137 resultados para Irish Studies Research
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This paper estimates the immediate impact of the European Central Bank’s asset purchase programmes on sovereign bond spreads in the euro area between 2008 and 2015 using a country-by-country GARCH model. The baseline estimates are rigorously diagnosed for misspecification and subjected to a wide range of sensitivity tests. Among others, changes in the dependent variable, the independent variables and the number of (G)ARCH terms are tested. Moreover, the model is applied to subsamples and dynamic conditional correlations are analyzed to estimate the effects of the asset purchases on the contagion of spread movements. Generally, it is found that the asset purchase programmes triggered an reduction of sovereign bond spreads. More specifically, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) had the most significant immediate effects on sovereign bond spreads across the euro area. The announcements related to the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme also yielded substantial spread compression in the periphery. In contrast to that, the most recent Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) announced in January 2015 and implemented since March 2015 had no significant immediate effects on sovereign bond spreads, except for Irish spreads. Hence, immediate effects seem to be dependent upon the size of the programme, the extent to which it targets distressed sovereigns and the way in which it is communicated.
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Little academic attention has been given to the study of Northern Irish Euroscepticism despite the fact that it is a unique and interesting example of citizens’ relationships with the EU. Northern Irish Euroscepticism is defined by the divergence in attitudes towards European integration between Catholics and Protestants. This is a divide that is rooted in historical and religious interpretations of the project, as well as the widespread belief that membership of the EU will somehow lead to a united Ireland. Membership in the EU has not had a significant political impact on Northern Ireland, with citizens’ attitudes being largely characterised by a clear lack of interest in the project. Participation at the European level provided limited opportunity for cooperation by both sides while it may be argued that European elections contributed to the sectarian divide.
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The EU‘s external action includes a preference for regional interlocutors and a tendency to promote regionalism. This work concentrates on the southeast Asian area and it aims at investigating the nature of EU‘s promotion of ASEAN regional integration. The EU‘s ideas and practices of regionalism as well as the single market experience influence the EU‘s international action. The power deriving from the EU‘s institutionalized market is used by the Union in a normative way to diffuse the EU‘s ideas and principles, advance the EU‘s interests and spread its model of economic integration through political dialogue, development cooperation and preferential trade arrangements. This action seems to result in a certain diffusion of the EU‘s ideas and practices in southeast Asia as well as in a subsequent reappropriation and redefinition of external inputs by ASEAN.
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The Habitats Directive has created a European network of protected areas combining environmental protection with social and economic activities. Although not clearly advocated in the Directive, participatory approaches have incrementally emerged in order to ensure an adequate management of the Natura 2000 network. This paper looks at the reasons why the European Commission on one side and the national/local authorities on the other side chose to engage in participatory approaches and assesses the structure, degree and scope of these approaches in the light of input and output legitimacy. Main findings are that participation was mostly implemented as a reaction to conflicts and out of a concern over policy implementation, two elements that continue to drive the philosophy of the Natura 2000 network‘s management. The limits of participation in Brussels are contrasted with the potential for more genuine and effective participation mechanisms on the field.
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Criticisms are often voiced at the fact that there is no well-informed European public. However, as the process of European integration has advanced, the media have been devoting more resources and space to the coverage of European affairs. At the same time, the national media have gone from being mere transmitters of information to having their own voice on European issues. In this respect, the media have emerged as actors capable of influencing the opinions of citizens, thereby contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere. The present study analyzes whether a Europeanization of the national media has taken place by studying how national newspapers provide information in Europe and whether a European public sphere is emerging. The results reveal that some European topics have experienced a certain Europeanization, but there is still an absence of European debate in the respective national public spheres.
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From the Introduction. May I say how delighted I am at this opportunity of talking to you today about the perspective of a Strasbourg judge on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It goes without saying that the views I here express are not to be attributed to the Court itself; yet they may be taken as reflecting, in a general sense, what I regard to be the Strasbourg approach.
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From the Introduction. That the requirement of a prior authorisation, as a precondition for the exercise of any economic activity, may restrict the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services is a truism. If an authorisation is required in the Member State where establishment is to take place or the service is to be offered (host Member State), then operators who lack such authorisation are in no right to proceed to the projected activity. Therefore, as soon as it is being accepted that the EU internal market rules are not only about discriminatory measures, but also cover mere restrictions, it comes as no surprise that national authorisation systems come to be scrutinized under the Internal Market rules.
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Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are collaborative patterns that temporarily bring together antagonistic stakeholders behind a common cause. This paper deals with such ‘transversal’ co-operations between citizens’ groups (NGOs, consumers associations…) and economic stakeholders (food industries, retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case studies that enable a more nuanced view on the perspectives for the development of transversal networks at the EU level. The main findings are that (i) the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of improved access to institutions; (ii) membership of a collaborative network leads to a learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors independent of the stakeholders themselves.
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Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach.
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From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.
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From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5