American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

EU Enlargement: Lessons from, and Prospects for. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2013

In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which the terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or Euro-crisis. Yet enlargement remains on the agenda, with the EU’s next enlargement starting on 1st July 2013 with the accession of Croatia, Iceland and FYROM looking set to follow in the near future, and probably other Western Balkan states and possibly Turkey in the long term. Enlargement therefore will soon come back into focus. Focusing on climate and energy security policy, this working paper first reflects upon the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the EU. A reflection on the EU’s recent past with some of the lessons that can be learnt then follows, with a consideration that predictions of decision- and policy-making gridlock were not realised, that newer member states have proved influential, and that prospective member states cannot be expected to be passive nor impotent. The latter part of this paper evaluates the potential prospects and outcomes of these lessons with regard to future enlargement from within (Scotland and Catalonia), and without (Turkey), and the political factors which may dictate whether these possible enlargements are realised.

Mogherini’s first 100 days: Not the quiet diplomat. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2015

To mark the passage of 100 days since Federica Mogherini took up the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission HR/VP, Steven Blockmans and Francesco Saverio Montesano reflect in a new CEPS Commentary on her early achievements and assess the efficacy of new approaches and working methods she has brought to EU foreign policy-making.

Is there reason to hope for Minsk II? CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

In his comparison of the agreement concluded in the Belarus capital by the leaders of Russia, France, Ukraine and Germany on February 12th with the one reached on 5 September 2014, Michael Emerson asks what will be different this time? He observes first that there are additional provisions which may be significant and secondly, the strategic political and economic context is categorically different.

More Union in European Defence. CEPS Task Force Report, 26 February 2015

Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. This CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU, in the face of numerous emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security threats. The report is a record of the deliberations over several months between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence, who conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our common security and defence activities. And that member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. This report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in the view of the Task Force experts, further integration should amount to a European Defence Union.

Spotlight-Europe - March 2015: The EU neighbourhood in shambles. Some recommendations for a new European neighbourhood strategy

Executive Summary. An “arc of instability” stretching from the European Union’s (EU) eastern borders down to the Mediterranean basin has undermined its flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy was designed to deliver prosperity, stability and democracy to countries surrounding the EU. It has manifestly failed and needs to be radically rethought. Starting with a tabula rasa, the EU should abandon the very concept of a heterogeneous “neighbourhood” in the face of glaring differences among the 16 countries affected, not least because some are uninterested in reform; others may even be failed states. EU member states are themselves pursuing divergent interests and goals. A fundamental review of the ENP should lead to more differentiated, targeted measures to promote “transformational change” within neighbouring states ready to accept it. The EU should offer revised incentives such as participation within the proposed “energy union” or freer trade designed to aid local economic development. It should embrace a wider range of actors, including civil society, promote entrepreneurship and help reform countries’ police and military forces. The review should reassert common EU institutions in negotiating and working with neighbours and give them a central role in preventing and resolving conflicts as well as promoting democratic reform and economic stability. This revised ENP should help underpin the EU’s efforts to forge a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army. EPC Commentary, 12 March 2015

In an interview with the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag on 8 March 2015, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, strongly advocated a common European army to consolidate peace in Europe, react to security threats both within the continent and in its neighbourhood, defend European values vis-à-vis aggressive powers, notably Russia, and create economies of scale by consolidating demand for military equipment.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 01/2014

Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.

The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation. IHS Political Science Series No. 137, 10 July 2014

This paper conceptualizes the European Union (EU) as a system of differentiated integration characterized by both variation in levels of centralization (vertical differentiation) and variation in territorial extension (horizontal differentiation) across policy areas. Differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening and has increased and consolidated as the EU’s powers, policy scope, and membership have grown. Turning to explanation, the paper attributes the pattern of differentiated integration in the EU to the interaction of interdependence and politicization. Differentiation among the member states (internal differentiation) results from supranational integration under conditions of high interdependence and politicization. By contrast, external differentiation (the selective policy integration of non-member states) occurs in highly interdependent but weakly politicized policy areas. These constellations are illustrated in case studies of differentiation in the internal market, monetary union, and defence.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

The new Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 12, July 2014

The objectives of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) include ways to improve the democratic and international images of the European Union (EU). The focus of the literature has so far focused on the overall treaty impact and on the EU´s international role. This paper considers instead its impact on the question of the democratic accountability of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (CSDP). This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part describes the changes the LT has made for the European Parliament (EP) in terms of its external relations. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in its foreign, security and defence policies. (3) The third part offers a preliminary analysis of the recently created Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) includes parliamentarians from the national EU parliaments. The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development in trying to bridge those existing democratic gaps, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of many such deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and of its member states.

Europe as International Actor: Maximizing Nation-State Sovereignty. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.3, 1996

The continually increasing literature on foreign- and security-policy dimensions of the European Union (EU) has provided no remedy for the widespread helplessness in gaining a purchase on Europe as an international actor. The basic hindrance to understanding this policy comes from an all-too-literal interpretation of the acronym involved: the CFSP is understood as a total or partial replacement of the nation-states' foreign and security policy. This article aims to point the way to a new understanding of the CFSP in which this policy is not based on the integration of nation­ state foreign and security policy. I suggest that the proper way to grasp the phenomenon of the CFSP is to describe it as an international regime whose goal is to administer links between economic integration and foreign- and security­ policy cooperation in the sense of maximizing the sovereignty of member states. This requires, on the one hand, the prevention of "spillovers" from the economic area that could interfere with the foreign- and security-policy indepen­ dence of member states. On the other hand, it demands applying the EU's economic potential to reinforce the foreign- and security-policy range of member states. Due to the logic of this policy, CFSP priorities and fields of ac­ tion differ profoundly from those of a national foreign and security policy. Expectations on the evolution of the CFSP must be aware of these basic characteristics of this policy.

National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.4, 2002

In spite of domestic and international political changes, French and German foreign policies have displayed high degrees of continuity between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s. Over the same time period, the directions of the two states’ foreign policies have also continued to differ from each other. Why do states similar in many respects often part ways in what they want and do? This article argues that the French and German national role conceptions (NRCs) account for both of these continuities. NRCs are domestically shared understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. As internal reference systems, they affect national interests and foreign policies. This article reestablishes the NRC concept, empirically codes it for France and Germany for the time period under consideration, and demonstrates comparatively how different NRCs lead to varying interests and policies across the major policy areas in security, defense, and armament.