Duel between the EU and Argentina: Weapons in the EU Arsenal. CEPS Commentary, 13 September 2012

Relations between the European Union and Argentina are under severe strain. For years, the Argentinean government has been involved in a diplomatic dispute with the United Kingdom over the status of the Falkland Islands (Las Islas Malvinas to the Argentines). It recently decided to take advantage of Spain’s current economic weakness to attack a major Spanish investment in the country. On April 16th, the Argentinean government expropriated 51% of Repsol’s shares in YPF, a former state-owned oil company, which had been privatised in the early 1990s. This action provoked a public outcry in Madrid and beyond, especially in the European Commission. In this Commentary, we explore its longer-term impact on relations between the EU and Argentina.

A Copernican Turn for Banking Union. CEPS Policy Brief No. 290, 14 May 2013

Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.

Central bank cooperation during the great recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/08, 20 June 2013

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.

A Copernican turn in Banking Union urgently needed. CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, July 2013 [is another Brief with no. 297]

Despite broad agreement among central bankers, policy-makers and economists that creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress in building this union has been painfully slow. This is largely due to the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. Taking a cue from Copernicus, Thomas Mayer suggests in this new CEPS Policy Brief that the impasse may be broken by turning the whole process on its head. So, instead of trying to move from common bank supervision, over to bank resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he proposes reversing the process by starting with deposit insurance, moving from there to resolution and ending with supervision.

Emerging Markets' Euro Nemesis. CEPS Commentary, 9 September 2013

In this new commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros argues that the weakening of European demand triggered by austerity is the real cause behind the recent deterioration of emerging markets’ current accounts. As a consequence, unless the US resumes its role as consumer of last resort, the latest bout of financial-market jitters will weaken the global economy again.

Taking stock after the Warsaw COP. CEPS Commentary, 4 December 2013

Drawing on his direct participation in the latest round of climate talks in Warsaw, Andrei Marcu looks at the results of the 19th COP through the lens of three basic questions, with a view to understanding how much progress was made and where we stand two years ahead of Paris. Are the targets adequate and how do we reach environmentally adequate targets? Can one understand and compare what other Parties are promising to do to ensure that the level of effort is comparable and equitable, and that companies are not asked to do more than their competitors in other jurisdictions? Is there comparability and equity in the eyes of the beholder? Do we understand what tools each country uses (what is available, what one gets as support) to ensure that no one country (and its companies) gets an easier ride or competitive advantage in meeting the commitment/promises that countries make. The author asserts that these questions need to be answered if an agreement is to be reached in 2015. And if they are not, he warns of mistrust, fear of carbon leakage and the temptation to resort to protectionist measures to compensate for competitive disadvantage.

Land, Labour and Capital Markets in European Agriculture: Diversity under a Common Policy. CEPS Paperback. October 2013

Well-functioning factor markets are an essential condition for the competitiveness and sustainable development of agriculture and rural areas. At the same time, the functioning of the factor markets themselves is influenced by changes in agriculture and the rural economy. Such changes can be the result of progress in technology, globalisation and European market integration, changing consumer preferences and shifts in policy. Changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the last decade have particularly affected the rural factor markets. This book analyses the functioning of factor markets for agriculture in the EU-27 and several candidate countries. Written by leading academics and policy analysts from various European countries, these chapters compare the different markets, their institutional framework, their impact on agricultural development and structural change, and their interaction with the CAP. As the first comparative study to cover rural factor markets in Europe, highlighting their diversity − despite the Common Agricultural Policy and an integrated single market − Land, Labour & Capital Markets in European Agriculture provides a timely and valuable source of information at a time of further CAP reform and the continuing transformation of the EU's rural areas.

Enforcement in the EU Single Market. CEPS Paperbacks. October 2012

Enforcement of and compliance with laws and regulations in the single market of the European Union are not only legally necessary, but also of crucial economic importance for business, consumers and the EU economy at large. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the current EU enforcement landscape and its functioning. The classical infringement route via the Court of Justice of the European Union remains critical as a last resort, but it is increasingly seen as very slow and costly. The new emphasis relies heavily on a range of pre-infringement as well as preventive initiatives that prevent new technical barriers from arising. They also tend to be far less costly and more rapid, informal and effective in pursuing a properly functioning internal market. These improvements are welcome news for the single market, yet EU enforcement still has problems to solve, for example in the area of public procurement.

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

Advances in EU Gender Equality: Missing the mark? EPIN [Working] Paper No. 41/September 2014

Gender balance has been a particularly salient issue in the recent process of formulating the list of designated commissioners. Jean-Claude Juncker’s success, as President-elect of the European Commission, in securing the designation of nine women as commissioners should be seen in perspective. Female representation in top EU positions remains low. This paper analyses the EP committees, finding a clear divergence in legislative influence between committees chaired by men and women. Although female political representation has been increasing, this is happening at a very slow pace and the most influential leadership roles in the EP remain dominated by men. This raises questions of the possible need to resort to stronger measures to improve female representation in the EU institutions.

Migration in the Central Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 02/2013

In the last decade irregular immigration has emerged as a “security” challenge (in the language of International Relations military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region particularly in the central, sub-region1. The designation of this issue as a “security challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial and will be discussed further down. This paper focuses on the situation in the central Mediterranean involving mainly four countries namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of which have long standing historic links and bilateral relations and participate in the so called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean. Two of these Central Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are EU member states and Tunisia has a long standing relationship with the EU [Association Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya so far has no formal relations at all with the EU. This paper analyses some of the aspects of migration in the central Mediterranean focusing on the link between the domestic and international politics of the issue in Italy and Malta and contrasting the different approaches taken. For example, although Italy and Malta both resort to self-help and both try to involve the EU in helping them tackle the problem, they do this in a markedly different way: Italy uses the EU as a supplement to its independent and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the EU as the major solution to the problem. Lacking the power and influence to deal with the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as primarily a multilateral issue or one that can only be tackled in concert with stronger powers in the region preferably within an EU context. On the other hand, Italy has been keen in involving the EU but decided to go it alone when this option turned out to be a dead end. In this paper I also try to show the extent (or limitations) to which multilateral initiatives such as the “5+5” and Euro operation really play a decisive role in incentivizing or facilitating inter-state cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity (norms) and the extent to which it is implemented as well as a number of connected issues. The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean Boat People, have been referred to by various names in the literature, all of which may be more or less deficient in actually defining them all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or “irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of international protection, “migrants at sea” and “boat people”. The use of “boat people” dispenses with the need of having to define the various categories of migrants involved and is thus preferred in this paper.

Russian sanctions against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential. OSW COMMENTARY No. 152, 2014-11-06

Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.

2002 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Events, results and consequences; Ukraine's Parliamentary system after the elections. OSW Study 8/2003

2002 elections: On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters. After the election: The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign. In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

The language issue in Ukraine: An attempt at a new perspective. OSW Study 40/2012

Ukraine has been an independent state for only 20 years and the consequence of the long-term incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian/Soviet state is an ethnically mixed society. In Ukraine, alongside Ukrainians, there are very many Russians and members of other nationalities of the former Soviet Union as well as a still large group of people who identify themselves as Soviets (in terms of their nationality). A significant part of Ukrainians use Russian in their everyday life (particularly professional) while knowing Ukrainian to only a small degree or not at all. Due to this Kyiv has to implement a language policy (which does not have to be pursued in e.g. Poland or Hungary) in search of solutions to ensure the stable functioning of a modern state for a multilingual society. The language issue is therefore an important challenge for the Ukrainian state and one of the more significant issues in Ukraine’s internal politics. In this text I eschew a detailed analysis of the question of Crimea as its social dynamics (also in the language area) is clearly distinct from the remaining part of Ukraine for four reasons: the short-term character of the region’s links with Ukraine, its relative geographic isolation (Crimea is almost an island), the formal autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the presence of the Crimean Tatar community which is demanding the recognition of its language rights.

The Western Borderlands: The place of eastern Galicia and Volhynia in the Ukrainian State. OSW Study 43/2013

The regions of Ukraine are strongly diversified. These differences are subject to historical conditions and attempts at unification which have been made over the past seventy years have proven that these differences will be impossible to reduce in the foreseeable future and will continue to bear an impact on Ukraine’s domestic policy. Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Volhynia) is a peripheral region in economic, political and cultural terms. Although it accounts for approximately 14% of Ukraine’s territory and 15% of the country’s population live there, the region generates only around 10% of the country’s GDP. Its metropolis, Lviv, Ukraine’s seventh largest city, was traditionally among the key centres in the nation’s history. However, its role in an independent Ukraine has been marginalised partly due to the fact that a significant part of its elite moved to Kyiv. This is also the most ethnically homogeneous region, where Russian speakers make up rather a small part of the population.