Military Capabilities: From Pooling & Sharing to a Permanent and Structured Approach. Security Policy Brief No. 37, September 2012

In 2013 the European Council for the first time since long will deal with European defence. An excellent opportunity: to move key Pooling & Sharing projects to the implementation stage in the short term, and to launch a permanent and structured approach to the development of European military capabilities for the long term.

And what will Europe do? The European Council and military strategy. Security Policy Brief No. 46, May 2013

Important decisions on Europe’s military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council. But why? What do Europeans actually want to do with their capabilities? The answer to that question would be the crowning piece of the European Council’s decisions.

Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Russia's interest in the Mistral: the political and military aspects. OSW Commentary No. 41, 2010-10-11

The negotiations over Russia’s purchase of French Mistral-class multipurpose assault ships, which were intensified in 2010, have gained a significant political dimension. The prospects of such a spectacular acquisition of large and expensive assault ships from one of NATO’s member states are being used by Russia to demonstrate that it has opened a new stage of relations with Western Europe. Paris has welcomed Russia’s desire to embark on military cooperation; for France, the Mistral deal has become a convenient tool to prove that relations with Russia are becoming increasingly normal, and that Russia poses no threat to the European security.

The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 205/31.03.2016

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.

The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted. Security Policy Brief No. 67, October 2015

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to produce a change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.