy accordingly is the key to achieving sustainable competitive advantage in the European Union.

EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

The New Deal with the United Kingdom: the Downside of Flexibility. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 38/2016

This paper examines the proposals listed by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in response to the letter sent by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, asking for a fresh settlement concerning the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. The paper reviews the nature and possible consequences of the “substantial changes” that were demanded in the areas of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration.

A New Settlement for the UK: A “Leap in the Dark”. Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 39/2016

This paper examines the outcome of the negotiations for a new settlement concerning the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. It reviews the nature and possible consequences of the “substantial changes” that were demanded in the areas of economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. We argue that the proposed arrangements do not amount to much and can prove harmful to the future of the EU. The paper is a follow-up to our analysis of the initial proposals, available under Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, 38/2016.

Language, Identity, Politics-the Myth of Two Ukraines. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, April 2014

The narrative of two Ukraines – the existence of two separate cultural-political communities within one Ukrainian state – has accompanied the relatively short history of inde-pendent Ukraine from the very be-ginning. Articulated by Mykola Ryabchuk more than twenty years ago1 and seemingly logical and reasonable, it has become the fa-vourite narrative of many Ukrainian and international commentators and analysts. One of these Ukraines is pro-European, shares liberal democracy values, wants to join the European Union, “return to Europe” and, what is very im-portant, speaks Ukrainian. The symbolic centre of this Ukraine is Lviv. The other is nostalgic about the Soviet Union, has close rela-tions with contemporary Russia, is hostile towards the West and does not share “western” values. The language of this other Ukraine is Russian and its “capital” is Do-netsk. Taking on board this narra-tive simply means equating one’s region of residence, political views, and preferred language.