Skill formation in Britain and Germany: Recent developments in the context of traditional differences. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No.06.1, 2006

This paper proposes a comparison of skill formation in Germany and Britain over the last decades. Taking historical trends into account, the two cases can be regarded as representing different types of skill production regimes. Institu-tional features include a relatively low degree of standardization of training and a larger amount of on-the-job training in Britain. In Germany, post-compulsory training has been conducted predominantly within the dual system of vocational training, underlining the vocational specificity of a large part of the labor market. As a consequence, international differences in individual skill investments, transitions from school to work and other life-course patterns can be observed. At least in Britain, however, the situation seems to have changed considerably during the 1990s. The paper argues that the divergence in more recent developments can still be understood as an expression of historical path-dependency given the traditional connections between the post-compulsory training system and the broader societal context in which it is embedded. These concern, in particular, links with the system of general and academic education as the basis for – and also a possible competitor with – vocational training; links with the labor market as they are indicated by specific skill requirements and returns to qualifications; and, links with the order of social stratification in the form of the selective acquisition and the social consequences of these qualifications. The links manifest themselves as typical individual-level consequences and decisions. Founded on the basis of these distinctions, the aim of this paper is to investigate the preceding conditions for recent developments in the qualification systems of Britain and Germany, which have adapted to specific challenges during the last decades.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Designing a New EU-Turkey Strategic Gas Partnership. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/10 July 2015

Highlights. • The European Commission’s February 2015 Energy Union Communication calls for intensified work on the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and the establishment of a new strategic energy partnership with Turkey. The presence of the European Union and Turkey in the region is complementary in a number of ways. Building on this could unlock the region’s gas export potential and make gas supplies to the EU and Turkey more secure. • The EU should establish dedicated energy diplomacy taskforces with Turkey and each potential supplier in the region (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Kurdistan Region of Iraq). This would allow the EU and Turkey to make use of their complementary diplomatic leverages to overcome barriers to regional gas trade. • In parallel, the EU should establish with Turkey a dedicated financing mechanism to facilitate gas infrastructure investments, with a primary focus on the upgrade of the Turkish gas grid. The European Investment Bank might play a role in attracting private and institutional investors through its financing tools. • The four ‘EU-Turkey Energy Diplomacy Taskforces’ and the ‘EU-Turkey Gas Infrastructure Financing Initiative’ would be initiatives of the recently started EU-Turkey Strategic High Level Energy Dialogue. Simone Tagliapietra (simone.tagliapietra@bruegel.org) is Visiting Fellow at Bruegel. Georg Zachmann (georg.zachmann@bruegel.org) is Research Fellow at Bruegel. The authors thank Agata Łoskot-Strachota for comments that helped to improve the paper significantly,

Nord Stream expansion: what does it mean for Europe? EPC Commentary, 2 July 2015

Two announcements in sequence have shaken the energy debate on 18 and 19 June. Gazprom announced the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with Shell, Exon and OMV for the construction of strings 3 and 4 of Nord Stream, aiming at doubling the current 55 bcm capacity of the corridor running in the Baltic sea bed and connecting the Russian terminal of Vyborg to Germany. On the day after, a €2 bn deal between Russia and Greece was signed for extending the Turkish Stream project into Greek territory. ...

EU Climate and Energy Governance: There’s more to it than meets the eye. CEPS Commentary, 14 July 2015

In this new CEPS Commentary, a team of climate and energy specialists argue that a reliable system of climate and energy governance in the EU would certainly need to go beyond the issues that are identified in the 2030 framework for climate and energy and the Energy Union. In their view, such a system would consist of no less than seven complex areas, which they proceed to outline and discuss their interrelationships. To ensure that these areas are dealt with in an integrated manner, they recommend that the European Commission creates a roadmap – possibly in the form of a Communication – that would indicate the direction, interactions and a timeline for their adoption.

Making low-carbon technology support smarter. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/02, 18 August 2015

This Policy Brief describes the interaction between three approaches that are effective in driving innovation in low-carbon technologies. Based on that, the author provides four recommendations for making low-carbon technology support smarter. THE ISSUE Combating climate change on the global level will be much easier when abundant low-carbon technologies that are competitive in their cost and capabilities are available. But private companies underinvest in low-carbon innovation because they cannot capture the climate benefits. There are three policies to address this issue: pricing carbon, supporting deployment of as-yet uncompetitive technologies and supporting research and development.

Low-cost batteries will not disrupt (all) energy utilities. CEPS Commentary, 5 October 2015

With the launch last April of an affordable lithium-ion home battery – the Powerwall – Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk is betting that batteries are going to become a mass market. This may very well become reality, but this commentary argues that one should not jump to the conclusion that this is the end of energy utilities. Similar to solar panels, batteries have high upfront costs. The massive deployment of solar was driven by dedicated policy support, in many cases without any kind of cost or volume control. There is no such thing for batteries. In the absence of financing programmes, the author finds that high upfront costs provide an unfavourable starting point for a disruptive development. But he notes that the fact that self-consumption of stored solar energy will soon pay for consumers represents a paradigm shift in the power industry, which should be seen as an opportunity, at least for first-movers.

Nord Stream II – Another test for EU unity. EPC Commentary, 9 October 2015

In September 2015, Gazprom and major European energy companies (Germany's E.ON and BASF/Wintershall, Austria's OMV, France’s ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell) signed an agreement to double the Nord Stream gas pipeline’s capacity by 2019. The plan is to transport up to 55 billion additional cubic meters of gas a year to Germany through the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European countries.

End of an energy honeymoon: what’s next for Russia-Turkey energy relations? EPC Commentary, 7 December 2015

Back in the autumn of 2014, the deal between Russia and Turkey on the Turkish Stream pipeline was expected to start a period of close energy cooperation between the two countries, potentially able to change the energy game in the region and consolidate political relations in a long-term perspective. One year later, after announcing the project’s size would be reduced by half, Moscow suspended the negotiations in retaliation to the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force at the border between Turkey and Syria. This seems to complement growing doubts about Turkish Stream, which already started as a result of Russia’s military involvement in Syria. From an EU perspective, recent developments raise doubts about Turkey’s role in the Union’s energy strategy.

Nord Stream II-testing EU and credibility. EPC Commentary, 16 December 2015

In September 2015, Gazprom and major European energy companies (Germany's E.ON and BASF/Wintershall, Austria's OMV, France’s ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell) signed an agreement to double the Nord Stream gas pipeline’s capacity by 2019. The plan is to transport up to 55 billion additional cubic metres of gas a year to Germany through the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European countries.

Rethinking the security of the European Union’s gas supply. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2016/01 January 2016

Highlights: • The security of the European Union’s gas supplies is crucial to ensuring that supplies to households are not disrupted in freezing winters, that industry can flourish and that the EU cannot be blackmailed in vital foreign policy questions. • Gas supply security should be addressed at EU level because a joint solution would be cheaper, national approaches could undermine the internal energy market and have adverse effects on other countries, and the EU Treaty explicitly calls for energy solidarity. • The current focus on supply diversification and reduction of dependence on imported gas is expensive and does not constitute a systemic response. • Instead of doing everything to reduce gas supplies from key suppliers, gas supply security could more effectively be safeguarded by ensuring that unused alternatives are maintained so that they can be tapped into for an indefinite period in case of supply disruption from a key supplier.This Policy Contribution outlines a market approach that could safeguard gas supply security at very low cost.

The energy security package: significant overhaul or business as usual? EPC Commentary, 24 February 2016

On 16 February 2016, the European Commission presented its energy security package, the first major delivery of the Energy Union agenda. The package includes legislative texts (the revised Regulation on Security of Supply and the Decision on Inter-Governmental Agreements) and non-legislative texts (the Communications on the LNG and Storage Strategy and the Heating and Cooling Strategy). This commentary takes stock of the political and market conditions surrounding the proposal, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s approach. It argues that more attention should be devoted to demand to ensure correct investment signals, which are key to the strategy’s success.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

Why the future of European renewables policy may be decided in Washington and not in Brussels. CEPS Commentary, 13 July 2016 Wednesday, 13 July 2016

In the last few years, several EU member states have reduced support to renewable energy, leading to numerous claims that these policy changes retroactively affected existing investments and that the practice of ‘grandfathering’ should have been observed. Among these, the case of Spain stands out, both due to the material size of the cuts and the large volume of investments affected, although the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Italy have also introduced reforms with deleterious consequences to their renewable energy sectors.

The triggers of competitiveness: the EFIGE cross-country report. Bruegel Blueprint 17, 17 July 2012

There is a pressing need for Europe to grow out of the crisis, meaning that Europe needs to become more competitive, enabling it to capture growth currently taking place mainly in emerging markets. But what are the triggers of competitiveness? The EFIGE project, led by Bruegel, takes a fresh look by inquiring into the determinants of firm-level international performance – focusing on external competitiveness. In the competitiveness debate, it is crucial to understand not only the macroeconomic challenge, but also to find the right micro-level triggers that will generate growth and exports. The authors identify firm-level total factor productivity as a major determinant of growth and exports. Human capital, research, equity finance and performance based incentives for employees also play their parts. Moreover, size matters and large firms typically are much better exporters than their smaller counterparts. This report builds on previous EFIGE research and studies in depth firm performance in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom) to identify the triggers of competitiveness.