Countries under Adjustment Programmes: What role for the ECB? CEPS Special Report No. 124, December 2015

Providing ‘technical assistance/advice’ on programmes for countries under financial stress is well within the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being fully part of the Troika, however, is a different role. Formally the ECB does not participate in the ‘decision-making’ on programmes (decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers – and the IMF). However, the ECB is part of the ‘decision-shaping’ process. These two roles have often been confused. The ECB should interpret its formal role in future ESM (European Stability Mechanism) programmes as narrowly as possible. Providing advice but avoid taking part in the operational work of programme surveillance. The ECB should de facto leave the Troika. At any rate, future incidents like the Italian or Spanish letters will be superseded by the OMTs (outright monetary transactions) and an Irish-type situation would be shaped by the legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the potential funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). An additional issue for the ECB is internal coherence: Its six-member Executive Board manages the participation in the Troika, monetary policy is decided by the Governing Council and banking supervision is under the Supervisory Board, separated in principle by Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB.

Financial assistance to Greece: Three programmes. EPC Discussion Paper, 26 February 2016

There are a lot of myths surrounding the bailout money that was given to Greece. Many people still believe that the money never went to the Greek people, but to the Greek and European banks; that the intervention of the euro-area governments and the IMF dealt almost exclusively with the Greek debt; that very little money was used to finance Greek public expenditure; that most Greek debt was reimbursed; that no cuts were made to the stock of Greek government bonds on the market; and, finally, that so far, no cuts have been made to the debt of the Greek state towards the euro-area countries. In this Discussion Paper, Fabio Colasanti debunks some of those myths by taking stock of the numbers behind the financial support given to Greece by the countries of the euro-area and the IMF. Examining the three bailout programmes in detail, he discusses the reasons for and against a restructuring of the Greek public debt in 2010, its implementation in 2012, the degree in which the Greek debt towards the euro-area countries has already been cut, and the scope for further cuts. Finally, the paper explains how both issues were and are still dominated by internal political considerations, both in the creditor countries and in Greece.

The Impact of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programmes on Sovereign Bond Spreads in the Euro Area. Bruges European Economic Research Papers 35/2015

This paper estimates the immediate impact of the European Central Bank’s asset purchase programmes on sovereign bond spreads in the euro area between 2008 and 2015 using a country-by-country GARCH model. The baseline estimates are rigorously diagnosed for misspecification and subjected to a wide range of sensitivity tests. Among others, changes in the dependent variable, the independent variables and the number of (G)ARCH terms are tested. Moreover, the model is applied to subsamples and dynamic conditional correlations are analyzed to estimate the effects of the asset purchases on the contagion of spread movements. Generally, it is found that the asset purchase programmes triggered an reduction of sovereign bond spreads. More specifically, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) had the most significant immediate effects on sovereign bond spreads across the euro area. The announcements related to the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme also yielded substantial spread compression in the periphery. In contrast to that, the most recent Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) announced in January 2015 and implemented since March 2015 had no significant immediate effects on sovereign bond spreads, except for Irish spreads. Hence, immediate effects seem to be dependent upon the size of the programme, the extent to which it targets distressed sovereigns and the way in which it is communicated.