Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.