Filling the gap: open economy considerations for more reliable potential output estimates. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/11, October 2015

This paper argues that the Phillips curve relationship is not sufficient to trace back the output gap, because the effect of excess demand is not symmetric across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. In the non-tradeable sector, excess demand creates excess employment and inflation via the Phillips curve, while in the tradeable sector much of the excess demand is absorbed by the trade balance. We set up an unobserved-components model including both a Phillips curve and a current account equation to estimate ‘sustainable output’ for 45 countries. Our estimates for many countries differ substantially from the potential output estimates of the European Commission, IMF and OECD. We assemble a comprehensive real-time dataset to estimate our model on data which was available in each year from 2004-15. Our model was able to identify correctly the sign of pre-crisis output gaps using real time data for countries such as the United States, Spain and Ireland, in contrast to the estimates of the three institutions, which estimated negative output gaps real-time, while their current estimates for the pre-crisis period suggest positive gaps. In the past five years the annual output gap estimate revisions of our model, the European Commission, IMF, OECD and the Hodrick-Prescott filter were broadly similar in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent of GDP for advanced countries. Such large revisions are worrisome, because the European fiscal framework can translate the imprecision in output gap estimates into poorly grounded fiscal policymaking in the EU.

What role for social investment in the new economic governance of the Eurozone? EPC Policy Brief, 10 November 2015

The EU, and the Eurozone in particular, has been going through a period of prolonged economic difficulty. While there are some signs of recovery, growth rates remain too low, only returning to the already modest growth rates of the pre-crisis period. This not only affects the creation of jobs, but also, through lower tax revenues and stagnant GDP levels, the consolidation of public finances.

A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: the case of food exports to China. OSW COMMENTARY #189, 2015-10-29

When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.

Household Final Consumption in the EU: The key driver for a sustainable recovery? ECRI Commentary No. 18, 4 December 2015

This commentary finds that after four to five years of poor performance, final consumption of households is expected to recover significantly in 2015 and 2016. This is all the more important since final consumption of households was the main driver of economic growth during the 12 years preceding the financial crisis. Some obstacles still stand in the way, however, preventing a sustainable recovery in private consumption.

Is there a way out of the Polish pickle? EPIN Commentary No. 31/22 January 2016

Poland is making headline news again. This time, however, not in a role of Central European Wunderkind surfing the economic crisis, but for reasons to be less proud of. Ever since the Prawo and Sprawiedliwość (PiS, a member of European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament) government took power after the elections in November, Poland has experienced political turmoil and is now facing accusations that the rule of law is in danger. This constitutes a major challenge for the European Union and for its other member states, which are looking for ways to deal with a recalcitrant state that makes a rapid U-turn on democratic fundamentals and takes any criticism hysterically. This is not the first time that the organisation has had to deal with such a case, yet solutions have not yet been found. Hungary is a case in point. And now Polish leaders too seem convinced about the virtues of the concept of illiberal democracy. Which prescription should the EU use to buck the trend and what are the potential side-effects?

Did quantitative easing affect interest rates outside the US? New evidence based on interest rate differentials. CEPS Working Document No. 416/January 2016

This paper explores the effects of non-standard monetary policies on international yield relationships. Based on a descriptive analysis of international long-term yields, we find evidence that long-term rates followed a global downward trend prior to as well as during the financial crisis. Comparing interest rate developments in the US and the eurozone, it is difficult to detect a distinct impact of the first round of the Fed’s quantitative easing programme (QE1) on US interest rates for which the global environment – the global downward trend in interest rates – does not account. Motivated by these findings, we analyse the impact of the Fed’s QE1 programme on the stability of the US-euro long-term interest rate relationship by using a CVAR (cointegrated vector autoregressive) model and, in particular, recursive estimation methods. Using data gathered between 2002 and 2014, we find limited evidence that QE1 caused the break-up or destabilised the transatlantic interest rate relationship. Taking global interest rate developments into account, we thus find no significant evidence that QE had any independent, distinct impact on US interest rates.

How to reconcile the EU border paradox? The concurrence of refugee reception and deterrence. IES Policy Brief 2015/4, November 2015

The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe in the summer of 2015 questions the effectiveness of European border and refugee policies. The breakdown of the Dublin and Schengen rules due to chaotic situations at the borders in the Balkans marks a critical juncture for the EU. We consider this breakdown as a consequence of a long-lasting co-operation crisis among EU Member States. The most recent Council decision responds to this co-operation crisis (Council Decision 12098/15). This Policy Brief analyses EU policy and politics and argues that plans for refugee relocation and reception centres as well as the use of qualified majority voting in the Council can unfold a dynamic that helps to solve the co-operation crisis. However, underlying the problems of co-operation and effectiveness is the EU’s border paradox: while EU border policy works towards refugee deterrence, EU asylum policy aims at refugee protection. The EU’s approach in regulating borders and asylum can be understood in terms of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 1993). Reconciling the paradox calls for overcoming such hypocrisy.

The bumpy road. Difficult reform process in Ukraine. OSW Commentary, Number 192|30.11.2015

The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhetoric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as president (7 June 2014), it is clear that the reform process in Ukraine is moving at a snail’s pace and is far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It has also provoked increasing frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects.

The Interregional Association Agreement between the European Union and Mercosur: Is the Timing Right? Bruges Political Research Papers 46/2015.

The European Union (EU) and Mercosur talks have been stalled since discussions were resumed in 2000. Recurring protectionist and institutional obstacles have slowed down negotiations. The financial crisis, however, has resulted in low domestic demand in the EU. This has made the interregional association agreement (IAA) with Mercosur more attractive. The loss of the Generalized Scheme of Preference (GSP) status and the lack of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU have both disadvantaged Mercosur. A further window of opportunity is opening up in Mercosur. In Brazil, there have been cries for a change in government. In Argentina, presidential elections will take place in October 2015 and will assuredly bring an end to Kirchnerismo. A change in leadership in both countries is expected to make agreement more likely. Protectionist policies are not expected to remain as high if there is change in government. This will provide the EU with an opportunity to advance the negotiations and conclude the IAA.

The Labour Market in Spain: Problems, Challenges and Future Trends. Policy Brief #2015/01

Spain’s economy was hit particularly hard by the financial crisis. After severe austerity measures have been implemented in recent years to contain a strong public debt increase, first signs of economic recovery are emerging. However, as SIM Europe results show, very few measures to soften the social consequences have been enacted. Spain scores second to last in the ‘Labour Market Access’ dimension of the Social Justice Index 2015, with the greatest deterioration among all EU countries compared to 2008. According to the Reform Barometer 2015, the quality of labour market reforms in Spain ranks last in the EU. With economic recovery gaining momentum, high priority should be given to ameliorating labour market access through higher education improvements, professional training, investments into R&D and promotion of high added-value industries.

MIGRATION PANORAMA. Schengen in the spotlight: a Europe with or without borders? APRIL 2016 (First edition)

The first edition of this new multi-authored publication entitled ‘Migration Panorama’ focuses on the consequences of the refugee and migration crisis on the Schengen area and the concept of a borderless union. Several external and EPC authors have contributed to building a comprehensive picture on the manifold challenges and possible consequences of maintaining and/or returning to internal border controls among Schengen countries. How does a signatory of the Schengen agreement see the current developments? What would be the impact of the reintroduction of physical borders on Europe’s digital economy? In what way do the V4 countries envisage to solve the ‘Schengen crisis’? How dangerous are the empty threats to expel Greece out of the Schengen area? What is the symbolic meaning of the Belgian border controls following the French decision to dismantle parts of the Calais ‘jungle’? Is saving Schengen only a question of national sovereignty or a matter of shared European responsibility? All these questions and many others are tackled in this first issue of the ‘Migration Panorama’ produced by EPC’ s Migration and Diversity Programme.

Energy across the Mediterranean: a call for realism. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2016/03 APRIL 2016

Political instability in the southern Mediterranean countries have highlighted the unsustainability of their economic models. Widespread economic discontent, and in particular very high youth unemployment, underpinned the Arab Spring uprisings. As the refugee crisis shows, this is also Europe’s problem and Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation needs to be reviewed. Energy is a key part of the cooperation framework.

Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process. CEPS Working Document No. 423 / June 2016

Although the Minsk process brought about a de-escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not all of its 13 points have been implemented, including a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry. In the absence of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US, to respond to Russia’s aggression. At the end of June 2016, when EU Heads of State and Government meet to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement the commitments it took upon itself in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in the Ukraine crisis, the leaders of the EU ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push for the renegotiation of the Minsk II agreement and widen the ‘Normandy format’ to include the US and bolster reforms in Ukraine.

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

Europe in limbo while the UK descends into chaos. EPC Post-Summit Commentary, 30 June 2016

The EU Summit and the separate meeting of the EU27 without the UK on 28/29 June 2016 demonstrated that the EU is in limbo. Following the initial shock, frustration and anger after the unexpected result of the UK ‘in/out’ referendum, the future relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) monopolised the meetings of EU leaders. The EU has entered uncharted waters and leaders are struggling to figure out how exactly to deal with the manifold (potential) consequences of the ‘Brexit crisis’. Despite the many uncertainties, the EU27 managed to reach some common lines, trying to convey four key messages, although the final outcome of the crisis and its effects on the Union’s overall future are still very unclear: