Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Evidence on migrants' integration in Europe

From the Introduction. This report summarizes the main outcomes of a multidisciplinary study carried out from September 2013 to March 2015 by a group of forty researchers from different disciplines (7) and countries (10). The project Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) was co-funded by the European Commission DG Home Affairs and its activities have been steered by the Ismu Foundation with the aim to feed the debate on integration governance and provide knowledge on the state of play of migrant inclusion throughout the European Union. To ensure the study’s comprehensiveness seven disciplines were involved: demography, economics, political science, social science, applied social studies, public administration and European policy. This different expertise deepened the research through utilizing various perspectives. Notably, the inclusion of public administrators in the research team provided insights on the importance of the policy vision. An analytical and prescriptive combined approach was used. Therefore, moving from the Common Basic Principles on migrants’ integration KING’s frame is partly shaped on the heuristic model of R. Penninx. This model analyses integration as it occurs in three dimensions (legal-political, socio-economic, cultural-religious) taking into account migrants’ and receiving societies’ role and position at institutional, collective and individual levels. By looking at these dimensions, KING provides evidence on integration processes and policies useful to provide recommendations for a better implementation of the Common Basic Principles of migrants' integration.