From Lampedusa to the Post-Stockholm Programme: Difficult European solidarity in the field of migration. European Policy Brief No. 24, March 2014

Solidarity is a founding principle of the European migration policy. To hold true, Member States must be faithful to their common commitment to European migration rules and implement fair burden sharing of the costs attached to border controls. However, solidarity among Member States appears altogether fragile and under threat, a situation that could jeopardise the founding principle of the free movement of persons in the European Union’s space. The recent solidarity crisis among Member States was solved by an increased externalisation of the European migration policy. Consequently, for the EU to live up to its values, it will have to prove itself generous towards third countries.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

A game played according to Lukashenka’s rules: the political opposition in Belarus. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 176, 08.07.2015

The Belarusian opposition is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since Alyaksandr Lukashenka took power in 1994. Following many months of negotiations, opposition leaders failed to select a joint candidate for the presidential election scheduled for 11th October. The failure of this latest round of talks has proven that not only is the opposition unlikely to threaten Lukashenka’s rule; it will not even be able to demonstrate to society that it could provide a genuine alternative to the present government.

Energising the TTIP: Political economy of the trade policy rationale. Paper No. 9 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’and CEPS Special Report No. 113/July 2015

Despite accounting for a significant share of global trade and the resulting interdependencies from it, energy governance remains largely fragmented and there is no global framework or agreement defining the rules of energy trade. This paper, after presenting the main global and regional energy market developments, discusses the opportunities to ‘energise the TTIP’, i.e. to include a chapter dedicated to trade and cooperation in the sphere of energy. The shale revolution in the US, the ever-rising interconnectedness of energy markets (recently proven by the disappearance of the ‘Asian gas premium’) and the EU’s quest to diversify its energy supplies generally sets favourable conditions to reinforce energy relations between the EU and the US. The question, as is often the case, is whether there is sufficient political will to tighten relations in a strategic sphere with connotations for national security and sovereignty.

The Schengen governance package - another missed opportunity? IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/1 February 2015

The Schengen Area of free movement is considered to be one of the most substantial and, in the eyes of many, most successful achievements of European integration. In 2014, the ‘Schengen Governance Package’, which alters the rules of the Schengen co-operation, came into force. It is a response to conflict among Member States in maintaining the common zone of freedom of movement. This Policy Brief aims to analyse how this package was developed and to assess whether it represents a suitable response to the conflict and difficulties within the Schengen agreement. The Brief argues that the Governance Package only touches on one part of the problem, namely border controls, whereas it does not deal with solidarity and burden-sharing and hence represents another missed opportunity to improve cooperation in the Schengen Area.

The limitations of policy coordination in the euro area under the European Semester. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015

The European Semester is a yearly process of the European Union to improve economic policy coordination and ensure the implementation of the EU’s economic rules. Each Semester concludes with recommendations for the euro area as a whole and for each EU member state. We show that implementation of recommendations was poor at the beginning of the Semester in 2011, and has deteriorated since. The European Semester is not particularly effective at enforcing even the EU’s fiscal and macroeconomic imbalance rules. We find that euro-area recommendations with tangible economic goals are not well reflected in the recommendations issued to member states. Finally, we review various proposals to improve the efficiency of the European Semester and conclude that while certain steps could be helpful, policy coordination will likely continue to have major limitations.

How to reconcile the EU border paradox? The concurrence of refugee reception and deterrence. IES Policy Brief 2015/4, November 2015

The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe in the summer of 2015 questions the effectiveness of European border and refugee policies. The breakdown of the Dublin and Schengen rules due to chaotic situations at the borders in the Balkans marks a critical juncture for the EU. We consider this breakdown as a consequence of a long-lasting co-operation crisis among EU Member States. The most recent Council decision responds to this co-operation crisis (Council Decision 12098/15). This Policy Brief analyses EU policy and politics and argues that plans for refugee relocation and reception centres as well as the use of qualified majority voting in the Council can unfold a dynamic that helps to solve the co-operation crisis. However, underlying the problems of co-operation and effectiveness is the EU’s border paradox: while EU border policy works towards refugee deterrence, EU asylum policy aims at refugee protection. The EU’s approach in regulating borders and asylum can be understood in terms of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 1993). Reconciling the paradox calls for overcoming such hypocrisy.

TTIP and Public Procurement: Going beyond the tip of the iceberg. CEPS Policy Brief No. 339, March 2016

Trade negotiations involving international public procurement rules are on the rise, stimulating a growing interest in having a clear picture of the economic stakes involved, including the current level of international openness. A recent paper published by the European Centre for International Political Economy (Messerlin, 2016) made an attempt to provide a range of estimates for the EU and the US and found relatively low rates of import penetration. This analytical approach, however, looked only at the ‘tip of the procurement iceberg’, as the data used covered primarily only one modality of international procurement (direct cross-border), which is not the main avenue for international government procurement. Other modalities, such as procurement from foreign subsidiaries established in Europe, account for much more. Such an approach therefore ignores the main modalities through which foreign firms win EU contracts. Once these other main procurement modalities are taken into account, EU openness in procurement is much higher. Comparable data across all modalities do not yet exist for the US, but we do have clear evidence that the US has introduced the largest number of protectionist procurement measures since 2008 affecting all modalities for international procurement. Against this background, this Policy Brief makes four basic points: i. Public procurement is a key area of trade negotiations, and TTIP is no exception to this rule. ii. The existing levels of openness in procurement markets need to be assessed across all three main procurement modalities and not based only on direct cross-border procurement, which is not the main procurement avenue. According to this comprehensive metric, the EU market already has a high foreign participation rate, including by US companies. iii. Unfortunately, similar data do not exist for the US market. But there is growing evidence of discriminatory measures introduced in recent years, which impede the ability of EU firms to compete on a level-playing field in US procurement markets. iv. The importance of procurement as a key negotiating area requires better data and a greater analytical engagement.

System Costs of Variable Renewable Energy in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 37/2015

To shift to a low-carbon economy, the EU has been encouraging the deployment of variable renewable energy sources (VRE). However, VRE lack of competitiveness and their technical specificities have substantially raised the cost of the transition. Economic evaluations show that VRE life-cycle costs of electricity generation are still today higher than those of conventional thermal power plants. Member States have consequently adopted dedicated policies to support them. In addition, Ueckerdt et al. (2013) show that when integrated to the power system, VRE induce supplementary not-accounted-for costs. This paper first exposes the rationale of EU renewables goals, the EU targets and current deployment. It then explains why the LCOE metric is not appropriate to compute VRE costs by describing integration costs, their magnitude and their implications. Finally, it analyses the consequences for the power system and policy options. The paper shows that the EU has greatly underestimated VRE direct and indirect costs and that policymakers have failed to take into account the burden caused by renewable energy and the return of State support policies. Indeed, induced market distortions have been shattering the whole power system and have undermined competition in the Internal Energy Market. EU policymakers can nonetheless take full account of this negative trend and reverse it by relying on competition rules, setting-up a framework to collect robust EU-wide data, redesigning the architecture of the electricity system and relying on EU regulators.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? Insights from the original Taylor Rule. CEPS Policy Brief No. 342, April 2016

Central banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. This Policy Brief finds that while consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. Nor is the real economy sending any deflationary signals either: unemployment is at record lows in the US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary spiral. In today’s high-debt environment, the authors argue that central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. They conclude that if the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional measures to fight deflation, which does not exist. In short, economic conditions are slowly normalising; so should monetary policy.