Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? EU Diplomacy Paper No. 3, May 2014

This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless make it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007

The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of the high-tech sector. The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel.

Assessing US and EU Foreign Targeting Arab Youth: Lessons from Morocco. ACES Working Papers (progress report), August 2009

As stated in the opening sentence of the proposal submitted for the ACES grant in 2009, the research that this seed grant is supporting is ambitious and large in scale. The primary goal is to produce a book-length study that assesses the priorities and impact of European and American foreign aid targeting youth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). To date, the research undertaken with the support of the grant has helped in providing some preliminary data for a) testing few hypotheses, b) fine-tuning the research design; and c) pointing to the direction where more conceptual and ethnographic research should be undertaken.

Growing global brands in foreign markets: A brand equity perspective. Impact of national culture on trademark registrations in emerging economy: Evidence from Russia. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

In this study we explore how firms deploy intellectual property assets (trademarks) in international context and the impact of cultural characteristics on such activities. Trademarks capture important elements of firm's brand-building efforts. Using growth model, a special case of hierarchical linear model, we demonstrate that that stock of trademarks in foreign market increase future trademark activity. Also, we explore the moderating roles of two cultural dimensions, individualism and masculinity, on such relationships. The findings indicated that firms from countries closer to host market (Russia) on individualism dimension tend to register more trademarks in host market. The opposite result is observed for masculinity dimension.

Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption in the EU Level the International Playing Field Between Foreign and Domestic Analysts? ACES Working Papers, October 2011

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been promoted as a global set of financial reporting standards that will help integrate global capital markets. We examine whether the mandatory European-wide adoption of IFRS in 2005 improved the forecast accuracy for foreign analysts relative to that of domestic analysts. We find that, on average, foreign analysts experience no incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts. However, we find that those foreign analysts who are familiar with IFRS do experience an incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts. We also find that this incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts is concentrated among firms domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Our results highlight that both familiarity with IFRS and the quality of countries' enforcement environments play key roles in determining the extent to which IFRS adoption can reduce information asymmetry between foreign and domestic analysts.

Is Vietnam the Right Choice for Foreign Investment?: The Case of the European Union’s Slipping Opportunity. ACES Working Papers, 2012

This analysis is broken into three interdependent sections: First, an analysis of the restrictions placed on foreign direct investment in Vietnam captures the current freedoms and inhibitors of investment in Vietnam. Foreign direct investment is defined by the UN as an investment made to acquire a lasting interest in or effective control over an enterprise operating outside of the economy of the investor. Second, a cursory look at the macroeconomic risks, to which investment dollars are susceptible, will paint a realistic portrait of return of foreign investment. Finally, this paper will examine the current, and historical, trade relationship between Vietnam and the European Union, in order to convey that the opportunity for investment in Vietnam remains to be an opportunity for Europe’s developed economies.