Too cold to handle: EU accession talks with Iceland. CEPS Commentary, 3 June 2013

Recent opinion polls suggest that most Icelanders are against joining the EU. By the same token, however, a majority of those polled are in favour of continuing accession talks. These results show that Iceland’s relationship with the EU is a deeply divisive issue within the country. Although no date for the referendum has been set, the new centre-right coalition may thus want to settle this matter as soon as possible. Should there indeed be a majority in support of continuing negotiations, then Iceland’s accession process will become a complicated and cool affair in the hands of an anti-EU membership coalition government.

Too good to be true? A quick assessment of the EC’s new Better Regulation Package. CEPS Special Report No. 108/May 2015

On 19 May 2015, the European Commission published a very comprehensive, ambitious and innovative Better Regulation package, which contains new guidelines on various phases of the policy cycle and various documents setting out the rules and functioning of entirely new consultation platforms and a new body in charge of regulatory scrutiny. This Special Report presents some initial impressions on the content of this remarkable set of new documents, which will shape the way in which EU policies will be prepared, shaped, monitored and evaluated in the years to come.

What's wrong with Europe's banks? CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2013

In offering his diagnosis of Europe’s ailing banking sector, Daniel Gros finds that it is undercapitalised, too large and populated by too many players without a viable long-term business model. In his view, it is the combination of the last two factors that is the most worrying and he warns that any major problem could overburden public budgets, making the sector, with total liabilities over 250% of GDP, possibly “too big to be saved”.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

The 2005 Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Too Little, Too Late? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 6/November 2006

This paper analyses the main critiques addressed by the literature and the policymakers to the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact. It further indicates to what extent the 2005 reform of the Pact meets those critics. It finally argues that the 2005 reform may be too little and arrive too late to restore the Pact credibility, ensure its enforceability and correctly set the derogations to the excessive deficit procedure on the nature of the shocks which cause the output gap rather than its size: a 3% of GDP limit on deficit spending may be a too binding constraint in front of a strongly negative demand shock, while it is irrationally large in front of a supply shock. Some empirical evidence is provided to identify in the last years strongly negative demand shocks from other shocks in the 25 EU Member States. Had this identifying method been adopted in November 2003, the European Commission and the Council would have both agreed to stop the excessive deficit procedure against Germany, but they would have both proceeded against France which apparently was not at the time hit by a strongly negative demand shock.

Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.

How to deal with Europe’s British problem. EPC Discussion Paper, 11 September 2015

This paper argues that the UK government's renegotiation bid is too feeble to be deserving of concessions by its EU partners, but that the rest of the EU can give the British what they seem to want by pressing on themselves to federal union.

Future of the EU27: What to expect from this summer’s period of reflection. CEPS Commentary, 18 July 2016

As the UK’s brutal political fallout of Brexit continues to astound the world, leaders in the other member states are wrestling with the EU’s new reality. They deemed it too early to draw conclusions at the June European Council. Instead, the heads of state and government declared a period of political reflection on the future of an EU with 27 member states. They will meet again informally on September 16th in Bratislava. The question is: What impetus can they give to reforms to remain united and deal with the challenges of the 21st century?

1 + 1 = 3? EU-US voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2012, September 2012

This paper investigates the factors that explain the voting cohesion of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on foreign policy issues in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It is often argued that the EU and the US are simply too different to cooperate within international organizations and thus to vote the same way, for example, in the UNGA. However, there is still a lack of research on this point and, more importantly, previous studies have not analyzed which factors explain EU-US voting cohesion. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by studying voting cohesion from 1980 until 2011 on issues of both ‘high’ politics (security) and ‘low’ politics (human rights) not only as regards EU-US voting cohesion, but also concerning voting cohesion among EU member states. I test six hypotheses derived from International Relations theories, and I argue that EU-US voting cohesion is best explained by the topic of the issue voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the US government, and by the type of resolution. On the EU level, the length of Union membership and transaction costs matter most.

An Assessment of US Progress towards its Pledge on Climate Change Mitigation. CEPS ECP Report No. 12, 15 October 2012

In 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 17% from 2005 levels. With the failure of Congress to adopt comprehensive climate legislation in 2010, the feasibility of the pledge was put in doubt. However, we find that the United States is near to reaching this goal: the country is currently on course to achieve reductions of 16.3% from 2005 levels in 2020. Three factors contribute to this outcome: greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act, secular trends including changes in relative fuel prices and energy efficiency and sub-national efforts. Perhaps even more surprising, domestic emissions are probably lower than would have been the case if the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal had become law in 2010. At this point, however, the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments under the Copenhagen Accord for 2020.

The meaning of Cyprus; moving toward banking union. CEPS Commentary, 8 April 2013

While acknowledging that Cyprus is too small to matter for global financial markets, this Commentary finds that its case could turn out to become a very important precedent for the way European policy-makers deal with future banking problems and the plans for a ‘banking union’.

Do European Union fines deter price-fixing? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/04, May 2013

The issue: Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition such as price fixing or market sharing have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient approaches should be followed in crisis times. Policy challenge: High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular personal sanctions targeting company officers who are responsible for leading the company to commit infringements. In the short term, pressure on decision makers could be increased by reducing the expected duration of investigations.

Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System. CEPS Policy Brief No. 287, 17 April 2013.

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is too politically sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks. Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible also for resolution. Experience has shown banking systems are more stable if deposit insurers are also responsible for resolution. The approach proposed here could thus be also used to design the ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM) which is being discussed as a complement to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis.

50 years of the ‘twin engine’. Franco-German reconciliation, European integration and reflections for Asia. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 8, March 2013

On 22 January 2013, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel gathered in Berlin to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the document that ended centuries of rivalry and warfare between their two countries. It is all too easy to forget the importance of Franco-German reconciliation. The 1950 Schuman Declaration, which led to the creation of the European Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), sought to render the prospect of war between France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible’. Over 60 years later, when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that indeed, ‘war between Germany and France is unthinkable’. Halfway around the world in Asia, the other theatre of World War II, tensions between China and Japan have arisen, with Taiwan and South Korea also in the fray. Nationalist movements in these countries have grown. This background brief lays out the issues for a timely reappraisal of the applicability, or otherwise, of the European integration and reconciliation processes to East Asia. The brief seeks to outline the contours of the historic act of Franco-German reconciliation, and its consequences ever since. Starting from a brief look at the history of rivalry and war between the two countries, the brief examines the events leading to the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and the development of Franco-German exchanges that have cemented the relationship. Difficulties between the countries are also raised. A timescale analysis of the opinion of the two publics is considered, as a measure of the success of Franco-German reconciliation.