Nord Stream II – Another test for EU unity. EPC Commentary, 9 October 2015

In September 2015, Gazprom and major European energy companies (Germany's E.ON and BASF/Wintershall, Austria's OMV, France’s ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell) signed an agreement to double the Nord Stream gas pipeline’s capacity by 2019. The plan is to transport up to 55 billion additional cubic meters of gas a year to Germany through the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European countries.

The Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU. OSW POINT OF VIEW 53, 2015-08-20

The Southern Gas Corridor is a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects controlled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, each at a different stage of implementation. The crisis in EU-Russia relations over Ukraine has made the two players interested in the Southern Gas Corridor once again. Brussels views it as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of gas supplies and a way to reinforce its position against Russia. In turn, Moscow’s proposal for Turkey and Greece to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project changes the energy map of the regional projects, which indirectly affects the Southern Gas Corridor. This has raised concern in Azerbaijan, which has been making efforts to manoeuvre between the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

Nord Stream II-testing EU and credibility. EPC Commentary, 16 December 2015

In September 2015, Gazprom and major European energy companies (Germany's E.ON and BASF/Wintershall, Austria's OMV, France’s ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell) signed an agreement to double the Nord Stream gas pipeline’s capacity by 2019. The plan is to transport up to 55 billion additional cubic metres of gas a year to Germany through the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European countries.

The rise of capacity mechanisms: are they inevitable in the European Union? Egmont Paper 80, September 2015

These last years, in multiple Member States, the electricity markets have seen the rapid emergence of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs). They are meant to guarantee the stability of the electricity system in a more uncertain context. The reactions of the European Commission were late towards them. It is thus essential to bring some clarity here, otherwise the legal uncertainty could become a new impediment for investment.

2016 already puts its mark on the economic map of Europe. CEPS Essay No. 22/8 January 2016

The start of 2016 brought highly symbolic changes to the trade policy map of Europe between the EU- and Russian-led blocs, as the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine entered into force provisionally, while Russia moved in precisely the opposite direction by scrapping its free trade agreement with Ukraine. However the ongoing changes go far wider and deeper. The energy sector and major industries see disengagement between Ukraine and Russia, and Russia’s share in Ukrainian trade is falling substantially. New transport corridors with China may offer synergies with trade opportunities for all three DCFTA states, with Georgia first in line. Visa liberalisation for the entire DCFTA space is now firmly in prospect. Divergent macroeconomic trends between a recovering eurozone and recession in Russia will accentuate the changes in trade structures. A better organisation of the pan-European economic space is surely desirable, but prospects for links between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union remain problematic.

Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement (Article 6). CEPS Special Report No. 128/January 2016

The markets provisions, contained in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015, can be seen as both a major success and a minor miracle. Throughout 2015, and during COP21 itself, the prediction was for a very small reference to anything related to markets, or possibly even the total omission of any such reference in the text. As predicted, the markets/non-markets text in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (PA) was one of the last issues to be agreed, in the last night of COP21, shortly before the text went to the COP President, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, for final approval and its subsequent release to the delegates for acceptance on 12 December 2015. This paper presents the evolution of the ideas contained in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, and how these were captured in textual form in different drafts of the agreement. Understanding the origin of different provisions in the PA, and their evolution, may prove crucial. Losing the institutional memory may lead to attempts, through re-interpretation of the PA, to renegotiate it.

Gas demand for power generation peaked as early as 2010. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2016

The outlook for natural gas demand is often considered bright, especially for gas used to generate electricity. This is because gas is the cleanest of all fossil fuels. The carbon intensity of modern gas-fired power stations is less than 50% that of modern coal plants. Moreover, gas-fired units are well-suited to follow rapid swings in supply and demand due to their flexibility. In the future, these balancing tasks will become more and more important given the intermittent character of the supply of wind and solar power. Gas seems to hold out the promise of being a key pillar of the energy transition and the perfect partner of renewables. Given the EU’s long-term climate policy goals, however, there is strong evidence that demand for gas for purposes of power generation peaked as early as 2010.

The EU ETS: Caught between an ideal and reality. CEPS Commentary, 8 march 2016

The EU ETS (emissions trading system) has passed its first decade of operation and has proven to be an inspiration for those who promote carbon pricing through carbon markets as a means to tackle climate change. During this period, Europe has learned important lessons from operating its own ETS and from observing the experiences of other jurisdictions with carbon markets.

State Aid to Infrastructure: Do Competitively Selected Operators Obtain an Undue Advantage? Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER) 33/2015

Addressing high and volatile natural resource prices, uncertain supply prospects, reindustrialization attempts and environmental damages related to resource use, resource efficiency has evolved into a highly debated proposal among academia, policy makers, firms and international financial institutions (IFIs). In 2011, the European Union (EU) declared resource efficiency as one of its seven flagship initiatives in its Europe 2020 strategy. This paper contributes to the discussions by assessing its key initiative, the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (EC 2011 571), following two streams of evaluation. In a first step, resource efficiency is linked to two theoretical frameworks regarding sustainability, (i) the sustainability triangle (consisting of economic, social and ecological dimensions) and (ii) balanced sustainability (combining weak and strong sustainability). Subsequently, both sustainability frameworks are used to assess to which degree the Roadmap follows the concept of sustainability. It can be concluded that it partially respects the sustainability triangle as well as balanced sustainability, primarily lacking a social dimension. In a second step, following Steger and Bleischwitz (2009), the impact of resource efficiency on competitiveness as advocated in the Roadmap is empirically evaluated. Using an Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data model reveals no robust impact of resource efficiency on competiveness in the EU between 2004 and 2009 – a puzzling result. Further empirical research and enhanced data availability are needed to better understand the impacts of resource efficiency on competitiveness on the macroeconomic, microeconomic and industry level. In that regard, strengthening the methodologies of resource indicators seem essential. Last but certainly not least, political will is required to achieve the transition of the EU-economy into a resource efficient future.

Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System. Bruges Political Research Papers 50/2015.

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved. OSW Studies 55, April 2016

The European Union has traditionally been the most important outlet for Russian oil exports. At the same time, during the period 2011-2014 a systematic decline was observed in crude oil supplies to the EU, while at the same time the export of petroleum products increased. It is now difficult to say that Russia is following a coherent oil strategy vis-a-vis the EU. The current shape of Russian activity is more the result of the business interests of individual companies, rather than the result of activities coordinated by the state. Although in the short term (up to 2020), the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU could be halted (as confirmed by the figures for 2015), the long-term prospects for Russia's position on the EU market are pessimistic. This is because the importance of factors unfavourable to Russia is rising, such as the decrease in consumption of oil in the EU, the increased competition among exporters to the EU market, and the deterioration of the climate of Russian/EU cooperation in the context of the anti-Russian sanctions, as well as unclear prospects for the development of the upstream sector in Russia.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

The EU Global Strategy: going beyond effective multilateralism? EPC Discussion Paper, June 2016

The ongoing consultation process on the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) presents an occasion for the European Union (EU) to redress the European Security Strategy’s (ESS) shortcomings and update its stance on multilateralism. As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply entrenched in the Union’s DNA, the EUGS is unlikely to represent ground-breaking innovations as to how the EU should act in international affairs. The key challenge in respect of the EU’s multilateralism is twofold. The first challenge lies in setting out clear priorities for the EU’s multilateral action to be pursued collectively by the member states; and the second in determining the form of multilateralism that would best suit the promotion of the priorities concerned. In this collection of six essays, policy analysts and academics are presented with the question: Over a five year horizon, what do you think should be the focus of the EU’s multilateral agenda? The answers dwell on the EU playing a proactive role in relation to emerging powers especially China, and Latin America as a whole; furthering the EU’s soft power through ‘science diplomacy’; and EU leadership in building a global energy and climate community, and counter terrorism measures.

Towards an Effective EU Framework for Road Transport and GHG Emissions. CEPS Special Report No. 141 / July 2016

The adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015 and the EU’s intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) have confirmed the EU’s commitment to achieve decarbonisation by 2050. Transport accounts for about a quarter of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, representing the second-largest source of GHG emissions in Europe after the energy sector. The transport sector will play a significant role in the EU’s efforts to decarbonise its economy in line with its international commitments. The purpose of this report is to examine different EU policy options to address transport emissions, with a special emphasis on passenger cars. It ‘thinks through’ the options that are currently assessed in the EU and considers how they could be put together in a comprehensive framework. The report concludes with a number of measures to lead EU transport decarbonisation policy. A distinction is made between i) no-regret options and ii) measures for consideration.