After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

Eurozone Debt Crisis: Reckless debtors or misguided rescuers? EuropEos Commentary No. 10, 26 May 2011

Based on the latest round of difficulties to emerge from the Greek financial assistance programme, this commentary concludes that there are serious flaws in the design of the eurozone’s crisis management system that periodically push the members to the brink of financial meltdown. He warns that the same is bound to happen again with Ireland and Portugal, and each time with higher risks that the fabric of cooperation within the eurozone will tear irreparably. In order to fix them, he proposes three basic changes to the crisis management arrangements and the design of the European Stabilty Mechanism (ESM) decided in March by the European Council.

Making the most of Energy Union. CEPS Commentary, 16 December 2014

By elevating “Energy Union” to the status of a Commission mission statement, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker succeeded in forging a new EU consensus on energy and climate change at the October European Council meeting. In a move that was made possible by linking the internal energy market and climate change agendas to security of supply, solidarity and infrastructure, the initiative notably meets the interests of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the peripheral member states. This commentary by a team of energy specialists at CEPS applauds this new development, but cautions that the European Commission will soon need to give it real meaning and substance before Energy Union can become reality. With this objective in mind, the authors outline six priorities to which Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič should give immediate attention.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 81/February 2015

This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.

Greece back on centre stage: the results of a déjà vu summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 23 March 2015

The March 2015 European Council might not enter history books, but the outcome of an informal ‘mini summit’ between seven EU leaders has the potential to prepare the grounds for a breakthrough in the negotiations between Athens and its lenders. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the search for a compromise promises to be a cumbersome, time-consuming and nerveracking exercise. But a solution now seems possible, proving all those doomsayers who have been predicting a ‘Grexit’ or ‘Graccident’ wrong. On other topics, EU leaders committed their countries to build an Energy Union, although questions remain about whether member states will agree to cede sovereignty on a number of significant points. This analysis looks also at the economic issues dealt with at the Spring Summit, with a focus on the perspectives for the European Semester and the Juncker Investment Plan. It ends with a summary of decisions taken on a number of other topics, including relations with Russia and Ukraine, the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, developments in Libya and in Tunisia, and the endorsement of the Council’s new Secretary General.

Politicising the Union? The Influence of ‘Leading Candidates’ for the Commission Presidency. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 36, October 2014

‘Leading candidates’ competed for the European Commission Presidency in the campaign for the European elections in May 2014. This element of political contestation poses a challenge to the Union’s institutional design. This article investigates to what extent competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthen the role of European Parliament (EP) party groups. In light of the example of the ‘Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats’ and its ‘leading candidate’, Martin Schulz, it is shown that the election campaign did strive to be EU-wide. However, Schulz’s influence on internal party cohesion and coalition formation remained limited. Therefore the influence of an elected ‘leading candidate’ is regarded as a symbolic act, which could deepen the relationship between the EP and the Commission as well as strengthen the democratic and political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the European Council.

Promoting the agenda for a social Economic and Monetary Union: Attention, credibility and coalition-building. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 37, November 2014

In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.

The EU's migrant strategy: a welcome new impetus. EPC Commentary, 19 May 2015

The publication of the Commission's agenda on migration comes at a difficult time: first and foremost in humanitarian terms on account of the recurrent and intolerable tragedies taking place in the Mediterranean, which demand a rapid response; and secondly, in political terms, if we consider both the economic situation (the crisis) and the political situation (the rise of far-right and anti-European parties) which makes all debate and action in this field rather tricky. In this context, the Juncker Commission faced a sensitive challenge because it needed to act quickly but had only limited room for manoeuvre. While certain guidelines had already been revealed at the European Council meeting on 23 April, the publication of the agenda has provided the Commission with an opportunity to recall and to specify the actions it wishes to undertake in the immediate, medium, and long terms. There are three aspects to the agenda worth highlighting: its innovation, its confirmation, and its long-term vision.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Solidarity and asylum seekers: member states agreed to disagree. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2015

At the June 2015 European Council, European leaders were meant to come to an agreement in order to help Italy and Greece cope with the increasing number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving on their shores. They were invited to give their agreement on a proposal from the European Commission to set up a mandatory relocation scheme, i.e. a scheme defining the precise number of asylum seekers that should be relocated to each member state over the next two years.

Flashlight Europe N°6–June 2015. Waiting for the Five Presidents’ Report on the Future of the Monetary Union: What do we need to know?

At the European Summit on 25-26 June Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, will be presenting a report on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It has been drawn up by the presidents of the EU Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and the Eurogroup, and is a sequel to the “Four Presidents’ Report” on the same topic that was compiled without the participation of the President of the European Parliament and presented in 2012. In this Flashlight we provide answers to key questions about the forthcoming report.

Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.

Dear Donald … Yours, David. CEPS Commentary, 12 November 2015

The cordial letter of November 10th from the British Prime Minister to the President of the European Council is an important document. It sets the stage for deliberations on whether the UK stays in the EU, or quits in an historic act of destructive disintegration for the EU that condemns the UK to what has fittingly been called “the spectre of geo-political irrelevance”. Overall the letter is looking like a plausible move towards settling the Brussels part of the Prime Minister’s manifest objective to keep the UK in the EU, argues Michael Emerson in this CEPS Commentary. But there is one major part of the debate that is underdeveloped so far: the clarification of the scenarios and consequences of secession. Eurosceptics have not detailed their positions on how to manage the secession, but what is becoming clearer is that all conceivable options are far more problematic than the status quo.

The EU deal to avoid Brexit: Take it or leave. CEPS Special Report No. 131/February 2016

Beyond the drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February 2016, what became clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 EU member states to agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated settlement on the UK’s relationship within the European Union. The deal has provided David Cameron with the political capital he needed to call a date for the in/out referendum and to lead a campaign for the UK to stay in the EU. Yet, for all the technical reforms packed into it, the deal is neither a crowd pleaser nor a vote winner. It does, however, mark a watershed acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional process of ‘ever closer union’. In this CEPS Special Report, Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans analyse the substance of the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” and shed light on its legal character. They contextualise this EU deal to avoid Brexit, and draw on the conclusions reached in a simulation of European Council negotiations between representatives of think tanks in the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in October 2015.

EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

EU-Turkey relations in the scope of the ongoing refugee crisis were at the heart of the European Council meeting of 7 March 2016. Among the set of initiatives proposed, the following two have attracted the most attention: First, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. This has come to be known as the ‘one for one’ resettlement approach. Second, all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey without offering any guarantee of protection.