Why the EU must reengage with Turkey. EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkey’s accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkey’s accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a “candidate country”, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EU’s new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Union’s current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.

Greece & the European Agenda: EU Enlargement and European Monetary Union. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.2, 1998

In the decade to come, the European Union will embark on two new projects, each destined to transform it in fundamental ways: (i) Eastern enlargement, and (ii) economic and monetary union. Neither of these projects will affect all members equally or in the same way. But Greece will, for two reasons, be affected in a manner qualitatively different to all other member states. First, Greece is the only country physically affected by the Luxembourg Summit's decision to begin accession negotiations with some, but not all, Central and Eastern European applicant countries: as a result of this decision, she will continue, for at least another eight to ten years, to be the only member country not to share a common border with another member state, with all the consequent implications in economic and geostrategic terms. Second, when the European Council meets in early May to select those member states that are deemed to have met the convergence criteria, it will find that Greece is the only member state falling short of those criteria. This development may create additional difficulties for her economy during the transitional period of derogation. It will also pose new risks to Greece, insofar as she will be absent during the initial-and crucial-years of establishing a common monetary policy.

Hostages to dialogue. The process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations. OSW COMMENTARY No. 214, 2016-06-08

In March 2011, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia started a dialogue that was intended to lead to the normalisation of mutual relations. This process, launched under the pressure of the EU, was aimed at building up confidence between the parties and resolving the everyday problems of the Serbian and Albanian communities, and as a consequence, reducing tension in the Western Balkans. The start of talks between representatives of the antagonist countries was the breakthrough that led to the Kosovo government gaining control over the whole of its territory, the establishment of a border (or ‘administrative boundary line’, as Belgrade calls it), and the start of the process of subordinating the Kosovo Serbian institutions to the authorities in Prishtina. Serbia also lifted its trade blockade on Kosovo, and allowed Prishtina to join the regional organisations. As a result, progress has been made in the process of integration of both states with the EU: Serbia has started accession negotiations, and Kosovo has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

Too cold to handle: EU accession talks with Iceland. CEPS Commentary, 3 June 2013

Recent opinion polls suggest that most Icelanders are against joining the EU. By the same token, however, a majority of those polled are in favour of continuing accession talks. These results show that Iceland’s relationship with the EU is a deeply divisive issue within the country. Although no date for the referendum has been set, the new centre-right coalition may thus want to settle this matter as soon as possible. Should there indeed be a majority in support of continuing negotiations, then Iceland’s accession process will become a complicated and cool affair in the hands of an anti-EU membership coalition government.