38 resultados para 133-824C
Resumo:
Following several years of political turmoil triggered by constitutional reform (a shift from a presidential to a semi-presidential system) and electoral reshuffles (parliamentary elections in 2012; presidential elections in 2013), the political situation in Georgia has stabilised: key posts in the country are now in the hands of democratically elected members of the Geor-gian Dream coalition. Despite its mosaic-like structure and internaltensions, Georgian Dream remains strong and enjoys high levels of public support. This puts it in good stead to play a central role in Georgian politics in the foreseeable future, including securing victory in the local government elections scheduled for June. However, local billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili does not currently hold a political office - despite the fact that he is the founder, sponsor and undisputed leader of the coalition, as well as former prime minister and the most popular public figure in Georgia (besides Patriarch Ilia II). This raises several questions, for example: Who is really at the helm of the Georgian state? What is the lon-g-term vision of the current government? The past achievements of the politically heterogeneo-us Georgian Dream - dominated by Mr Ivanishvili - offer little help in answering these questions. In addition to a series of challenges on the domestic front, the new Georgian leadership is also facing strategic geopolitical challenges, compounded by the current conflict in Ukraine. These include the future of Georgia’s relations with the West (including the process of EU and NATO integration) and with Russia (in response to repeated attempts to re-integrate the post-Soviet republics). The scale and dynamism of the changes in both the geopolitical order in the post-Soviet region and in the relations between Russia and the West are causing further questions to be raised about their impact on the position of the Georgian political elite and about their consequences for the entire country.
Resumo:
A key element of Russia’s policy towards the new government of Ukraine concerns demands for a constitutional reform that would transform the country from a unitary into a federal state in a way that would considerably privilege the eastern and southern regions. Such a change to Ukraine’s administrative system would enable Moscow to put pressure on Ukraine’s central government via the regions. In order to achieve its objectives, Russia has been pressuring Kyiv to establish a constitutional assembly in a form that would guarantee the endorsement of solutions dictated by Russia. In other words, Russia has been demanding, in what is practically an ultimatum, that Ukraine give up one of the fundamental sovereign rights of a state, the right to freely determine its system of government. Transforming Ukraine into a federal state is an unacceptable idea, primarily because the intention behind Russia’s demands is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, both through the content of the proposed changes and the way in which they are to be implemented. However, keeping in place the current, centralist model of state governance is not a feasible alternative. Ukraine will have to grant its regions broad self-governance powers, including the power to hold local referendums, and to transfer a considerable portion of the prerogatives currently held by the state to the local self-governments, along with adequate financial resources. That is because decentralisation along these lines is the only way forward towards a modern democracy in Ukraine. Russia’s policy has forced Kyiv to undertake legislative work on constitutional reform as a matter of urgency, rather than waiting until a new parliament is elected in which the new, post-Maidan balance of political power will be reflected, as political logic would require. The first draft of the constitutional amendments (of which no details are known at this stage) is to be presented in mid-May, and is expected to come into force in early autumn. However, whether these plans can be put into practice depends on further developments in the eastern part of Ukraine, because (among other reasons) if a state of emergency is introduced, the constitutional amendment process will have to be suspended.
