22 resultados para Administrative law--Turkey


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As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

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From the Introduction. In the academic year 1991-1992, Utrecht University, on my initiative, started to offer courses in European criminal law. This initiative came at a symbolic moment, just prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaty of Maastricht1 and the outlining of European policy in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Director of the Legal Department, Paul DEMARET, was aware of the significance of this development and I have been given the opportunity to teach this subject at the College of Europe since 1995. Since then, JHA has evolved into one of the main areas of EU legislation. Now we are again on the threshold of an important historical feat. In June 2003, the European Convention reached agreement concerning a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.2 The use of the term “Constitution” for the future EU Treaty is not simply cosmetic. The realisation has dawned that EU integration must be embedded in a treaty document which also regulates the rights and duties of citizens, not just with respect to European citizenship, but also with respect to, for example, Justice. Where JHA is concerned, this result acknowledges that the harmonisation of criminal law and criminal procedure and transnational cooperation cannot preclude the harmonisation of principles of due law and fair trial. Despite the substantial Europeanisation of criminal law, many criminal lawyers are defending the achievements and typicalities of their national criminal law like never before. EU initiatives are assessed from the perspective of the national agenda and national achievements. We are still too far removed from a European criminal law policy that is both European and enjoys national support. The core issue is therefore not how to keep our criminal (procedural) law national and free from European influences, but rather how to ensure democratic decision making, the quality of the constitutional state and the guarantees of criminal law in a national administrative model which has to operate increasingly interactively within a European and international context. In this contribution, the contours of the Europeanisation of criminal law are outlined and analysed. First, attention will be paid to the EC and, second, to the JHA. Following this, an evaluation and a look ahead at the current IGC are indicated.

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From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.

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The coming weeks and months will be decisive for the general tenor of politics in Turkey. The country faces local elections this March, presidential elections in August and general elections next June, while top-level political scandals compound the deterioration in the state of democracy and rule of law. At the same time, stagnation in Turkey’s accession process continues to sour relations with the EU. In this new Policy Brief, Steven Blockmans puts forward a number of recommendations to help drive the EU accession process forward, namely the early opening of negotiation chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), in line with the EU’s so-called New Approach. In that way reform could not just be assured on paper, but a track record in implementation could be established throughout the process. To achieve this, member states, and Cyprus in particular, need to be persuaded to end their opposition to formulating benchmarks for the opening of accession negotiating chapters 23 and 24.

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On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

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Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkey’s accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkey’s accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a “candidate country”, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EU’s new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Union’s current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.

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Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.