Shale Gas and the EU Internal Gas Market: Beyond the Hype and Hysteria. CEPS Working Document No. 369, September 2012

This paper analyses the interplay between shale gas and the EU internal gas market. Drawing on data presented in the 2012 International Energy Agency’s report on unconventional gas and additional scenario analyses performed by the Joint Research Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries where there is political support for shale gas extraction. And second, a well-functioning internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply than domestic shale gas exploitation. This has important implications for the shale gas industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate that this is the case.

Should Europe be fracking? CEPS Commentary, 5 October 2012

Underlining the fact that shale gas, like all natural resources, can only be used once, Daniel Gros observes in this CEPS Commentary that the real issue is not whether this resource should be developed in Europe, but when it should be used: today or tomorrow? Europe is already a heavy user of gas, but its consumption is stagnating (along with its economy). Despite the hype about the shale gas revolution, the extraction cost of (onshore) conventional gas remains below that of fracking. And lots of pipelines have already been built so that the marginal cost of bringing this ‘conventional’ gas to Europe is thus rather low. Thus, from an economic and environmental point of view, Gros argues that fracking is unlikely to bring large benefits for Europe and that shale gas might just substitute for conventional gas, which is plentiful.

Pathways to Low Carbon Transport in the EU – From Possibility to Reality. Report of the CEPS Task Force on transport and climate change. CEPS Task Force Report, June 2013

A new CEPS Task Force Report has identified possible pathways for achieving the EU’s ambitious climate change targets. It concludes that a GHG emissions reduction in line with EU climate change policy is possible, but it requires immediate action. This report argues that most of the reductions required of the transport sector in the EU could come from more energy-efficient vehicles, combined with the gradual introduction of low-carbon fuels and new engine technologies. The key policy for reducing GHG emissions in road transport is the steady tightening of emissions standards in line with technological progress. The report also identifies strategies for the transport system to become more energy and/or carbon efficient, arguing that leverage can be further enhanced by local and city governments’ incentives for efficient and low-carbon vehicles in line with local circumstances and choices. The Task Force on Low Carbon Transport brought together a diverse set of stakeholders from the car and oil industries, business associations, international organisations, member states, academic experts and NGOs. This authoritative report is the result of that unique collaboration.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

An end to support for renewables? The wrong battle to fight. CEPS Commentary, October 2013

On 11 October 2013, the CEOs of 10 large European energy utilities issued a warning that the European energy infrastructure is “in jeopardy” and called for an end to support for renewables on grounds that wind and solar were mature technologies that no longer required such support. Given the unlikelihood, however, that EU decision-makers would renege on their decarbonisation or renewable energy targets, Fabio Genoese asks in this commentary whether it would not be a better strategy for conventional generators to explore new business models built around a ‘reliability pricing system’, in which nearly 100% reliability would be guaranteed for base load but not for peak demand.

Carbon leakage: an overview. CEPS Special Report No. 79, 6 December 2013

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on climate policy, given the confluence of issues that are currently being debated, including the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework and the review of the EU carbon leakage list by 2014. Carbon leakage is the result of asymmetrical carbon policies, especially carbon pricing, and the resulting carbon cost, which affects the international competitive position of some EU industry and could displace production and/or investment, and the emissions of the activities displaced. This paper identifies the difference between carbon price and carbon cost to leakage exposed industry as one of two fundamental issues to be understood and addressed; lack of visibility on future climate policies and anti-leakage provisions is the other key issue. While this is a global issue, most of the experience has been accumulated in the EU. Carbon leakage is only one of the factors that could affect the competitive position of sectors, but it is difficult to attribute the impact of carbon costs versus other variables such as energy costs, labour, etc. Studies have predicted the risk of a significant amount of production leakage in a number of energy-intensive industries. To address the danger, they were included in the EU ETS carbon leakage list, which gave them access to free allowances. However, a limited number of studies undertaken after the end of the second trading period (2012) show little evidence of production leakage and asks the question whether the issue has not been blown out of proportion. The paper argues that the past may not be a good representation of the future, as it was heavily influenced by a high level of free allocation, the exceptional economic downturn, CO2 prices significantly below what was anticipated, as well as the potential for changes in some fundamental variables such as the shrinking pool of allowances available for free allocation. It emphasises the need for a well-informed debate in the EU on measures to address carbon leakage post-2020, underpinned by a number of options, and objective criteria to evaluate those options. It emphasises that the debate should cover both investment and production leakage, caused by both direct and indirect carbon costs.

When and how to support renewables? Letting the data speak. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/01, February 2014

Low-carbon energy technologies are pivotal for decarbonising our economies up to 2050 while ensuring secure and affordable energy. Consequently, innovation that reduces the cost of low-carbon energy would play an important role in reducing transition costs. We assess the two most prominent innovation policy instruments (i) public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) subsidies and (ii) public deployment policies. Our results indicate that both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the greatest effect coming from deployment. Finally, we find significant cross-border effects, especially for winddeployment. Increased deployment in one country coincides with increased patenting in nearby countries. Based on our findings we argue that both deployment and RD&D support are needed to create innovation in renewable energy technologies. However, we worry that current support is unbalanced. Public spending on deployment has been two orders of magnitude larger (in 2010 about €48 billion in the five largest EU countries in 2010) than spending on RD&D support (about €315 million). Consequently, basing the policy mix more on empirical evidence could increase the efficiency of innovation policy targeted towards renewable energy technologies.

Carbon Leakage: Options for the EU. CEPS Special Report, March 2014

This CEPS Special Report builds on the first deliverable of the project entitled “Carbon leakage: Options for the EU”. It identifies carbon costs, and the ability to pass through carbon costs, as the main risk factors that could lead from asymmetrical carbon policies to carbon leakage. It also outlines and evaluates, based on criteria discussed in the paper, options for detecting and mitigating the risk of carbon leakage in three jurisdictions, with special attention to the EU ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme). Based on the analysis of approaches currently used in a number of existing carbon pricing systems, it identifies the balance between the number of sectors identified as being at risk, and the amount of compensation provided as a risk mitigation measure, as the critical element in providing an optimum approach to address carbon leakage risks. It also identifies a risk-based approach to identifying sectors at risk as allowing for a better reflection of reality in a counterfactual argument. Finally, the paper concludes that while, with some exceptions, there has been limited carbon leakage until now, the past may not be a good reflection of the future and that measures need to be put in place for the post-2020 period. While examining a number of approaches, it identifies free allocation as the most likely way forward for mitigating the risk of carbon leakage. While other approaches may provide interesting options, they also present challenges for implementation, from a market functioning, to international trade and relations, points of view. A number of challenges will need to be addressed in the post-2020 period, with many of them part of the EU ETS structural reform package. Some of these challenges include, among others, the need to recognise, and provide for individual sectoral characteristics, as well as for changes in production patterns, due to economic cycles, and other factors. Finally, the paper emphasises the need for an open dialogue regarding the post-2020 provisions for carbon leakage as no overall Energy and Climate Package is likely to be agreed on until this matter is addressed.

On Ukrainian Gas Transit and South Stream. There may be more than meets the eye. CEPS Commentaries, 21 March 2014

The EU relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, a major share of Russian gas flows through the Ukrainian territory before reaching consumers located other consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary or Italy). But is the Ukrainian gas transit route still a risk? Will the construction of the South Stream pipeline further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country? Or is there more at stake here than meets the eye?

Abolishing Oil Indexation in Gas Contracts: Is it the cure-all? CEPS Commentaries, 3 March 2014

Recently, the EU energy debate has been dominated by the discussion on energy prices and the competitiveness of the European industry. According to the latest estimates of the International Energy Agency, gas prices in the US are one-quarter of those in Europe. Moreover, prices of imported gas vary across the EU member states. Some EU policy-makers hope that the completion of the internal energy market and the transition to hub-based pricing will solve these discrepancies. Julian Wieczorkiewicz asks in this Commentary whether the abolition of oil-indexation will constitute a cure-all for the above-mentioned problems.

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

The Role of Market Mechanisms in a Post-2020 Climate Change Agreement. CEPS Special Report No. 87/May 2014

This special report is intended to serve as a background briefing document for the European Climate Platform seminar on Carbon Markets in the 2015 Agreement: Role and Architecture, but also raises issues of more enduring relevance in the wider debate about market mechanisms and the next climate change agreement. The paper looks at the relationship between the carbon market and a new climate change agreement, to be finalised in Paris in 2015. It tries to answer two key questions: does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and operation of a carbon market? Introduction. The world has changed in many ways since 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, along some critical axes, both from an economic and emissions points of view. Moreover, and this cannot be quantified, the appetite for global governance, especially for an agreement with such far-reaching implications as a climate change agreement, has diminished considerably. This paper looks at the relationship between the carbon market and a new climate change agreement, to be finalised in Paris in 2015. It tries to answer two key questions: does the carbon market have a role to play in a post-2020 agreement, and what is the role of a post-2020 agreement in the creation and operation of a carbon market?

La Méditerranée en 2020 et son Rôle dans le Réseau Energétigue Européen, Résumé et conclusions. May 1994

None.

Annexe II: Analyse de la situation politique en Mediterranee et dans les pays du golfe el les risques sur les approvisionnements petroliers et gaziers 1) Algerie & Pays D'Afrique du Nord 2) Pays de L'Est Mediterraneen et du Golfe. OME, Draft du 18 April 1995 = Annex II: Analysis of the political situation in the Mediterranean and the Gulf countries and risks on petroleum and gas supplies 1) Pays D'Algerie & North Africa 2) Country of Eastern Mediterraneen and the Gulf. OME, Draft of 18 April 1995

None.

A Gas Hub for Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 11 June 2014

For many years, when natural gas was mentioned in conjunction with Ukraine, it meant nothing but trouble. But at the very moment when Ukraine's territorial integrity is at stake, natural gas could become part of the solution. Due to its massive storage potential, namely one-third that of the EU (or seven-times that of the UK), Ukraine is a natural candidate for an eastern European gas hub. Becoming an integrated part of the European gas market has economic and political merits – both for Ukraine and the EU.